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THE SCHOLAR AND THE INARTICULATE PREMISE

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THE SCHOLAR AND THE INARTICULATE PREMISE*

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I

IT OFTEN OCCURS in the more formal of academic meetings that, just as fundamental or basic assumptions become involved in the discussion, the session comes to an end. The argument is dropped just as it is becoming interesting, and where the participants could not avoid denying some of the propositions offered by their colleagues. It seems that one of the common characteristics of academic discussion is the avoidance of the conflicting fundamental premises on which much argument is built. In other words, one might say that a scholar's life with his colleagues is made peaceful in measure because the context of discourse avoids the essentials, and because scholars tend to keep their major premises as inarticulate as possible. It can hardly be argued that such a procedure is of any benefit to scholarship, and it leaves teaching less marked by insight than it might be.

During the time when the recent Political Theory Panel was in operation,¹ the political theorists agreed that one of their tasks is to try to understand fundamentals and to state them so that they may be understood. The nature of a "fundamental" in social thought can be the subject of much elusive argument. But it amounts to an assumption about the cause, the significance, or the final purpose of a set of experiences, physical or mental. Very often, the interpretation of historical movement will force us to state what we believe to be cause in history, but even here we usually evade any serious commitment while we indulge in our implicit philosophies of history. Obviously, assumptions about the nature of man, the issue of a material or spiritual interpretation of the universe, the justification of significant historical events, and the evaluation of patterns of cultural thought are likely to force us down to bed-rock in social or political discussion. One reason for the buried premise, one reason for burying it and making it inarticulate, is the fact that ultimate assumptions touch us so deeply that we cannot talk about them in a dispassionate manner. Perhaps they appear to us very much as individual poetic experiences which we feel incapable of sharing intelligibly with our fellowmen. Perhaps we feel that it is not respectable to have such deep-seated convictions

* This paper is a revision and condensation of an address given at the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association meeting in Walla Walla, Washington, April 23, 1949.

¹ The work of the Research Committee of the American Political Science Association and its several panels has been published by Ernest S. Griffith (editor), *Research in Political Science* (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1948).

and thus resort to a kind of habitual evasiveness in the examination of our ideas. But whatever the explanation, it is clear that such inarticulateness does exist, and that it explains much of the colorlessness of American political science.

Now it has been said that the social scientist, and the political scientist in particular, is philosophically illiterate, and that his efforts to be philosophical are quite inept. Political scientists are not commonly skilled in the historical evolution of metaphysical doctrine, but we do know some philosophy, more, it is certain, than we are given credit for. Perhaps our reluctance to discuss central issues arises because we know the issues too well. Or, it probably is often true that we have been so schooled in the orthodoxy of science that we do not really know what the premises of the other side, or of the man from another cultural division of the human race, might be. By preserving the inarticulate premise we avoid an intellectual wrestling that would tax our energies to the utmost. However, it is possible to be conscious of such premises, to explain them dispassionately and thus to arrive at a much clearer understanding of the nature of our intellectual life.

II

One of the broadest issues we face is the nature of human intelligence. Shall we assume, genetically speaking, that human reason is simply and solely a product of organic evolution, and that it has its vestigial remains like the physical body of man? Shall we assume that cultural anthropology can tell us what we want to know about the reason of man, provided we spike it a little with psychology and physiology? Or shall we assume that reason is a characteristic of order in the universe, and that, whether we are theists or deists, reason is a work of the Creator? H. W. Schneider has suggested the importance of the development in American thought of the secular theory of intelligence. We might trace it from the publication of William James' *Psychology* through the work today of John Dewey.³ We have in such a conflict the ultimate social difference between a secular and a religious approach to intelligence. While we may use only the secular theory in our individual classroom, we can hardly pretend that we are canvassing the forces at work in the intellectual world.

Yet we move head-on into immediate applications. Professor Charles E. Merriam has long been one of the outstanding advocates of the scientific method in the social sciences. He has urged the application of all of the emergent phases of social science to the study of politics. Perhaps here we can say that we have the twentieth-century application of the metaphysical idea of the eighteenth century that man is perfectible, though

³ H. W. Schneider, *A History of American Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), pp. 362 ff., 513 ff.

not perfect through science, the world is a better place. In 1900 the same man might have obtained a patent for a machine of the nature of the anthropological machine in other phases of the heavenly machine. Becker's philosophy is of little relevance for the good.

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⁴ See Charles E. Merriam, rev. ed.,

⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau,

⁶ See the review, pp. 335-336,

not perfect, and, like that century, that the way to attain this end is through science.³ Might we not say that since that time, so remote from the world in which we live today, we have waited for the fruition of this idea? In 1945 Professor Merriam published his *Systematic Politics*, in which the same theme is found, for it is argued that with the knowledge we have obtained from the various social sciences we ought to be able to plan a happy society. Yet it is difficult to find in such discussions a statement of just what we have learned from any social science about the nature of man. This, we can say, is the acid test: just what has anthropology taught us? What, economics, sociology, psychology, or any other phase of social study? If one does not come down to earth, it is still the heavenly city of the eighteenth-century philosophers, to use Professor Becker's phrase, and still it is laid up in heaven, like Plato's city, and has little relevance to the war and chaos of the time in which we struggle now for the good life.

About the same time, Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, also of the University of Chicago, entered the lists as a critic.⁴ His study criticizes the rationalist theories of liberalism, and those who have been attached to the eighteenth century could hardly welcome its publication.⁵ It can be said that eighteenth-century thought is still very like the central premise in the theory of method held by the social sciences. But it is a premise that is, largely inarticulate, since any criticism of this view is pushed so far into the background that the average student hardly knows there is any other set of hypotheses that might be adopted in the study of political behavior and in the formulation of philosophical value.

Just what is the issue that can arouse such deep-seated controversy? Morgenthau holds that the rationalist tradition is false, and that it is not a preception that can explain the observable clusters of behavior in the contemporary political drama, to say nothing of the political pattern over the last several centuries. It might be said, indeed, that the sin of rationalism began with St. Thomas. Rather, we should adopt a pre-rationalist tradition, a tradition represented by the more somber and realistic views of St. Augustine, if we would assemble a body of principles that can be used to explain the past or enable us to meet the challenge of the present. But if we return to a pre-rationalist tradition, we return simply to a true rationalism, one that, pragmatically speaking, is workable in our time and for so long as human nature presents us with its customary mixture of the rational and the irrational.

³ See Charles E. Merriam, *New Aspects of Politics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925; rev. ed., 1931); *Systematic Politics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1945).

⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).

⁵ See the review of this volume in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLI (April, 1947), pp. 335-336, by R. K. Gooch.

One may be reminded here of an idea advanced by Reinhold Niebuhr, one of the most distinguished of modern theologians and a no mean political philosopher. We fail to realize the dream of the rationalist society, he has urged, not because of lack of knowledge, because of a lack of education for the masses, or because science has not been adequate to the dream of its function, but because of sin, intellectual pride, and the inherent selfishness of mortal man. In the life of each of us, and everyday in truth, we re-enact the fall of man. It is not education but regeneration that can help us, but even so, man is destined, by his nature, to be frustrated in history. Perhaps only beyond history can we escape from the law's delay and the oppressor's wrong, the wickedness of rulers and the injustice of the mighty.⁶

Might we now ask whether the dream of a rational society, a society that is, in truth, a prison run by a calculating machine, as Bentham's work suggests, is truly science? It may be doubted, but the discussion shows how deeply tinctured is the contemporary science of society with ideas that ultimately have little relation to science in a proper sense of the term. Perhaps if the social scientists should separate their science from their metaphysics we could claim more readily the respect of those who are scientists.⁷

In this battle, where the inarticulate premise of the eighteenth century is held tenaciously by many who call themselves social scientists, we get the fundamental dividing line between the liberal and the conservative mentalities for the last century and a half. The realism of the conservative is not a defense of evil in the world, but it is a recognition of it as a constant factor. It is a belief that evil arises from the nature of man, not from a lack of more science or more education, however laudable these things may be. Carl Schmitt, of unhallowed memory, once argued that all of the great political philosophers have insisted on the evil in the nature of man. Can we not cite most of the Christian thinkers, as well as Machiavelli and Hobbes for this contention, a contention based on empirical observation, as much as on the presuppositions of theistic philosophy? In any case, last year at the Amsterdam meeting of the Protestant groups, the declaration in criticism of communist philosophy says that any who promise a perfect realization of happiness in this world, deceive those to whom the promise is made.

The liberal mind, the mind devoted to the idea of progress and the goodness of man, has promised just this, and its failure through time has merely put off the millenium to another day. Perfection is just around

⁶ Reinhold Niebuhr, *Beyond Tragedy* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937); *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944).

⁷ The reader should consult Eric Voegelin, "The Origin of Scientism," *Social Research*, Vol. XV (December, 1948), pp. 462-494.

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the corner, but the moment of turning is never reached. Let us try to explain the age in which we live, one of the bloodiest in human history; let us ask ourselves why the humanitarian and scientific aspiration of the new day has not been realized, and perhaps our discussions will be more scientific, while they are at the same time more philosophical.

III

Political theory is the most controversial of all the phases of political science. It is so if one considers the assumptions of argument that are inarticulate, that are buried or ignored in many of our efforts at scholarship. One of the areas in which the submerged premises may be suitably studied is the evaluation of cultural trends. The presuppositions of Anglo-American life are deeply embedded in our thought, for both language and institutional habit lead us to such a condition. We know something of the Germanic attitude toward life, but between the Anglo-American and the Latin mind there is a gulf that is seldom bridged. We assume the creativeness of our social scientists and forget, through ignorance, the contributions of writers in other cultures who use another tongue. Our military and economic preponderance and the shadow of British greatness in the nineteenth century force the student in any other culture into a defensive attitude. A lecturer in Mexico I once heard on an economic subject spent most of his time showing that the ideas of the Anglo-American economists had long before been expressed by Latins, particularly by Spanish economists of the early modern period. It was strange to hear a Mexican Marxist proclaim the glory of the economic thought of leaders of the Counter-Reformation. But it was one way to make young Mexicans proud of their intellectual heritage, a heritage that we know little about, and perhaps in our greatness care less. It is clear that the inarticulate premise makes the life and labor of the professor much easier than they would otherwise be.

Thus the interpretation of Western history in the relation between cultures included in it and the total relation of the Western stream of culture with other world cultures create an issue that we may ignore at our peril. It is an issue that no scholar can ignore, and we can only welcome efforts to interpret the labor of civilized man in his totality. We must establish a universe of discourse between ourselves and the minds of other cultures.

But more narrowly and more immediately our task must be to consider the inarticulate conflicts within Western society itself. And here a perceptive knowledge of the conflicts between theological systems would be of profound significance. The political philosopher must be a theologian of some competence to be either philosophical or political. How can one understand the conflict of soul or the development of the drama in

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Hamlet without a knowledge of Catholic thought? Without some perception of Catholic morals, some insight into the problems of canon law, and even the eternal conflict between the spiritual and the temporal, the play is almost as bad as its presentation would be without the central character of Hamlet himself. Shakespeare does not tell us of the disturbance in the soul of the priest who married the queen to the king's brother so soon after the king's murder, but that would be a drama in itself; and the priest is called churlish by Laertes because, the body of Ophelia, the suicide, is buried in a Christian cemetery, though with simple ceremony. There are a dozen other points that might be mentioned, but enough has been given for illustration.

Let us hurry on to other illustrations of the theme. Consider the conflict between the Protestant and Catholic interpretations of history since the Reformation. Consider Lyman Abbott, the successor to Henry Ward Beecher at Plymouth Congregational Church in Brooklyn, adopting an Hegelian philosophy of history, because one can say that Hegel's view is fully as much a Magnificat to the Reformation as to the laurels of the Prussian state.⁸ Consider the American Protestant liberal who feels a sense of communion with the Latin liberal primarily because the Latin liberal has been anti-clerical or anti-Catholic, though in nearly every other way there is little in common between them. The grim fury of American religious leaders against the mortal memory and the cadaver of Tom Paine was based on a clearer perception of this issue than we have today. Likewise, one can say that the Federalists who opposed the influence of the French Revolution in the United States were clearer in their major premises than Thomas Jefferson, though this again is an issue that would require much exploration for clarity.

The conflict between Anglo-American culture and the Latin mind is peculiarly sharp when we evaluate the whole stream of liberalism that might be called "Latin." By contrast, American and British liberalism has been at home in the natural law tradition of Locke, and actually there is not much conflict between Catholic and Protestant interpretations of history in this area. The Declaration of Independence can be a rallying point between them, because it is so peculiarly a combination of the Christian tradition with a practical or even utilitarian attitude toward political problems. To state the matter in another way: the Catholic can look on the American natural law tradition, its principle of consent and the rule of law as an extension of Christian thought from early times to the present. The Protestant may omit an emphasis on the long continuity of ideas, but the conclusion as to the nature of government is not strikingly different.

⁸ See Lyman Abbott, *The Rights of Man; A Study in Twentieth-Century Problems* (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1901), Lecture I.

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⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

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On the continent the issue has often been a question of the interpretation of the French Revolution and the evaluation of the secularist tradition associated with French liberalism. One might say that the tradition of Latin liberalism is primarily French, and that the central issue is the evaluation of the great revolution. Lyman Abbott was willing to see in the French Revolution and in the rise of German thought the completion of the process begun with the Reformation, but surely he could not accept the anti-theistic implications of French secular thought.⁹

A deeper reason for this situation can perhaps be found. For a man like Lyman Abbott has to decide just how great a price he will pay in philosophical concession to fight the historic Church in Latin Europe. Latin liberalism has been particularly anti-clerical without being anti-Protestant, because Protestantism has never been a strong force in Latin Europe, except the influence of the Calvinists in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France. But Latin liberalism has been sharply logical, and in its war against the Church it has developed an anti-theistic, secular, and empirical attitude toward life in order to deny the primary assumptions of historic Christian philosophy. Thus, a Protestant American liberal who supports Latin liberalism with its atheistic humanism is, in effect, denying the major premises of his own view of life in supporting an ally who, to say the most, could hardly be firm in his loyalty. The major premises in the argument become buried, ignored, or forgotten.

However, the scientific liberal among us is on more certain ground when he hails the liberalism of the French Revolution in a brotherly spirit. He can go to Mexico, as Lincoln Steffens did in order to assist the liberals in 1917 in drawing up the present Mexican Constitution. But logically, if he at the same time urges religious freedom for the United States, he cannot approve of the Mexican system. If that were done, he would approve in the United States the confiscation of all religious property, Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish; he would deny the right of any religious body to establish a school or a hospital; he would permit religious worship to be carried on only under license from the state; and he would make it a crime for as many as three persons devoted to the religious life to live together under the same roof.¹⁰ Surely, our liberals do not go this far, but they have agreed implicitly with the Mexican liberal that religion should be destroyed as a force in the education of citizens.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁰ *The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931), pp. 722 ff., discusses in some detail his advice to Carranza, but he does not discuss the religious articles of the Mexican Constitution. On the other hand, one could hardly assume that such matters were not discussed. The relation of American and Mexican liberals in this period is an obscure chapter that should be investigated, if at all possible.

If we turn from religion as a source of political thought to consider the abstract idea of democracy, what results do we get? David Easton speaks of the mighty scientific triumvirate, Comte, Marx, and Spencer, and implies that they paved the way for the democratic faith of the present.¹¹ But was Marx a democrat? Was Comte, with his authoritarian religion of humanity? More agreement might be reached about Spencer, but is the meaning of democracy the same in Anglo-American culture and in the Latin mind? Does not Easton's suggestion provoke the thought that democracy and any religious life are incompatible? That democracy must, in the nature of the case, be based on a secular theory of life? Here, we are back to the conflict in the theory of intelligence, but that issue is one that can hardly be escaped.

One should mention that in many ways Comte came to symbolize liberalism for the Latin mind. Today in some Latin American universities he occupies a position that is not possible in our system of thought. Positivism, in other words, symbolized the crusade against Latin Christianity. Most of our liberals, on the other hand, would hesitate to admit any discipleship to Comte. They may, perhaps, as social scientists say that Comte is outmoded, because the scientific method has moved on and left him behind. But if the defender of the scientific method should investigate his premises, his inarticulate premises, he might come out somewhere close to the Latin belief in the Comtean philosophy. The price of surface understanding is the maintenance of the inarticulate premise as a major methodological weapon in intellectual life.

IV

Let us discuss a third problem, that of the philosophy of history. This subject is of interest because the major premises are somewhat closer to the surface than in the material already examined. We sense more easily and surely our friends and our enemies when we face frankly and clearly the issues involved in any philosophy of history. For a philosophy of history has to state its primary ideas of causation; otherwise it is no philosophy at all. The trouble is, of course, that most of us have a philosophy of history that is more implicit than explicit. It is only when we are up against writers like St. Augustine, Hegel, Spengler, Toynbee, or others that we are forced to say yes or no, and we are likewise forced to realize that in whatever we say there are practical implications, following as the night the day, throughout our system of values. Thus, simply as an intellectual exercise, a study of the philosophy of history forces us to pull the inarticulate premises out of our intellectual id for examination in the more clear light of thought.

¹¹ David Easton, "Walter Bagehot and Liberal Realism," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLIII (February, 1949), pp. 35-36.

The reason for this optimism for a better than to technology we have one result, and is surely one pervasiveness of the best than to have it is respectable Toynbee, more him or listen soul to the d of time was many, it is less of Hegel. But we have another men is not an of the structure with the principle such as Thom

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¹² See G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. George W. Atkinson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1934-1937).

¹³ See Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution* (New York and Lon

The reason for this is obvious. For the philosophy of progress and optimism for the future is mixed in our marrow. Tomorrow will be better than today, because the kind of thinking we do, the kind of technology we have, and the kind of education we indulge in can have only one result, and that is the continued progress of the human race. Progress is surely one of the important ideas of the eighteenth century, and its pervasiveness gives us assurance. In this we are today in line with some of the best thought of the eighteenth century. Nothing is more jolting than to have someone question progress, especially if the person who does it is respectable under the unwritten code of academic life. Arnold J. Toynbee, more than any man living, occupies this position. We can read him or listen to him without admitting that, like Faust, we have sold our soul to the devil. Hegel never questioned progress, for the culmination of time was embodied in Lutheran Prussia. After two wars with Germany, it is less respectable than it once was in America to be a follower of Hegel. But if we consider Oswald Spengler or Pitirim A. Sorokin we have another picture.¹² For to admit being influenced by these gentlemen is not at all respectable, since they deny most of the presuppositions of the structure of academic life, and in particular they are not imbued with the principle of progress, as are our most respectable philosophers, such as Thomas Jefferson or John Dewey.

Hence, we do not have to consider Hegel, and we may ignore both Spengler and Sorokin. But such is not the case with Toynbee. If we read him, we can admit it in public, though once that admission is made we are logically bound to say either "Credo" or "Non credo." The philosophy of history is a very dangerous subject with which to deal, for thinking about it is liable to land us with presuppositions that are contrary to the inarticulate premises of modern liberalism. Toynbee, for all his respectability, has no respect for the liberal assumptions on which, some say, the modern social science subjects are founded. His great sin is to brush aside, as unhistorical, the liberal and linear view of progress. In fact, he, like Bagehot, would consider progress the exception and not the rule in history.¹³ One may inquire, too, whether Toynbee is so sure about the future progress of Western society. In any case, the hope of the West does not lie even remotely near the sacred grove of the social sciences. If we turn to Christianity we may have a chance, but not if we turn to Professor Merriam's *Systematic Politics*.

¹² See G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, trans. by J. Sibree (London and New York: George Bell and Sons, 1894); Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, trans. by C. F. Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, one vol. ed., 1932); Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (4 vols., New York and Cincinnati: American Book Company, 1937-1941); Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (6 vols., New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1934-1939). See also the one volume abridgement of Toynbee by D. C. Somervell (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1947).

¹³ See Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics* (New York: Appleton, 1873); Easton, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

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While Spengler propounds a grand drama of history, a poetry of cultural time, a monistic conception of the rise and fall of human societies, Toynbee, in contrast, deals with a multitude of forces that in their coincidence in time may explain the rise or the disintegration of societies. The liberal mentality, committed as it is to the modern conception of progress through science and education, must, of course, reject Spengler. But in Toynbee the problem is different, for the multiple system of causation can be reconciled in degree with liberal thought. Toynbee is, however, more at home with conservative theories of social causation, and the theory of the creative minority in Toynbee is certainly at home in aristocratic thought from the Greeks to the present. There is great value in reading Toynbee, however, because one becomes conscious, in a respectable fashion, of the premises upon which so much of our conventional social science is based.

Let us, for example, consider Marxism. Most agree that Marxism has a power to make converts that many other social systems do not have, save perhaps those that stem from theistic philosophy. At least, one can say that many persons who might have been followers of Herbert Spencer in 1875 are in this present year followers in whole or in part of the Marxian creed. It is not a question here of the tactical and programmatic differences between capitalism, communism, and socialism, or other economic and political "isms" of our time. It is an issue of basic premises. For Marx takes the Hegelian system of historical logic, and inverts it from a spiritual to a materialistic basis. He then adopts the techniques of revolution suggested by the left-wing Jacobins of the French Revolution, assuming the inevitable future victory of the proletariat as a new ruling class. Then, with the economic analysis of the British political economists behind him, he adds the millennial conception of the progressives of the eighteenth century. But let us hasten to say that without the millennial view, the utopian and cataclysmic conception of the future, Marxism would be little more than a tedious description of the evils of the life of man. It is the preaching of the inevitability of progress and the future reign of Old Testament justice that makes a burning appeal to the humanitarian and liberal mind. The future will be better and utopia will come. In other words, Marx has much the same appeal to the liberal, reformistic and progressive mind that was offered by other nineteenth-century liberal creeds. Thus, for much the same reason, emotionally at least, one may today be a follower of Marx who yesterday might have been a follower of Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, or Auguste Comte. While the modern mind may be impressed with Marxism as a scientific view of society, and thus base predictions on the

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laws of the social world rather than on a hope of what it will be, the liberal mind must be impressed with the humanitarian principle, the aspiration toward the future, the dream of a perfect society, and the end of the frustration of man in history.

Now Marxism is one of the great philosophies of history, and it is natural in some degree that it should become the philosophy of history espoused by the liberal mind. It has been observed that liberal thinkers grow distinctly more conservative in an effort to combat Marxism, and the reason is simple, since the liberal mythology of progress inevitably has to be criticized. Like Reinhold Niebuhr, we find ourselves saying that men will always be frustrated in history, and anyone who denies this stern necessity of human time is a deceiver. For Toynbee there is no millennial eschatology. There is, in his view, a class struggle, but it is a struggle between the dominant minority, the internal and the external proletariats. However, this struggle does not eventuate in an eruptive attainment of a new golden age, or in the seizure of a new golden bough. It may mean the death of an old society and the ultimate birth of a new one, but not in Marxian terms, not as the realization of a perfect economic, social, or political justice. Nor would Toynbee admit that the proletariat could be a ruling class, though he might concede that an elitist party, like the Communist, could for a time be a creative minority, holding the loyalty of the masses. Its end, however, is like the others, for it is destined to become, it seems, simply a dominant minority. Any position more moderate than the Marxian must deny the apocalyptic vision of a new society; it must assume a gradual or possible progress of mankind rather than a vast and inevitable progress.

V

Let us hasten to a conclusion. We have selected some areas of modern political thought where there is probably some value in getting the inarticulate premise into a clearer light of day. To bring such premises into the light is one of the primary tasks of the student of political theory. But in this task we are all political philosophers, and we are all students of the other branches of our great discipline, the study of politics as an integral social science. We have spoken of some of the great issues of our time. Beyond the conflict in fundamentals we have sketched, most of the momentary issues of politics are limited indeed, for they involve in many instances technical arrangements and the compromises of fluid interests. Unconsciously we evaluate the short run as a subordinate part of larger issues. We can be better political scientists by knowing the premises, inarticulate as they often are, upon which our arguments may rest. And, strikingly enough, the inarticulate premises are often the oldest, the most deeply-rooted, and the most pervasive in our Western thought.