

# THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

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## Reviews

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## REVIEWS

## DEWEY, HOOK AND SANTAYANA\*

1. What is interesting about Dewey at this late hour is his liveliness and firmness and militance. He fights for "pragmatism, experimentalism, instrumentalism," and against all those strawman enemies he has ever had. He likes to fight, and for nearly sixty years, ever since his early divorce from Hegel, he has been at it. One might say that for three score years Dewey has fought that ghost of Hegel and the absolutism of Hegel or of any one else, and the reader is left wondering at times whether it is Dewey or Hegel who has won. He made the best compact statement of his position in the title essay of the *Influence of Darwin upon Philosophy* when Dewey and the *Origin of Species* were fifty years old. He said that philosophy had once and for a long time claimed as its realm that of pure knowing, the land of essences and ends and fixities, but that men like Kepler, Galileo, Descartes and Newton cut that old alleged ground from under it. Henceforth philosophy had to foreswear inquiry into the fixed and final and absolute. It hated to yield an inch, but it had to give up whole worlds to astronomy, then to physics and lastly to biology. These sciences are above all a method of hypotheses of tested knowing, and of results. Philosophy has to learn the same method.

Dewey kept saying these things over and over for more than a generation. He said them with a certain charm in *Democracy and Education* in 1916 and he has rated this his best book. He said them with ease in 1919 in lectures he gave in Japan under the title of *Reconstruction in Philosophy* where in one readable chapter after another, for example on logic, on morals and so on, he found fault with what he took to be the method and results of the older philosophy. In 1922 he said them in a book on conduct that was not especially well ordered, and followed with a work on experience and nature that was lumpy and difficult. In 1929 he made in the Gifford Lectures the same kind of attack and in substance the same attack, and on the matter of criteria he affirmed that science would furnish standards and he cited in particular the science of engineering, just then to the fore. The next year he gave another compact summary, "What I Believe," in the *Forum*, where he put into the formula, "To be is to be in process, in change," the evolutionary thought that had since 1885 or so dominated him more than had James or Bergson and perhaps as much as had Bacon. Five years later his Yale lectures on faith appeared, lectures that in this reviewer's opinion were then greatly over-rated by H. N. Wieman and many others that now have dropped to their proper level. For his eightieth birthday in 1939 studies on him appeared in the Living Philosophers series, and in a very difficult reply he said that under

\*1. John Dewey: *Problems of Men*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946. Pp. 424. \$5.00).

2. Sidney Hook: *Education for Modern Man*. (New York: Dial press, 1946. Pp. 237. \$2.75).

3. George Santayana: *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels*. (New York: Scribners, 1946. Pp. 266. \$2.75).

the inspiration of Meade he had long been an interactionist, and one may suppose that is one reason why he has often been so hard to read.

His new book of course shows nothing novel. The essays are somewhat disconnected, as all but the introduction are reprints and all but one of these covering the last eleven years. Dewey naturally is a little tired, but in the introduction, as in an article in *Fortune* for August, 1944, he still is able to make the sparks fly. He is unhappy about the state of philosophy in America as expressed in *Philosophy in American Education* by Arthur Murphy and others, and Dewey's reaction appears to be that philosophers have not the right to differ "philosophically on just the issues" with which they are called on to deal. The Murphy Committee ought not to have had "internal divisions" reflecting our general confusions and conflicts. So Mr. Dewey holds. He then goes on to find fault with Positivism because it will not assume the search for wisdom, and with Scholasticism because, says Dewey, it "denies the existence of any natural and human means of determining judgments as to what is good and evil." This leaves the road open for Pragmatism. Still, even in his vigorous fighting for a pragmatism that is not, like other isms, "pre-scientific, pre-technological, pre-democratic," a pragmatism that would delete such old dualisms as subjective and objective, mind and reality, and so on, it is a bit as if Dewey himself were frightened and were fighting more to save Pragmatism than to find truth and good.

2. Most colleges present now as "liberal education" a confusion of "decayed classical curriculums," some mixed social science offerings and "narrowing vocational programs—the whole unplanned and unchecked by leading ideas." The whole is intelligible only as an historical accretion and the result of such pressures as inert traditions and vested departmental interests.

So says Sidney Hook in a Deweyism that at many points is fresher and more relevant than is Dewey and yet lacks the starch even of the 1946 Dewey. Hook is full of the incomplete and uncritical Deweyan assertion that we must justify ends by consequences, just as if consequences, whether good or bad, were not themselves ends. Like Dewey, Hook allocates opponents' philosophy to "a metaphysics or religion," whereas his remains philosophy and is therefore true. Full of good passages, Hook is nevertheless manifestly on the defensive—the first time perhaps that the progressivists in education have been so clearly on the defensive—and at the bottom what he provides us with are the following premises for a nonsense logic. 1. Man has no nature. 2. It is all the same whether we say man's is a thinking nature or a singing nature. 3. It is all the same what we say the nature of man is. 4. The soul as understood by Christian theologians is supernatural and is not subject to change. 5. There is no difference between substance and accident.

3. Among the most interesting of Santayana's many studies is the article called "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics" (*Journal of Philos.*, 1925) where he showed that Dewey has always been involved in the immediate, the task here and now to be done. Dewey is new and striving and up to the minute, an activist in philosophy: situations, doings and sufferings and events are everything to him. Santayana is a contemplative soul, in no hurry, more interested in the abiding than in what he calls Dewey's "short-winded" prag-

matism, and in an essay of thirty years ago he says he would choose for his part to go as a pilgrim and weep at the foot of the Cross in Jerusalem. He is a monk who has missed his vocation, a grandee whom nature has misplaced, and for over eighty years he has been trying, in a busy and to him largely senseless world, to maintain his poise. Dewey wants a lot of things done, and for him truth lies in action and consequences, one would almost think in any kind of consequences. Santayana did once say in one of his unforgettable sentences that ethics is the science of all good and of how it can be accomplished. But for him truth consists in beauty, and if Dewey called one of his works *The Quest for Certainty*, in order to scold those who make the quest, and if a better title would have been "the quest for good," Santayana's works could be summed up not as a quest at all, but in the title of his own first full-length work, *The Sense of Beauty* (1896).

In America, Santayana was surely a fish out of water. But in any country he would have been a lone man, and he was a man almost without a country and even without parents. He could always stand fairly well on his own feet. Perhaps he was "conceited," to use a word he once used of himself, though in the first volume of *Persons and Places* (1944) he said he never was "disdainful" of persons, but only of things.

This lone contemplative man getting acquainted with the Christ of the Gospels is hardly seeking the truth or good or the ideal or real and historical, social dynamism to be found in the Gospels. He is as always seeking beauty. And of course he finds it, and it will give churchmen and philosophers delight and occasionally some direction to read this beautiful prose-poem. But he remains at many points arbitrary as well as aloof. Take one example of the arbitrariness, expressed in lovely language. He says that the psyche for Aristotle is the "biological animation proper to specific bodies," and that it is "the natural magic" keeping each individual within his species and determining his normal organs, habits and passions. One wonders how great the value of this book, and how far Santayana really goes by way of what he calls "a more circumspect psychology" toward "untravelling the mystery of God in man."—LEO R. WARD, C.S.C.

#### ON LOVE\*

Taking as his symbols the lion and the unicorn "fighting for the crown," Father D'Arcy, the Jesuit philosopher who is Master of Campion Hall, Oxford, has written an account of the two loves who created two cities, "love of self to the contempt of God, and love of God to the contempt of self." He takes it as axiomatic that in all life, as in all literature, there are these two "what is your two-O? Two, two, for the lilywhite boys, clothed all in green-O": yah and yin, or male and female; heat and cold, life and death, positive and negative, energy and inertia, major and minor chords, classic and romantic, nature and grace, lover and beloved. But, as the French proverb has it, "jamais deux sans trois"—never two without three, and, since the

\* M. C. D'Arcy: *The Mind and Heart of Love*. (New York: Henry Holt. Pp. 333. \$3.50.)

Incarnation, that third way of love is God's manner of loving man, together with man's graced response to that love, this love like the Third Person of the Trinity, Who is its highest and ultimate expression, has been called *Philia*, and *Caritas*; it lives by light of nothing but of love, and is the love which St. Bernard said 'contains God Himself.'

Father D'Arcy's tremendous study of the various aspects of Eros and Agape, and of the several problems they arouse, is based on a number of books, books which he calls not only landmarks in the history of the development of his own ideas, but midwives to them. Amongst those which he discusses most fully, are Pierre Rousselot's *Problème de l'Amour au Moyen Age*, Nygren's *Eros and Agape*, Hunter Guthrie's *Introduction au Problème de l'histoire de la Philosophie*, Denis de Rougemont's *L'Amour et l'Occident*, C. S. Lewis' *Allegory of Love*, Max Scheeler's *Nature et Formes de la Symptomatie*, and Dr. Burnaby's Hulsean lectures, published under the title of *Amor Dei*. And most important of all, are his deductions based on Aristotle's chapters on the "coming to be and the passing away of organic life."

Father D'Arcy starts with the paradox observed by De Rougemont that in the intrinsically Christian middle ages arose the strange theory of courtly love: love that was supposed to be as far as could be from the flesh, yet permitted some of the least savoury expressions of carnal desire. Still more strange is the fact that the nineteenth century Victorians also took to their heart the Tristram story—in Wagner's music, in Sir Thomas Malory's prose and in Tennyson and Swinburne's verse. Inevitable adultery, followed by a no less inevitable death: a will to lust followed by a will to death; *animus*, the desire to take, met by *anima*, the longing to give. Father D'Arcy agrees with de Rougemont in laying the blame on Gnosticism, and beyond it, on the Manichaeism of which Gnosticism was a Christian manifestation. All the Far Eastern religions postulate an antagonism between flesh and spirit; for the Persians the war between them is the condition of existence; the Hebrew version "gives a twist to the theology of the Old Testament" and when in contact with Greek thought the antagonism is oppressed in Orphism. Not only is a purely naturalistic cult anti-Christian, Father D'Arcy reminds us: "a too spiritual ideal which despises the body and this earth is also anti-Christian." God so loved the world that He took our Flesh; to make a ladder out of this world and to long to kick away the ladder is a rejection of the Divine Humanity, "ex . . . humana carne subsistens." This is a tremendously necessary warning today, when Christianity is fighting the same battle as St. John fought when he wrote the prologue to the Fourth Gospel to silence the Gnostics. All pantheisms, all ideas of "emanation and evolution, and processes and beginnings and doctrines of the One and the All . . . of supermen and reincarnations, beliefs in a 'Godhead, Ground, Brahman, Clear Light of the Void, which is the unmanifested principle of all manifestations'" as Aldous Huxley tells us "are only Gnostic efforts to do better than Christianity and escape from the reality of a living, creative, personal and loving God."

Always, there must be two to love. Father D'Arcy disapproves of Nygren's uprooting of egocentric love, his extinguishing of human love, as much as of Huxley's over-spiritualizing of it. Nygren declares that man's return of love to God cannot be love; it must rather be called faith. For there is

no possible response, since God's "uncaused love" so overpowers man that he can do nothing else than love God. "This brings us straight back to pantheism for if Agape be an act which proceeds from man, and at the same time has nothing human or free in it, how can that act, which is expressly declared to be divine, be anything less? And if man is literally divine, we are back at monism."

Father D'Arcy is at his most illuminating in tracing Freud's death-wish back to the normal life of animals. Aristotle had already called attention to the fact that there is in every finite being a principle of non-being or death as well as a principle of life or form. In the animal world the rhythm of give and take, the twin movement of desire is universal; and it may well be that what seems to be a will to death in man is simply the animal in him desiring the only form of survival that animal knows—the good of the species attained by the annihilation of the individual. St. Thomas teaches that animals desire perpetuity in generation, but as "they do not possess a personal life of their own, the desire is for the continuity of the race." Since man is half an animal, this may, indeed, be an explanation truer, because more realistic, than that postulated by modern psycho-analysis.

How wonderful is Father D'Arcy's use of English! He can be sourly witty, as when he describes how true affection begins to diminish, when man loses himself in abstractions "and one of the two loves, like a swollen gland, begins to discharge too much." Or "the fire was chilled into air, and the air became wind of Zarathustra and caused an inflation of consciousness that can apparently be checked only by the most terrible catastrophes to civilization." But then, when he is talking of love, his language soars to meet his august subject. His choice of quotation, too, is unrivalled. And these is nowhere a word too much; this is a completely integrated argument by a very civilized person.

His conclusion is that the "primary act of the creature is not to possess God but to belong to Him"; only in the perspective of His love can the two loves, between whom our self ricochets, find peace. We would grab, and we would give, but when we shall have attained to the perfect vision of God, then the soul, rendering to Him that which is His due will begin to live with Him for Him alone; and He, Who loves the soul and the intellect, will give both increase.

Like rich, well-ploughed earth, this book is an affirmation of the sanity, as well as of the sanctity, of both Eros and Agape, *animus* and *anima*, and is most nourishing alike to the mind and to the heart of man.—ANNE FREMANTLE.

#### POWER POLITICS\*

For the general understanding of this thought-provoking book, a vantage-point is furnished by a passage in which the writer contrasts the difficulties encountered by social wisdom with those encountered by technological research. "The reconsideration of the problem of social action must start with

\* Hans J. Morgenthau: *Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946. Pp. 245. \$3.00)

the recognition of the fundamental distinction which exists between social problems and those with which the natural sciences deal. The latter are either solvable at a particular moment of history or they are not. When they are solved, they are solved once and for all. Thus, the problem of the air-cooled engine was unsolvable under certain technological conditions and became solvable under others. When it was solved, it was solved unequivocally and definitely; and mankind could, as it were, forget about it, cherishing the solution as one of its imperishable possessions.

"Social problems, such as marriage, education, equality, freedom, authority, peace, are of a different type. They do not grow out of temporary limitations of knowledge or temporary insufficiencies of technical achievement—both of which can be overcome by the progressive development of theory and practice. They are the result of those conflicts in which the selfishness and the lust for power, which are common to all men, involve all men. One might say that the attempt at solving those problems is the attempt to resolve those conflicts on a more or less limited scale. Yet social problems are never solved definitely. They must be solved every day anew. As eternal vigilance is the price of freedom, so is the provisional solution of all social problems paid for with never ending effort. No scientific formula has been invented which could relieve us from this never finished task." (p. 215-216).

Using terms not uncommon among contemporary philosophers, we may say that a technological question has the character of a *problem* rather than that of a *mystery*; whereas a question pertaining to ethical and social life is a *mystery* rather than a *problem*. The solution of a *problem* is final: it is *the* answer to a certain question, and marks the end of all the trouble connected with this question. When Descartes pointed out that a child who has formed a multiplication according to the rules has done just as much as any mathematical genius could do with regard to this particular multiplication, he disclosed one of the deepest aspects of his philosophical reformation, namely, the ambition to state all questions in the form of *problems* which could be finally solved through the operation of a method. But, if a question happens to be a *mystery* rather than a *problem*, the answer to it, no matter how true and certain, is never so final as not to call for further research. The trouble is never over; in a way it increases as better knowledge presents to the mind new and deeper aspects of the *mystery*.

Familiarity with a world of *problems* often makes for an optimistic and superficial conception of life. The scientific man described by Morgenthau is a character born of the rationalistic belief that human issues are but *problems* and that human reason can solve them with finality. Social science, conceived after the pattern of the sciences of nature, is supposed to provide all the information we need in order to reduce steadily, unlimitedly and rapidly, the amount of trouble with which we have to cope in human relations. Properly spread, this information would suffice to bring about adjusted behavior, peace, happiness. The dark forces of the appetite, the obscure domains of contingency and freedom, are systematically ignored. Necessary progress originates in the scientific function of the mind and materializes in human communities through the sheer communication of scientific results.

To the conception of life and history worked out by the scientific man,

Professor Morgenthau opposes what to him seems to be the fundamental reality of social and political life, namely, the lust for power. The fact that political organisms seek power, regardless of the dictates of reason and of the recommendations of self-interest, explodes the illusions of the scientific man. We are entering here into a domain where irrationality prevails, where rational expectations are given the lie by an unending multitude of unruly occurrences. From this operation of irrational forces at the core of political life, Professor Morgenthau draws a pessimistic outlook: in human affairs, every achievement is precarious and whatever amount of good can be accomplished has to be accomplished through a struggle which will never be over.

The pessimism of the writer is free from despair and makes no concessions to the nihilistic tendencies so common among the intellectuals of our time. This confident and courageous pessimism would be entirely congenial if it were a purely ethical and historical theory. But the ethical pessimism of Professor Morgenthau seems to be associated with a certain kind of metaphysical pessimism. His realization of "the tragic meaning of the irrationality of life" expresses itself in a language that attributes positive reality to evil (pp. 204 ff). The notion that evil is but "a negative quality, the absence of something whose presence would be good" (p. 204) is classed by him among the illusions of rationalism. We find an unmistakable touch of Manichaeism in the statement that "to the degree in which the *essence* (italics mine) and aim of politics is power over man, politics is evil" (p. 195).

Whether the ethical pessimism, whose foundations are so strikingly described in this book, entails the metaphysical view that such a fully normal and natural thing as political activity includes evil in its very essence remains to be examined. To clear up the metaphysical issue involved in Professor Morgenthau's conclusions, it would be necessary to subject the notion of *power politics* to further and more detailed analysis. The search for power is not evil in all respects. It has vicious aspects, actually associated with politics—and a few other forms of human activity—in all societies and in all times. Yet it cannot be taken for granted that the only possible way to account for the steadiness of this association is to attribute the character of evil to the essence of politics, or to a part of its essence.—YVES R. SIMON.

### AN AMERICAN IDEA OF PROGRESS\*

There are as many versions of the "American Tradition" as there are schools of thought in the United States. There is common agreement among most American people on the acceptance of such notions as American democracy, freedom of religion, and freedom of enterprise as parts of that tradition but only so long as these factors are not defined in terms of any particular philosophy. When, however, these factors are identified with the concepts of the school of the economic interpretation of history, with its instrumental notion of truth, a distinction must be made between these concepts of American institutions and those institutions as they were created and used in the past.

\* Louis M. Hacker and Helene S. Zahler, ed: *The Shaping of the American Tradition*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947. Pp. xxiv, 1247. \$6.00.)

To men who believed in an objective theology religious freedom meant something quite positive which it does not mean to the followers of William James and John Dewey. There is, also, an initial difficulty in the proposition that history be interpreted in terms of present day values because, for the historian, such values can be properly understood only from the perspective of subsequent generations. There is, further, a manifest probability that such pragmatic judgments—if we learn anything from history—may seem wholly wrong when they can be viewed with an historical perspective. There are other elements in this huge tome with which students of American tradition can easily disagree aside from the usual suggestion that the telling of history and the editing of documents cannot be combined in the same action.

Since economics has been called the dismal science one can, perhaps, allow that an economic interpretation of American history recognize no smile or spiritual enlightenment. Indeed, in this study the first sign of a smile comes, after many hundred pages, in the sarcastic passages from Charles Dickens. There is, perhaps, an excuse for this. The over-logical Puritans, whom the editor casts aside with such vigor, were not humorous by temperament, and their theology had far more to do with the formation of our American tradition than their economics. But, Dr. Hacker seems to miss the logical development of present day pragmatism from early Puritanism as suggested by Perry Miller. One wonders how much the editor knows of the "society of Aquinas" which he says was already finished when the American tradition was being formed. He ignores the importance of those medieval notions of right and personality which have never been entirely absent in American life.

This economic interpretation of early America might have been lightened by some excerpts from Samuel Sewall's diary, from the witchcraft stories of the Mothers, or from the meditations of Jonathan Edwards—to mention only a few examples. As a matter of fact Jonathan Edwards' religious spirit is actually caricatured in the introduction to the passages from his writings.

In studying the post-revolutionary period the traditional concept of the opposing leaders, Jefferson and Hamilton, is tritely given with, perhaps, a fairer estimate of Hamilton than usual with economic interpretationists. Less is said here about the "enlightenment" than Becker and Curti have claimed, probably because supporting documents are not at hand. Again, in the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828, the electoral vote does not give the proper estimate of the closeness of the popular vote and Jackson's election needs closer scrutiny. Emerson is over-praised and the Anglo-Saxon-Nordic tradition, while not formally approved, receives at least a nod in the interpretation of the nativistic outbreaks. Calloun's *Disunion* is harmed by an introduction that fails to distinguish the more permanent elements of his political philosophy.

American history is undergoing constant revision under the scrutiny of a full army of younger students. The events after 1850 are acquiring new meanings, not by pragmatic interpretations, but by closer scrutiny of the facts. With the closing of the frontier period and the advance of the United States into world affairs the economic factors have become very important but the failure of pure economic theory to solve the modern crisis should cause at least a doubt in the minds of those who follow the party line of economic interpretation.

The definitions drawn up in the introduction guided the choice of documents and the estimate of the present is made the key to the past. Perhaps a clearer realization that there is failure in the present might cause a doubt about this economic interpretation of the American Tradition. Certainly, the development of the United States was not nearly so strictly logical or so single-minded as Dr. Hacker would make us believe, and there are more than economic forces active in the present world. And just as the "third revolution" may not seem so "revolutionary" to the next generation, so the concept of American history based upon such a dogma may seem rather strange and even dull to a quick-witted historian fifty years from now.

—THOMAS T. McAVOY, C.S.C.

### THE GERMAN PROBLEM\*

1. Allen Welsh Dulles, the wartime head of the OSS in Switzerland, has brought together in *Germany's Underground* the first comprehensive report in English on the anti-Nazi movement within Germany. No one is better qualified, since Dulles' OSS office maintained contact with various groups of plotters within Germany and was sufficiently well-informed to provide Washington in April, 1944 with details of the *Waldküte* program in which Carl Goerdeler, the heroic mayor of Leipzig, and General Beck were prominent. This revolt, which began spectacularly on July 20, 1944 with an attempt on Hitler's life, was more than a "coup of disgruntled generals" as the Nazis announced to the world as soon as order had been restored. The explosion at Hitler's secret headquarters culminated the unrest among the military, intellectuals, civil servants, and religious which had been gathering force since 1933. On the eve of the Munich crisis, when General Beck was still chief of staff, there had been a plot among officers and civilians to overthrow the Nazi regime if the western powers went to war over the Sudeten issue. When France and England yielded to Hitler's demands the plot collapsed. This was most unfortunate for, as Dulles believes, 1938 was the most opportune time for a revolt. Henceforth the military distrusted the civilian conspirators who had badly miscalculated Anglo-French foreign policy. This estrangement compromised all subsequent resistance; the generals' failure of nerve doomed the valiant effort that was made in 1944.

- \*1. Allen Welsh Dulles: *Germany's Underground*. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947. Pp. xiii, 207. \$3.00.)
2. Fabian von Schlabrendorff (Gero v. S. Gaevernitz, ed.): *They Almost Killed Hitler*. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947. Pp. x, 150. \$2.50.)
3. David Rousset: *The Other Kingdom*. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1947. Pp. 173. \$2.75.)
4. Rudolf Pechel: *Deutscher Widerstand*. (Erlenbach-Zürich: Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1947. Pp. 343.)
5. Victor H. Bernstein: *Final Judgment; The Story of Nuremberg*. (New York: Boni & Gaer, 1947. Pp. xii, 289. \$3.50.)
6. H. R. Trevor-Roper: *The Last Days of Hitler*. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947. Pp. xiv, 254. \$3.00.)

There is more than an account of the German underground in Dulles' book. He speculates on the cause of the Nazi movement and analyzes the relation of the intellectuals, the universities, and the churches to it. He offers his opinion that area bombing prolonged the war by making the German people more dependent upon the state for their basic needs. Nowhere does the author indicate that the German underground movement deserved the support of the allied powers. But from his laconic summary of the policy in Washington, and from his discussion of the unconditional surrender formula, it is not hard to guess that he would have approved sending the same material aid that was sustaining resistance elsewhere in Europe.

Measured by the German accounts of the resistance to Hitler the praise bestowed on the Kreisau Circle by Dulles seems excessive. There was an anti-Nazi intellectual center nourished at Kreisau, the estate of Count Helmuth von Moltke, a descendant of the famous chief of staff. His Christian and humanitarian views attracted a secret following among Catholics and Protestants liberals and socialists, whose chief indulgence was in planning the new society which would fill the spiritual and political vacuum left by the collapse of the Third Reich at the end of its unsuccessful war. To attribute the spiritual and political ideology of the German resistance to this group does it too much honor. Of course both Goerdeler and Moltke tried to link their movements to the opposition latent among Catholic and Protestant clergymen. But only a few members of the Kreisau circle participated in the attempted assassination of Hitler, though few survived the Gestapo terror unleashed by it.

Whether a regime as firmly established as the Third Reich could have been toppled by what remained essentially a loosely organized plot, which was continually being jeopardized by vacillating and timid generals, must forever remain unanswered. Despite the author's valid political insights he mistakes a conspiracy for a well-planned revolt. That the German resistance movement attracted idealistic and courageous men, and that it even achieved nobility through the participation of men like Ulrich von Hassell, is undeniable. Yet even this career diplomat, who experienced deep shame over the collapse of civic virtue in his country, was essentially a political romantic. Realities of the mass age, which were an open book to Hitler, remained unknown to many courageous men like Hassell and Goerdeler.

2. Fabian von Schlabrendorff relates his experiences in the German resistance in *They Almost Killed Hitler*. Authenticity of the details, which supplement those found in Dulles' book, is vouchsafed by the editorship of Gero v. S. Gaevernitz, Dulles' assistant in the OSS office in Switzerland. Gaevernitz, an American citizen, played a leading role in the negotiations which led to the surrender of the German armies in Italy. While screening German political prisoners he encountered Schlabrendorff whose story is told here.

That Schlabrendorff escaped being sentenced by Roland Freisler, the fanatical judge of the "Peoples' Court" which visited Nazi vengeance on the unsuccessful plotters of July 20, 1944, and that Schlabrendorff survived the Gestapo's rough handling was extraordinary good fortune. Less luck attended the daring attempt which he and Henning von Tresckow made to blow up Hitler's plane in flight by a time bomb. This failure in March, 1943 did not deter subsequent attempts at assassination since the plotters felt that only

Hitler's death would rally the irresolute generals to an anti-Nazi cause. Both Dulles and Schlabendorff emphasize the difficulty of convincing German officers bound by oaths of obedience to the *Führer* that their real course of duty lay in opposition to him. Only Hitler's death could remove that psychological barrier which largely accounts for the vacillating attitude of the military figures. They were paralyzed when Hitler survived the bomb planted on July 20 by Graf von Stauffenberg and a revolt which might still have been attempted collapsed for want of military support. This was only one aspect of the German officers' peculiar sense of honor; Schlabendorff points out that the bribes, such as those given Field Marshal Kluge by Hitler, corrupted the corps while helping to assure its political loyalty. If Schlabendorff seems optimistic about the possibility of overthrowing the Nazis, it is an optimism born of civic courage and high moral conviction, which, unfortunately, so few of his countrymen seem to have shared.

3. By skilfully combining the techniques of the novelist and the reporter, and with an obvious inspiration from Céline and Kafka, David Rousset in *The Other Kingdom* has made real the world of the Nazi concentration camps. From his own experience in Buchenwald and other places Rousset has given us a dark portrait of the most dismal thing in modern history: the great institutions for the dehumanization of humanity. Even these kingdoms of Satan required a government and the author has taken pains to clarify the hierarchy of camp officialdom and to set forth the rhythm and impulse of its life. The satanic kingdoms had a history also. In the beginning they were filled with German criminals, whose priority in time and whose race gave them a privileged status in the eyes of the SS. The "green men," for the criminals were a green identifying patch, were forever at war with the "red men," the political offenders. To a large extent the underlings of the SS were chosen from the criminal element, and their code of fraud, violence, and greed ruled all the prisoners' lives. Large drafts of political prisoners had begun by 1944 to alter the balance in the camps, but the "green men" still enforced their original charter of values. Even the labor of the prisoners, for eventually the concentration camps became large elements in the German war economy, was secondary to their stupefaction.

It is worth emphasizing that there was a large degree of communication between the camps and the German populace. This occurred in the delivery of supplies, the movement of prisoners, in fulfilling labor assignments, and in grafting with the SS, particularly the exchange of camp medicines and drugs for liquor. When the great technical installations were made, in the underground V-2 factory at Buchenwald for example, representatives of German industry and many technicians came to know the conditions of the camps at first hand. Civilian Germany cannot plead ignorance of the "SS state."

Rousset seems overgenerous in his praise of the communist inmates, who are usually portrayed in that familiar literary stereotype of the wise, tolerant, patient, and philosophical party member. When Rousset chooses to address his fellow prisoners it is on the development of the Soviet Union. With liberation near he is admitted to the plans of the communists for the seizure of the SS guards and for the common defence against the "green men." And in conclusion we learn that the concentration camps were basically the result of

the breakdown of society in that mechanism of crisis and decay that is inherent in capitalism and imperialism. From Rousset's pen we are not likely to have an equally inspired account of "the other kingdoms" which still flourish behind the iron curtain.

4. The most detailed and best informed account of the German resistance is found in Rudolf Pechel's *Deutscher Widerstand*, a recent Swiss publication. The author is more objective than Hans Berndt Gisevius, whose book attracted wide attention in the American press, and is much less inclined to romanticize than Schlabendorff. As editor of the *Deutsche Rundschau* Pechel was at a focal point of the anti-Nazi movement since his magazine functioned as a kind of central for bringing opposition groups together. In its editorial policy the magazine attacked the Nazis obliquely by featuring articles on morals and values, thereby allowing the reader to draw his own conclusion about German conditions after 1933.

For his outspoken editorial of January, 1942, prophesying German defeat because of American intervention, Pechel was arrested by the Gestapo and on April 8, 1942 began almost three years of virtually uninterrupted confinement. He knew the concentration camp and the Gestapo terror at first hand. Both Pechel and his wife were arraigned with others caught up in the Nazi dragnet after the failure of the July 20 plot. A six year sentence was imposed on Pechel's wife but through a fluke of Nazi justice he was released. The thwarted Gestapo seized him almost immediately and he was again released (April 14, 1945) only after a daring plea by his son, an officer in the armored forces. So Pechel has genuine qualifications as a chronicler of the German resistance. He does not seem to have any profound convictions about political liberty, or liberalism; he fought the Nazis in the name of humanity and in his outlook an urbane cosmopolitanism is oddly coupled with cultural nationalism. Pechel consciously bears aloft the traditions of German idealism and admits that the purpose of his book is to represent before the world an inner and uncorrupted Germany which refused to yield before Hitler.

The narrative begins in 1932-33 and supplies excellent detail about the anti-Nazi movement in the churches, the army, the Communist Party, and among small groups and by single individuals. Unlike some authors who have lumped all the Hitler opposition together because the Nazi vengeance after July 20 was so indiscriminate, Pechel makes careful distinctions, tempers his praise here and there, and tries to honor those whose courage and ideals were outstanding even among courageous men and women. Carl Goerdeler is especially singled out and Pechel provides a detailed analysis of his program for the "new Germany." In addition to a reformed German political order Goerdeler hoped for a European regional federation which would eventually become a world union of states. Yet his European planning had a marked anti-English bias and like most opposition leaders, except perhaps some of the communists, Goerdeler's reconstructed Germany would include Austria, the Sudetenland, and German-speaking Tyrol. Nor were reparations to be levied upon Germany by the victors. In the appendix Pechel provides the proclamations and announcements with which the July 20 conspirators intended to launch their government.

While Pechel's book leaves no doubt that the Sodom of Nazi Germany was not without its ten honest men it seems unlikely that, as the author believes, the Nazi opposition could be counted in millions. Yet this is consistent with Pechel's view that Germany was the first nation to be conquered by the Nazis. For the docility of the German masses under Hitler he advances the effectiveness of the terror. Like many otherwise sincere Germans Pechel seems to think that this bore exclusively on the German nation. Nor is Pechel free of that German self-pity which so many postwar observers have noticed. One chapter begins: "It is impossible for those living abroad to have a clear picture of life realities in present day Germany, with its hunger, its privation, its return to the primitive conditions of pre-history, with that nameless misery of the fugitives and all its difficult consequences for the entire nation, of the spiritual anguish arising from the absence of millions of prisoners of war. . . ." (p. 25) Nobody that is except the Russians, the Poles, the French, the Belgians, the Dutch, the Czechs, the Norwegians, the Greeks, the Jugoslavs, and so on!

Pechel not only chides the allies for not sending arms and munitions to the German resistance but believes that the non-German world bears a large responsibility for the Nazi movement. Before the war the visits of foreign dignitaries (a long list is provided) and the conclusion of solemn treaties seemed to sanctify the Nazi regime and calmed the fears of many Germans who felt something was amiss. Upon the concordat of 1933 Pechel lays a large blame. It divided and confused the Catholics about the propriety of resistance, though Catholics eventually played a large role, and it immediately enjoined the hierarchy from a forthright denunciation of the German government.

Of those who have written about the Hitler opposition Pechel denounces the military class in the strongest terms. With some national pride he distinguishes, however, between the traditional German officer and those who masqueraded in his uniform while doing Hitler's bidding. Pechel is aware that Hitler corrupted the officers' corps and though the *Führer's* last days were filled with wild denunciations of the generals, they were powerless before him. Their weakness compromised the plot of July 20, for years of delay and indecision had enfeebled the officers' will. But Pechel is very objective about the failure of the last great plot against the Nazis. It did not fail because Hitler escaped assassination but because it was attempted too late; the dismissal of Colonel General von Fritsch or the Munich crisis would have been more favorable moments. Such opportunistic hang-ons as General Rommel added nothing to a group whose energy and zeal were already fatally weak. A government of justice and righteousness cannot be founded by men who have compromised with evil and who turn from their course only when a world conquest is not fulfilled.

5. At this moment of history can we still agree with Jakob Burckhardt that, "The ultimate truth with respect to the character, the conscience, and the guilt of a people remains forever a secret. . . ." In *Final Judgment*, Victor H. Bernstein, *PM's* correspondent at the Nuremberg trials, deals with this issue and treats it in the light of evidence presented by the allied prosecution. A large part of the story is told in documents, all of which are cited

from the recently published series, *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*. Bernstein has performed a real service in bringing the most crucial evidence to the attention of a larger audience than that poorly edited multi-volumed series could be expected to reach. Yet *Final Judgment* is more than an analysis of the trial for it reviews recent German history and poses questions about the policy of our occupation authorities. These elements are frequently confused and intermingled for neither in style nor organization is the book a finished literary product. And some reservations have to be made about a social analysis that proceeds so rigorously from a priori assumptions. An unwavering political outlook from somewhat left of center, an unshakable faith in the political virtue and reliability of the German workers, together with the notion that fascism is nothing more than a plot of gangsters, militarists, and industrialists against the people, are not ideal viewpoints for making moral and historical judgments on the scale which Bernstein attempts. Still, as a source of information about the Nazi system his book has its own merit, and for reaching honest conclusions, which evidently cost considerable anguish, the author's integrity is unassailable.

In a concluding chapter, "Collective Guilt," strong evidence is marshalled that the German people were deeply involved in the maintenance, expansion, and governing technique of Nazi dictatorship. This involves the author in a certain contradiction, since he refuses to indict the working class and maintains that it is the sole basis upon which a future Germany can be built. But apart from that issue Bernstein testifies that the knowledge of and participation in crimes and atrocities were widespread. From Rousset's account it is also perfectly clear that the German populace had large dealings with the concentration camps, those instruments of political terror which the German nation was "unaware of" but "feared intensely."

A large share of guilt was borne by the *Wehrmacht* behind whose loud claims to the dignity and honor of German arms lurked a foul complicity in mass murder, both of war prisoners and civilians. Testimony at Nuremberg proved that the *Einsatzgruppen*, those "Special Task Forces for Genocide," operated in areas designated by the army high command. The indictment and convictions of Generals Keitel and Jodl rested not only on evidence that the military abetted the Nazi extermination policy but also agreed to and set in motion the savage conduct of war in the east. Despite the mass of evidence the average American still remains unaware of the bestial nature of Germany's war against the Soviet Union. Bernstein's material strips the last vestige of honor which may once have been attached to the German uniform. Another profession does not emerge unscathed from his lash. Not only SS doctors but "serious students of medicine" were eager to dissect human beings sacrificed by German justice. Quotations from representative medical publications show the extent to which scientists experimented upon the cadavers.

It is a great virtue of Bernstein's book that he uses the Nuremberg evidence to expose the whole Nazi system, not merely the leaders on trial, and to disclose the extent to which Nazism had poisoned German national life. There is a strong inference in the chapter entitled "Collective Guilt" that the German people might very well have been put on trial too. But Bernstein is callously indifferent to the philosophical and ethical aspects of his charge. Even in an



age which has elevated its newspaper correspondents to the rank of seer, one must heed the words of Jakob Burckhardt, "The ultimate truth . . . remains forever a secret. . . ."

6. *The Last Days of Hitler* by the young Oxford historian, H. R. Trevor-Roper, has enjoyed the largest circulation of the postwar books about Nazi Germany. This is very fortunate indeed for as a British intelligence officer assigned to investigate Hitler's death the author has come by an extraordinary fund of knowledge, not only about the last days of Hitler, but about the nature of his government. The first chapter mercilessly exposes the internal weaknesses of dictatorship. Trevor-Roper knows that there is more to the study of government than the arrangement of neatly interconnected boxes labeled "executive," "judiciary," and so forth. "Behind the facade of unanimity, all dictatorships are to a large extent centrifugal: the rule of a court conceals a political anarchy in which jealous feudatories, with their private armies and reservations of public resources, are secretly bargaining, and may openly fight, for the reversion or the preservation of power." (p. 233) Germany in its last days lacked a government; it was directed by a court, Hitler's court, in which personal rivalry, jealousy, fear, and intrigue all took precedence over real politics.

Only the German propaganda remained to the end a logical, if vain, effort but this was because it was directed by the only intellect among the Nazis. Albert Speer fares even better than Goebbels at the author's hands. If Trevor-Roper admires Goebbels' intellect he does so while despairing that it served perverted ends. Except for Speer's indifference to politics and history the young architect, selected intuitively by Hitler to succeed Todt as head of German war production, emerges from the narrative as a sinner whose objectivity about sin makes redemption unnecessary. Speer's concern for the future, however, especially his efforts to save German industry from the mad destruction of a Nazi scorched earth policy seems in the author's eyes to remove the taint of long association with Hitler. In the drama of Hitler's last days Speer functions as a kind of disembodied spirit, entering and leaving the *Führer's* underground bunker at will, alternately siding with Hitler's enemies and then regaining his loyalty, and conveniently serving as an alter ego, and so enabling Hitler to engage in those dramatic debates without which the tragedy would not have been complete.

In a narrative crowded with details, which testify to Trevor-Roper's diligence in gathering material but detract from the interest of the last chapters, enough evidence is brought together to prove that Hitler died by his own hand. All the macabre events of his last hours, his marriage to Eva Braun, the drafting of his will and testament, and the funeral pyre of the greatest blood-lifter and murderer of all history, are faithfully described. In fact much of our knowledge of these events depends on Trevor-Roper's report and it appears unlikely that any substantial revisions will be made in this picture of the death throes of Nazism's sole leader. At no time, according to Trevor-Roper, either in the beginning of "his battle" or at the height of his power, was Hitler the tool of interests or individuals. To the last Hitler commanded a fanatical devotion among his immediate retainers and especially among the common people. Their devotion was indeed the secret of his power, as it must be of every leader who moves the masses and through them achieves great military conquests.

In a book so excellently written and filled with so much insight about politics and leadership it is distressing to find what are really unnecessary jibes at the Catholics. Goebbels for example is erroneously described as having received a Jesuit education. Robert Bellarmine and Cardinal Newman are dragged in scurrilously to illustrate obscure points. And it is surprising to find the statement that, "The Jesuits created a system of education aimed at preventing knowledge. . . ." (p. 17) Trevor-Roper is entitled to disagree with Jesuit educational methods but his statement as phrased is an historical absurdity. Recent issues of the *London Tablet* have been concerned with these manifestations of prejudice which might disqualify Trevor-Roper as a universal historian. When he ventures into the larger fields of history he should bear in mind with Benedetto Croce, who can hardly be accused of overfriendliness to religion, that the historian must deal with, "The meaning of every mental system, of every concept of reality, which, transformed into faith, has become the basis for action and also the light of moral life."—WILLIAM O. SHANAHAN

#### DARKNESS OVER GERMANY\*

The literature on Germany has become abundant. The difficulty consists in finding out the few books which are really good. That is why it may be helpful for the readers of this periodical if their attention is drawn to the outstanding study by Eugen Günster which has been published in Switzerland and which otherwise might escape their notice. The author—who has earned under the pseudonym "Steinhausen" a reputation as a penetrating and gifted thinker in political philosophy—has written a book on the intellectual and moral errors of Germany which is particularly interesting on the following points.

(1) He brings out very clearly the immense responsibility of leading members of the German intelligentsia for having prepared the ground on which National Socialism could thrive. This reminder has become all the more necessary as some of these intellectual incendiaries, having discovered too late what their teachings led to, seem to have forgotten their own past. On all this I agree wholeheartedly with the author, and I also believe he is right when he says that, if we can speak of the responsibility of a whole nation at all, it consists in making some ideas dominant while showing others into the background. There can be no doubt that without the increasing predominance of certain destructive ideas before 1933 the Third Reich would have been impossible. But besides the work done by men like Jungfer, Sombart, Stapel *e tutti quanti* we must not forget—and here I should like to supplement Günster's verdict—all the fuel added by writers and sociologists of the Left, like Karl Mannheim and others. On this point, one can still consult with great profit Professor E. R. Curtius' book *Deutscher Geist in Gefahr* which appeared in 1932.

(2) Günster defends very ably and very convincingly the view of the

\* Eugen Günster: *Volk im Dunkel. Die geistige Tragödie des deutschen Volkes.* (Luzern: Vita Nova Verlag, 1946. Pp. 159).

German federalist who sees in Bismarck's revolution 1864-71 the real origin of most of the evil which later culminated in Hitler and who cannot conceive of any successful "re-education" of the German people which does not consist in unmaking the education so successfully and fatally carried through by Bismarck.

(3) Günter has the courage—and here I am mentioning a particularly valuable aspect of the book—to see the German catastrophe not as the isolated case of a wicked or mad people but as a part of a problem of moral and intellectual dissolution which concerns the whole Western world. That is what also invalidates the naive notion of the "conquerors" of Germany bringing the Germans intractable values like Moses from Sinai. But on this point I am not quite sure that I share Günter's views. He seems to deplore the lack of understanding between the Western Allies and Soviet Russia and to see in it one of the gravest obstacles to Germany's "re-education." But I am of the opinion that it was precisely the weak attitude towards Russian totalitarianism which has been one of the major symptoms of Western disorientation during the last years and one of the worst handicaps to the Western Allies in showing the Germans the way to the Good Society. How can Germany be taught by a world which does not condemn Communism just as much as National Socialism? What shall we think of an Allied general in one of the Western zones who recently blamed one of my German colleagues for his uncompromising attitude towards Communism and who, after having asked my friend to learn to make compromises and to "live with the times," received the obvious answer that this had been exactly the advice given by the Nazis after 1933 and that the general was now punishing those who had followed it? How shall we judge responsible people in the Allied countries who still seem to regard anti-Communist and anti-Russian Germans as a sort of neo-Nazis? They ought to thank the Creator on their knees that the majority of the Germans is not for but against the Russians—just as the Europeans ought to be grateful that Americans have realized their interests in a Europe which is not Russian and not Communist.—WILHELM ROEPKE

#### FRENCH AFFAIRS\*

1. For more than forty years Albert Guerard has presented to American students the history of French civilization. He asks that this last book, a short history of France, be considered as his testament. The volume is a master-

- \*1. Albert Guerard: *France. A Short History*. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1946. Pp. 274. \$3.00.)  
 2. D. W. Brogan: *French Personalities and Problems*. (New York: A. Knopf, 1947. Pp. 241. \$3.00.)  
 3. David Thomson: *Democracy in France. The Third Republic*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. Pp. 284. \$4.00.)  
 4. H. du Moulin de Labarthe: *Le Temps des Illusions, Souvenirs, Juillet 1940-Avril 1942*. (Geneve: Les Editions du Cheval Aile, 1946. Pp. 436.)  
 5. Walter Stucki: *Von Pétain zur vierten Republik*. (Bern: Herbert Lang & Cie., 1947. Pp. 174.)  
 6. William L. Langer: *Our Vichy Gamble*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947. Pp. ix-412-xi. \$3.75.)

piece of condensation, sketching the foundations and the history within 242 pages. There are five maps which will be of much help to the reader. Guerard is obviously an ardent lover of the country from which he came—but this love is based on great knowledge and he skillfully uses the facts of political and intellectual history to characterize basic trends and ideas. France, in her contributions to humanity, is the heroine of the book; to France, which is a collective and age-long striving for human values, "which is most French when she is most universal," all individualities and particular periods mentioned in the book are subordinated. Some readers may find Guerard's book too optimistic—at the moment there seems to be little hope that France, after World War II, will become the Greater France, the New French Commonwealth of hundred millions, as Guerard expects. Other readers may find the definition of France as representing the idea of mankind in all its spiritual traditions to be somewhat vague. Most readers will regret that the book is not a volume of 400-500 pages—many formulations and descriptions are only hints, due to the pressure of space. But despite all its shortcomings this volume is a brilliant introduction to French history, its ups and downs. Chapter VI, "The Bourgeois-liberal Revolution, 1750-1848," seems to me particularly instructive as an example of Guerard's art of characterization. The sentences on Robespierre may be quoted: "He haunts history as an enigmatic ghost, pure but not lovable; formidable yet precise, pedantic, almost old-maidish; the man of one book, Rousseau's *Social Contract* made flesh. With his death the wild adventure into absolute democracy was over."

2. Among English students of French affairs D. W. Brogan has obtained a high reputation by his volume on the Third Republic. He is also widely known by his studies on the U. S. A. and her institutions as well as by his attempts to explain English mentality to Americans. But I am afraid the collection of articles (mostly book reviews) under the title *French Personalities and Problems* will not increase the reputation of the Cambridge political scientist. First he displays here in an exasperating, boring and often involuntarily amusing way the defects of his manner of writing. He overindulges in parallels to and comparisons with more or less known literary and political events and figures. The reader must soon admit his embarrassing ignorance before such learning. But soon he discovers that it does not help much when the relation of Maurras and Leon Daudet is compared with the friendship between Marx and Engels. Secondly, reading D. W. Brogan we have the same feeling which we would have on being served at dinner only elaborate appetizers and desserts. There is much said by Brogan in a most artful way—but the central topic does not come off. It is approached, but not reached. We hear much about details, but not about what keeps the details together. Thirdly, the general ideas of the book are nebulous. Enthusiasm for justice and liberty and horror of Vichy do not liberate from the obligation to be precise and factual. Of course, D. W. Brogan knows Maurras, Barres Tocqueville very well—but his articles about them are more or less causeries, with some casual interesting remarks and sidelights. Has D. W. Brogan been overcome by a danger which menaces the student of French affairs, the desire to be witty and surprising at any price? Or does this collection of disconnected articles only prove that pages written for the day cannot form a book? In

any case, D. W. Brogan has the merit of having demonstrated by this volume that too much sophistication can be as disappointing as much pedantic display of information.

3. How comforting is the reading of D. Thomson's *Democracy in France* after the depressing experience with D. W. Brogan's firework of illusions and mysterious hints. True, this English student of French affairs is modest enough to present facts, to analyze institutions, and to describe political trends, though it must be admitted that he is not a brilliant stylist. But those who are eager to learn about the peculiarities of French modern social and political developments will read his book with much profit. The Rousseauistic French concept of democracy, the revolutionary tradition, is well analyzed. Excellent pages are devoted to the modern French distrust of a strong executive as well as to French bureaucracy. The peculiar working of French parliamentary democracy as well as of French parties is fully grasped. The importance of the relations between the State and the Catholic Church is seen, though it must be noted that Thomson is not always sure (despite his will to be fair and objective) in his judgments on Catholic affairs, as his remarks on the Syllabus—which would have exasperated Bishop Dupanloup—show.

On the whole, Thomson's book can be recommended to everyone looking for a survey of modern French political institutions and of recent French history, without which the present Fourth Republic cannot be understood. Thomson emphasizes that the problem of a stronger executive power must be solved. That does not speak for an optimistic prognosis, as is shown in the fight of General de Gaulle against the constitution which rather weakens the executive. And then there is the Communist problem—not only the result of a profound distrust of the masses against the narrow class mentality of certain groups. The bibliography of D. Thomson is good; it may be noted only that there is an English translation of Yves Simon's book, *The Road to Vichy* (New York: Sheed and Ward).

4. H. du Moulin de Labarthe was a French civil servant, an *inspecteur des finances* who, after the February 1934 demonstrations, caused by the Stavisky scandal, was discharged for a too harsh public criticism of the Republican regime. That did not prevent him from serving during World War II in an economic mission to Spain. After the collapse of France in 1940 he was appointed by Marshal Pétain, the new Chief of State, as the head of his civil cabinet in Vichy. He remained in this post for twenty-one months, until April 1941. Then he was sent to Switzerland, broke with Vichy in 1943, without joining de Gaulle. He has remained in exile after World War II, not willing to share the fate of other leading figures of the Vichy regime who have been condemned, with few exceptions, by French courts. He has now published a volume of his memoirs describing his activity as one of the most intimate collaborators of Marshal Pétain.

These memoirs would not deserve much attention if they were only a *plaidoyer* of a civil servant who was, as he tells *post factum*, always very invertebrate and a skilful act of accusation against those who have forgotten their original friendly relations with Vichy. But du Moulin's book is much more than a personal document. It will remain a classic description of the

Vichy regime in its first period, when it had not yet clearly developed into an instrument of the Nazi invader, and when the collapse of the *Revolution Nationale* was not yet fully manifest. Of course, many details in du Moulin's story must be accepted with extreme caution; but on the other side, even such a publication as the *Revue Internationale*, which regards him as the exponent of a bourgeois counter-revolution, admits that his description of the 13th of December, 1941, of Laval's dismissal, is very valuable.

Particularly impressive is du Moulin's description of Pétain. The Marshal appears as an honest, though slightly senile and vain man. In the final analysis he is not aware of the impossibility of his situation. He believes that he can renew France by establishing a kind of paternalistic authoritarian regime, without parliamentarians and politicians. He does not know any details of the constitution which he promises to establish. He is somewhat an Anglophobe, despising the Italians, not liking Germans, though he is impressed by their military power. He is no believer in a German victory as Laval was; he is an "attentiste" who hopes somewhat vaguely that the war will end in a stalemate which will justify a policy of "La France Seule." He has an extraordinary personal charm which makes one forget that he does not trust anybody. He is a man without much religious or spiritual needs. The Marshal, denounced as a clerical, does not go to mass except for political reasons. On Sundays he is satisfied to listen to a concert on the radio.

Very different men form the elite of his regime. There are bureaucrats who are glad to have escaped parliamentary controls and influences; some fanatics who hate anti-French democracy and sectarian masonry; military men, more or less naive, who like to enjoy power; more or less cynical opportunists, such as Laval, the old parliamentary tactician who believes that Germany must win and that the era of representative power is past, or Admiral Darlan who simply likes to be on the side of the winner; representatives of a younger generation as the so-called *Synargues* (Pucheu etc.) who regard political affairs as problems which can be solved by efficient economic and administrative techniques. The Marshal is necessary for all these different men because he is a mythical symbol, because he appears as a charismatic leader to whom the French people cling in its defeat and despair. But he loses this power as it becomes clear that he goes from one capitulation to another—though sometimes he regains his original prestige, as for example, when he dismisses Laval on December 13, 1941, encouraged by the other ministers, fearing that Laval will make him a puppet, a figurehead.

5. The Swiss Minister in France during the Vichy regime, Walter Stucki, has—in contrast to du Moulin de Labarthe—no personal axe to grind. Therefore it is particularly impressive that his story confirms, to a large extent, the views of du Moulin. He emphasizes too the fact that Pétain, at the beginning, enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of the French people, but that he destroyed this prestige by his weaknesses, though he never became an eager collaborator with the Germans as Laval or as Deat and Doriot, who went even further than Pétain, selling out completely to Hitler's New Europe. He, too, confirms Pétain's personal charm and inability to master and understand the situation. Stucki, the cool and dry Swiss civil servant and diplomat, emphasizes that Pétain did not know how to exploit the divergences among

various German groups for France's benefit. This book, written without literary pretensions, contains much interesting material. There is the German General who represents the German Army in Vichy, though he knows that he is at the mercy of any Gestapo agent. He says that he is ashamed to wear the German uniform as he learns from Minister Stuckel that the SS has burnt 600 French women and children in Oradour, but he continues to serve Hitler, for he fears what would happen to his family if he should disobey. There is the pathetic story about the desperate efforts of Pétain to find a way out as the German defeat has become obvious. He tries to revise the National Assembly, he tries to make de Gaulle his heir. There is the moving story of how Pétain is forced by the Nazis to leave Vichy. Only the Papal Nuncio and the Swiss minister dare to witness the use of force against the French Chief of State.

6. The relations between the U. S. A. government and the Vichy regime have been the object of many bitter controversies during the war years. It is the principal aim of Professor W. L. Langer's study to settle these polemics in favor of the State Department. But the value of his book is independent of its main purpose. It is a required reading for all students of World War II because it contains many quotations from very important documents. Men such as Admiral Leahy, for a time American Ambassador in Vichy, as well as the State Department, the OSS, etc., opened their files to the Harvard historian. His book gives an impressive picture of the manifold difficulties facing the foreign and military policies of the U. S. A. during the war years. Power considerations played a great role. What would happen to the French fleet? Relations with allies—England particularly—had to be taken into account. There were conflicts between various government agencies—the Board of Economic Warfare did not always agree with the State Department. It was most difficult to evaluate correctly the prestige of Pétain and the rise of de Gaulle's influence inside France.

I think that Langer refutes victoriously those oversimplifying amateurs who settled all problems by claiming that Pétain was a fascist. But on the other hand he does not answer the question, why a more friendly attitude towards de Gaulle could not have accompanied the attempts to exploit relations with Vichy? He admits understandable errors and failures of certain hopes: Weygand refused to cooperate actively in a decisive moment; General Giraud did not have the expected influence. The question may be raised whether Vichy's egoistic interests did not play a greater role in withholding some concessions to Germany than the U. S. A.'s diplomatic influences and pressures. But even if one cannot share all political judgments of Professor Langer, remembering his former mistakes in evaluating Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, etc., one must admire the skilful organization of the volume, and the wealth of its documentary evidence. (Critics will claim that obviously Professor Langer is inclined to give quotations supporting his view.) The survey of the conditions under which the Franco-German armistice was concluded is particularly useful; the vacillation of Reynaud is correctly emphasized. But I think the decline of Pétain's prestige and the rise of the belief in de Gaulle are not correctly dated. They started earlier than Professor Langer apparently assumes. It is a little surprising that the statement against de Gaulle's movement, issued after the St. Pierre-Miquelon incident, is not quoted—though an expression used in it gave material or pretexts to

embitter the controversy about the Vichy policy of the State Department. It may be noted also that there is a certain discrepancy in the restatements of the President's views on France's power (p. 5 and p. 15), and finally, it would have been very interesting to have more quotations from Ambassador Bullitt's reports, especially on the beginning of the Vichy regime.—WALDEMAR GURIAN

#### SOVIET ECONOMICS\*

One result of the contrast between the relatively free discussion characteristic of the capitalist system and the rigid restrictions on political and economic discourse in the USSR is that many educated Westerners tend to forget that the Russian system also involves sharp tensions and maladjustments, even though Socialist problems are different from ours. Professor Prokopovitz, former minister of commerce and industry in the Russian Provisional Government of 1917, has written a book for the educated European layman that may help to correct this situation.

The author deserves congratulations for selecting important problems and endeavoring to solve them in a dispassionate and scientific frame of mind. By presenting an historical description of Soviet population, agriculture, industry, retail trade, foreign trade and national income up to the outbreak of World War II, he shows clearly Soviet efforts to devise expedients and make adjustments to problems as they arose. In this manner a dynamic picture of the evolution of new economic institutions by a trial and error process emerges. In the analytical passages he attempts to answer the basic economic questions: how much does the system produce and how is it distributed among the population?

The analysis of quantity and quality of population as a key factor in the productive powers of a nation is a more or less conventional description of the shift from a predominantly agricultural economy to an industrial one. The author does not attempt to project his figures into the future or draw some of the general implications of the shift from agriculture to industry, as Norestein and others have done. The material on the quality of the population is limited to two and a half pages on education, which are inadequate for dealing with the problem and might well have been omitted. Such weaknesses are compensated by some keen observations and conclusions on the relationship between the earlier economic policies of the Bolsheviks and population changes.

The long chapter on agriculture is perhaps the best in the book. In contrast with those writers, such as Pares, who picture Russia as a land overflowing with resources, Prokopovitz points out that due to climatic and soil conditions only six and a half per cent of the territory was cultivated in 1938-39. (The new Five Year Plan calls for an expansion of this area by only a sixteenth.) He also concludes that the USSR is in need of agricultural imports from the Balkans, Siam and Outer Mongolia, an observation that may help to explain Russian expansion in these areas. His conclusions concerning the effects of collectivization on agricultural productivity are: 1) that the total

\* Prokopovitz, S. N.: *Russlands Volkswirtschaft unter den Sowjets*. (Zürich: Europa Verlag, 1944. Pp. 459. \$5.50)

amount of agricultural products has increased only slightly since Tsarist days; 2) that productivity per person has decreased slightly; and 3) that the amount available for the market, and hence taken away from the peasants has increased very markedly. (It is unfortunate that one of the tables on which this conclusion is based [p. 133] has the column headings transposed.) The reviewer is not in a position to judge the validity of these conclusions. Other writers who cover the same problem, such as the generally valuable study of Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (Cambridge University Press, 1946), do not grapple with it directly. Hubbard's *The Economics of Soviet Agriculture* estimates that the output per worker is greater (p. 257), but on the basis of very slender data.

The absence for the most part of stated sources for the material in the tables, the meagerness of the book, makes checking doubly difficult. There is often no way of knowing whether the tables represent the results of the author's computations or are direct copies of Soviet statistics.

Although the historical and strictly descriptive material in the chapters on industry remains a very useful synthesis of the available factual information, the interpretation is not as successful as in the chapter on agriculture. A thirteen page general and theoretical discussion of economic planning is only loosely related to the rest of the book. Prokopovitch has a distinct bias against economic planning that renders this part of his discussion inferior to Baykov. Nor does Prokopovitch fulfill very clearly the task he sets himself: to discover the extent to which planning is adapted to his objectives. To the reviewer this formulation of the task appears somewhat vague.

Some of his other comments on the performance of the Soviet economic machine are in line with the conclusions reached by several other investigators, that is, that the central planning authority limits severely the functions of factory managers, and that the low quality of goods is due to the fact that there is no automatic incentive to lower costs and increase quality such as exists under free competition. The latter difficulty might also be attributed to the process of acquiring new industrial techniques. Without accepting Soviet figures at their face value the author acknowledges the colossal growth of Soviet production and the consequent increase in the national income. His final comments on this point (p. 311) might well serve as a summary of the entire book. He observes that the building of a new industrial machine had to be done at the expense of the workers and peasants themselves, a burden that was increased by the failure of food production to keep up with the growth of the urban industrial population. This conclusion may seem trite to avid readers of journalistic accounts. But so far as the reviewer is aware it is the first attempt to reach any such general conclusion on the basis of a careful and thorough analysis of the available facts.

The final political chapters do not add much to the value of the study. A disproportionate amount of attention is given to the various paper conclusions of the USSR, though political realities do not by any means escape the author. For instance, he observes that all major political decisions since the foundation of the regime have been made by the Communist Party. With the exception of occasional observations of this type, the political material might well have been omitted in favor of more details on some economic matters.

Despite these weaknesses the book represents a courageous and generally successful attempt to portray and explain the development and present functioning of Soviet economic institutions. Serious students of Russia will be the losers if they overlook its contributions.—BARRINGTON MOORE, JR.

#### THE SHADOWS OF ONE WORLD\*

1. James Burnham again reveals himself as a melodramatic commentator on contemporary affairs. He is a Platonist, or better still, a Neo-Platonist, whose *One is power. The Managerial Revolution* is a power *Republic* and *The Struggle for the World* may be compared to Plato's unhappy descent into the practical world of Syracuse. Burnham's book is valuable because he publicly advocates what many have furtively and indirectly proposed—an aggressive anti-Soviet policy, reinforced by preparations for a war already begun, and the establishment of American imperial control of the world. A deceptive clarity supports the thesis. Technology has made a potential unity in a politically and culturally divided world. This unity must be achieved in order to solve the crisis of our time. In ignoring the crisis the non-Soviet world dissipates its strength. Meanwhile, the Communist lords of Russia strive unceasingly to confound the world's confusion as the prelude to Communist world conquest, their solution of the crisis. There are now only two states whose power may enable them to rule the world. The atom bomb precipitates the crisis, for its destructiveness promises success to the aggressor nation and especially to the United States, as long as it enjoys a monopoly of the bomb. Later, Burnham implies, Russia will surely use the bomb. If eventually Russia, why not now the United States? He supports this program by a grim and not implausible suggestion that actually the United States will attempt nothing serious. The outcome will be either a Bolshevik triumph or mutual destruction and the end of Western civilization.

Burnham's concern with power is responsible for both his strength and his weaknesses. He sharply criticizes many popular American failings, among them, the belief that a 'tough' foreign policy, restricted to criticism and reproaches, will stop Russia. He is at his best in describing and overrating international Communism. His weakness is revealed in that he practically identifies morality and the total renunciation of power. When the Communist menace is destroyed, the world may indulge in the luxury of moral sentiments. In a universal American *Pax Romana* world state theorists will find the realization of their theories and the moralists and mystics may renounce power.

This analysis touches upon the painful question which troubles our consciences and yet it misses all of its complexity. Is a preventive war justifiable? Communist plans and the atom bomb portend the most harrowing years for us. May we then for our own peace of mind unleash the searing blast of the bomb and the horrors of its radioactive hangover on the prisoners of the Soviet masters? Who in turning his back on Christian teaching can roar the crusad-

\*1. James Burnham: *The Struggle for the World*. (New York: The John Day Co., 1947. Pp. 247. \$3.00.)

2. Quincy Wright, Editor: *A Foreign Policy for the United States*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947. Pp. x-405. \$4.50.)

ing cry, *Deus vult!* The certain imminence of the war cannot be established. Thus, a preventive war cannot be justified. The likely result of such a war can hardly be a good commensurate with its evil. These considerations, of course, apply only to a preventive war, the counsel of despair. The Communists, as Burnham recognizes, are not presently eager for war. Momentarily, they are not strong enough. If our strength deters them, then surely we are rather obliged to become stronger than to go to war. Politicians and their electors, who by their torpid selfishness weaken us, incur the responsibility for war. In a democracy all of us are on trial.

Burnham may plead that he agrees with this and it is true that he makes many qualifications. But the tenor of his book is established by his first sentence. "The Third World War began in April 1944." If that is so, his less candid chapter "Is War Inevitable?" is superfluous. Curiously enough, one of the weakest chapters in the book is his negative answer to the question "Is a Communist World Empire Desirable?" There is something of the debater's insincerity in his manner of arguing. To convince us of the menace of Communism he exaggerates its strength. Thereafter, to persuade us that a war will not be too difficult he notes the weaknesses of Communism. Both should have been discussed in considering the possibility of war.

2. It is heartening to turn from Burnham's work to Quincy Wright's edition of the papers and discussion of last year's Harris Institute. In it is revealed the strength of our freedom. The Communist leaders are very sensitive to power considerations. But their ideology and totalitarianism prevent the free-ranging discussion of issues. Their minds, and this is both a danger to us and a source of strength, are the prisoners of their ideology. In the suspicion haunted mazes of the Kremlin pathological men find in themselves the justification of the tortuous fears inculcated by their ideology. But even the danger is lessened by the fact that a totalitarian economy is wracked by ambitious struggles for power, and simple contradictions, and misled by false statistics. The economies of Britain and the United States were more efficiently geared for war than the Nazi and Soviet economies. Free people accepted the goal towards which the war controlled economy was directed. The totalitarian police could not assure a similar cohesion.

The Soviet Union and the atom bomb loom very large in this dialogue of free men on American foreign policy. A number of them, notably Bernard Brodie and W. T. R. Fox, have had to revise their viewpoints in the light of the events of 1944-1946. Almost all the participants are temperate and reasonable in the midst of the world's confusion. Burnham is not. He regards Roosevelt's attempt to establish a personal working relationship with Stalin as naively inept. The Cornell historian, deKiewiet, on the other hand, describes what Roosevelt tried to do, details an alternative course, and notes the consequences of Roosevelt's misjudgment. But in view of Waldemar Gurian's noteworthy insistence that the Bolsheviks have two foreign policies, one aiming at Russian security and the other based on their belief that objective developments in various countries will produce revolutionary situations, only the post-war period could reveal that he had misjudged. Political uncertainty makes the discussion of trade policies less pertinent for the moment. The discussion of information policies is interesting. The paper and discussion on Latin America is inferior to the rest of the volume.—M. A. FITZSIMONS

### THE DECENTRALIST PHILOSOPHY\*

Any writer who questions the liberal theory of industrial and urban progress is likely to be branded as either utopian or reactionary. Yet there is an increasing number who deny that industrialism and specialization under contemporary urban conditions can give men freedom. Many shades of opinion and social theory are combined in what is now called the Decentralist Movement. Some decentralists are primarily agrarians; some are single-taxers; some are concerned with the health of the soil, of man, and with the effect of large-scale processing on food; some are primarily critics of the city and its apparently insoluble social economic, governmental and fiscal problems; some believe that the industrial worker must get one foot on the soil; some believe that the decentralist task is one of adult education; but none of them believes that it is possible for men to be free under industrial regimentation and the modern bureaucratic or military state.

Professor Nutting, who himself practices many of the principles of decentralism, asks, in *Reclamation of Independence*, how the common man can be free. What is the common man's freedom? Freedom is more than the current practice of democracy. "It exists where every mature and normal individual has the opportunity of making for himself, with no compulsion from other men or from government, those great decisions by which the main course of his life is directed and by which his character is formed. . . ." (p. 9). Freedom does not consist simply in a high material standard of living; it consists in breaking the widening circles of interdependence; it consists in each individual learning to do for himself more and more of those things that are now performed by this nation of employees. Freedom is organic with the home, its ownership, and the family with its productive activities. Central to Nutting's thesis, therefore, is the productive homestead, in which food is produced and processed, and the local community that seeks, perhaps at a cost to efficiency, an approach to organic exchange. Everyone can begin the construction of his freedom, because every one can learn to do things for himself, and he can do them if he is not afraid of work.

*Reclamation of Independence* is a statement, not only of the concept of freedom, but also the decentralist theory of society. As industrialism fails to preserve the economic independence of the common man, it provides a dialectic of the employee state. A nation of specialists and consumers, Nutting argues, moves steadily toward helpless dependence on the "System." Keeping the System going leads to collectivism, to control by the few and to the complete regimentation of society. Socialism itself is a phase of general and compulsory uniformity and it is a prelude to disaster. In this analysis both the conservative and the liberal are wrong, and their solutions, private enterprise and industrial democracy, only confirm the malady of our time. Neither understands the movement of history nor the spiritual basis of happiness. For Nutting argues that economic dependence is the master evil of our time. The answer to exploitation and dependence is the Green Revolution.

The Green Revolution implies many changes in industrial organization,

\* Willis D. Nutting: *Reclamation of Independence*. (Nevada City, Calif.: Berliner & Langgan, Publishers, 1947. Pp. iii, 198, \$3.00).

agriculture, and in the structure of society. It implies fundamental alterations in the practices of democracy. Nutting is sure that if men are going to control their government it must be reshaped in decentralist terms so that individuals can understand what government is about. Just as industry must be localized, so an agriculture that is dependent entirely on market situations must also be changed. Men must have access to the means for their support.

Finally, the author contends that the Green Revolution falls into the pattern of the American tradition. Both conservatives and liberals, he thinks, falsify that tradition. Those for private enterprise, stress competition and the exploitation of resources at the cost of cooperation and the common good. Liberals praise collectivism and those who lean on the state, and they seek to remedy each failure with more legislation for the control of individuals. "The American tradition is essentially right, because it presents man as a being who should take care of himself, whereas modern liberalism presents him as essentially a being to be taken care of" (p. 189). Nutting concludes his volume by affirming that "What the common man needs, if this is to be his century, is not to be cared for by the employers or the state, but to be given the opportunity to care for himself; for only thus can he become what he was meant to be: a free person rather than merely a molecule of society" (p. 198).

—FRANCIS G. WILSON

#### POPE PIUS XII AND ROOSEVELT\*

This correspondence, occasioned by the Taylor Special Mission to the Vatican, "will have," as President Truman says in his Preface to the volume, "a permanent place in the history of the greatest war in the annals of mankind." Speaking for "the seekers of light and the seekers of peace everywhere," Pope Pius and President Roosevelt repeatedly reassured each other of their high resolve to work for a just and Christian peace. On only one issue, that of American aid to the Soviet Union, does the correspondence suggest any important divergence of opinion between the two leaders. In his letter to the Pope, on September 3, 1941, the President noted that many people in all churches in the United States held that Russia is governed completely by a communistic form of society. "In my opinion," the President wrote, "the fact is that Russia is governed by a dictatorship, as rigid in its manner of being as is the dictatorship in Germany." Yet the leaders in all churches in the United States should realize, he insisted, that the survival of Russia (using only communistic propaganda outside her own borders) was less dangerous to religion, to the church as such, and to humanity in general than the survival of the German form of dictatorship which was employing every type of military aggression to achieve world conquest. In his reply the Pope is silent on these points.

The volume carries portraits of Roosevelt, the Pope and Truman, Prefaces by Truman and the Pope, and an Introduction and ten Explanatory Notes by Myron C. Taylor.—AARON I. ABELL

\* Myron C. Taylor, editor: *War-time Correspondence Between President Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII*. (New York: Macmillan, 1947. Pp. xiii-127. \$2.50)