

in spite of the impulse he gave to the sense of continuity in history, was forced to admit that "only a very few periods are of real value." Even the central theme of the Enlightenment which, according to the later historiographic point of view, was particularly outmoded, remained alive in the writings of Burckhardt to whom it was a basic conception. For, in spite of all the bitter attacks on the belief in human nature being ever the same, Burckhardt, in his survey of history, emphasized from the beginning the assumption of "man as he is, always was and always will be."⁶¹

⁶¹ *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, translated under the title, *Force and Freedom, Reflections on History* (New York, 1943), p. 82.

TRADITION AND PROPAGANDA

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To those who see civilization as a work of historical continuity, or as the realization of moral standards in human organization, the preoccupation with propaganda in the twentieth century must stand as a high symbol of the disintegration of culture. The source of the power of propaganda is the pervasive uncertainty of values. It is only a disordered world that suffers from disordered propaganda; the war of nerves is within us and is of our making. Our concern with propaganda, either as a crutch in the struggles of politics or as a defense against the impact of a complex world, is almost pathological. In result there is a tendency of propagandists to reduce all thought and judgment to mere techniques in the struggle for social power.

Propaganda is, indeed, the new Machiavellianism of those who regard themselves above ordinary brutality. It implies the use of expansive, total means to attain what we call our democratic ends. But the basic appeals in propaganda tend to become increasingly primitive, uncivilized, and irresponsible. The universal defamation of character takes the place of universal judgments of right and wrong, and the exaggerated confidence of the propagandist in the discontinuity of means and ends is revenged by the imperialistic demolition of the ends themselves. If we consult the tradition of constitutional government, democracy implies justice in the use of means or techniques; it implies that ends have their justified framework of civilized means. But there does exist a reservoir of symbolism upon which the propagandist may rely, and the refilling of this reservoir is the long-run issue for us today. Yet it is clear that while propaganda exploits existential symbolism, it is the task of education, it is the work of culture, to create the symbols themselves. Civilization may accept the irregular or fallen nature of man, but there is finally no inconsistency between men as they are and the process of education in the formation of civilization.

Now we can have a tradition without democracy, but we cannot have a democracy without a tradition, and by

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that we mean a living, accepted, or organic tradition. The conservative of the present chaos will say that tradition, American tradition, is a phase of the democratic method. Just as Burke argued, we must live our continuity, and value imaginatively our experience. But the governance of tradition becomes increasingly important as the significance of social and political decision increases. The most difficult decisions must be traditional in character, else force or propaganda (which is force in the diminutive) must take the place of acceptable use and wont. We are today in a period in which there is discipline for the American people, but the democratic discipline must be one that can be given recognition by those who are mustered for social purposes. And as authorities have seen the operative conditions of propaganda about them, they have moved from the democratic techniques to the undemocratic discipline of men.

Whatever we may say about the social collectivity, we must not forget that in the end the psychological condition of the individual is most important. Such is true even when we consider such factors as economic relationships, which are largely psychological. In looking at the individual we must try to determine what is a normal use of propaganda and what is its pathological abuse: Clearly, we must move on beyond a mere statement of psychological technique to a judgment of right and wrong, the better and the worse. If we assume that social interests are reconcilable and that relative harmony can prevail, propaganda can function within the limits of the national federation of traditions. But if no social reconciliation is possible, propaganda must be an instrument for the destruction of the enemy and a phase of revolution and class war. Class war, we must remember, is like all war in the larger sense, and like such war it is a kind of social hell. The conservative argument insists that if we would have peace abroad we must cultivate it at home, even to the last personality. We must at least try to know the individual.

But in the uncompromising spirit of our age, we do not seek to know the human reality. Instead we call our opponents ignorant victims of cultural lag. Yet social lag is always a question of attitudes, and is easily exploited for propaganda purposes. Ultimately it may be a justifi-

cation of the use of force in reshaping social structure. It is easy to assume that the laggard is unprogressive, especially when attitudes are expressed in politics and law. Perhaps it is more useful to observe the lag or discrepancy between the facts of power and the possible or existing consensus. The very existence of such a discrepancy gives the propagandist his opportunity, for the horror of our time is that the techniques of power, the capacity of the few to control, do succeed within measure, even in the sacred groves of democracy.

What picture of human nature do we get, then, from the psychic Goliath that is modern propaganda technique? Beside it the mere economic interpretation of behavior is extremely simple and highly rational, for such an interpretation assumes even that the enemy acts in accordance with a discernible principle. Capitalist civilization, for example, has tried to appeal to interest, self and calculated interest. This civilization is, we are told, peaceful in its extended impulses, as is shown in the conditions necessary for the operation of business; the bourgeois is rational and therefore unheroic in his outlook on life. The alternative is clear, for one thing about our times is that alternatives have become painfully clear. That alternative for us is the warlike theory of the totalitarians. Because the substitute is warlike, it is also propagandist; and one necessity of the times is to overcome the bourgeois tradition in order, among other things, to subordinate business to a new set of rulers.¹

But since the economic calculation cannot be separated from its context, and since a statement of putative economic interest is not an analysis of conduct, the propagandist must resort to the unconscious. A Freudian and irrationalist façade has become necessary in the last generation to the operation of economic determinism which nestles in the concept of social irreconcilability. We must even assume, for example, that the theological and political views of the Cromwellians in seventeenth-century England were but window dressing for the economic rationalism of the emergent bourgeoisie. If the explicit bourgeois attitudes are rationalistic, the attack upon them in current-day

¹ Cf. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York, 1942), pp. 128 ff.

propaganda slips back to the irrationalism of nearly all propaganda efforts. The symbolism of the class war, therefore, is a piling of psychological determinism upon economic determinism in order to make the latter seem to work. The Freudian façade is closer to the economic conflict than the old-fashioned Marxist would like to think. To the conservative the issue is, in part at least, between an ethical view of political battle that is grounded on the tradition of the West and a psychological interpretation which, in conflict, grows increasingly primitive and emotional.

In sober reckoning, however, we cannot assume that the great orientations of thought are, or can be, produced by so obvious a technique as propaganda. We must move to the larger and more creative context of tradition. It is only in disruptive times that the issue between propaganda and tradition becomes important, and the importance arises only because of the temporary effectiveness of propaganda technique. Normally, propaganda may be said to have a somewhat narrow scope, but one which is subordinate to the rôle of tradition in civilized life. When tradition begins to disintegrate (*i.e.*, there is no community of interpretation) propaganda can be used within limits as a substitute for the governance of tradition. The late Guglielmo Ferrero insisted that Napoleon Bonaparte originated the modern technique of propaganda control, but if this is true it would illustrate the point that is being made, for the tradition of the West was at the time entering upon a long revolutionary disruption.² Without tradition subjects fear rulers and rulers fear subjects, hence the emergence of the primitive as against the civilized from both sides of the political equation.

In spite of the political conflicts in our own early history, there seemed to be remarkable agreement among leaders on fundamentals in social organization. *The Federalist* is, from this point of view, a symbol of a great tradition, one in which agreement was possible.³ In such a condition it was tenable to believe in simple theories of human motivation. John Adams, James Madison, and others envisioned

² Guglielmo Ferrero, *The Principles of Power* (New York, 1942), translated by Theodore R. Jaeckel.

³ Cf. Francis G. Wilson, "The Federalist on Public Opinion," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 6, pp. 563 ff. (1942).

an element of immutability in the conditioning of opinion, but which was withal a simple conception of the springs of action. In a traditionalist society it is possible to consider all men as responding to specified forces and ideas. It is a rationalist rather than a propagandist view of human action, since the recognized motivations are amenable to rational analysis. Out of such conceptions our political forebears concentrated their attention on the structure of government and leadership, and they were led to believe that social balance was attainable in part at least by the organization of a constitutional system. The balanced or mixed constitution, with the check and balance system, was in theory possible because of the previous analysis of why men think and act as they do. Evil itself was subject to reasonable analysis.

In our own day, when the sources of action are incomprehensible, measurably because of the disintegration of traditional coherence under the impact of industrialism, we cannot content ourselves with the older view of balance or with eighteenth-century rationalism applied to human nature. Can we not say that the balance in the new era must be different from the older tradition? Or can we assume that in the end tradition will be victorious in a rejuvenated form so that the chaos of the present will be temporary only? For the moment, then, we are seeking for new forms of balance in society, and we expect further triumphs of pressure groups, bureaucratic force, military interest, and modifications of the party system. In such a condition there is, first of all, a great specialization in tradition which separates it from the masses; and, in the second place, the "military mobility" of such group traditions is likely to result in conflict within the ruling groups. However, the separation of specialized tradition from the people argues that a new social balance will increasingly accept the irrationalist system of motivations in relation to the subjects of government. The mutual lack of self-control on the ethical level in both the propagandist rulers and the propagandized subjects points to the ultimate failure of specialized tradition at the top.

It is now clear, from a generation of experience with pressure and interest groups in the age of mass-communication, that propaganda is a "power" in the state. It is like judicial review or the Presidential veto in that it dis-

arms or negatives those who might oppose action that the masters of communication and propaganda wish to carry through. We must say, however, that with mass-communication, group-interest propaganda is only one of the total balance of forces; it is an overall technique in the construction of any system of equilibrium of élites. In the end, moreover, propaganda is a technique for attaining or retaining power. Government or official propaganda may be verbally educational in aim, especially if it seeks to develop community cooperation outside of bureaucratic control, but even here there may be implications that are merely more subtle than the more obvious struggle for power. To the subject of the mass-communication élite, a cross-fire or conflict within the streams of propaganda is part of the social salvation of man. Such propaganda may begin with a vigorous flattery of the people (Disraeli laid it on with a trowel for Queen Victoria's benefit), but propaganda becomes more directly a technique of power as rulers press upon the citizens and as the governors fear the changing mood of the people. Those who would resist must examine the catch-words of all, whether private or public, and they must recognize that the disciples of Rousseau move backwards steadily toward Hobbes and Machiavelli. Propaganda is measured finally by a realism which lacks the restraint of ethical standards.⁴ It has become a volcanic force of distorted symbolism, which denies the connection of the citizen with his reasonable social experience; it is implicitly an individualistic technique to gain a collectivism of prejudice.⁵

The relationship between propaganda and tradition may be illuminated by another fact. Propaganda succeeds in part because of the abdication of opinion by individuals and groups, but such an abdication means the loss of tradition, the corresponding disintegration of personal standards and a sense of having no power or influence over those who make decisions. Stockholders of corporations have given up the will to control the managers of the concerns which they in theory own, while members of trade

⁴ See in general Irving Babbitt, *Democracy and Leadership* (Boston, 1924).

⁵ See in general, for example, Eugene Lyons: *The Red Decade, The Stalinist Penetration of America* (Indianapolis, 1941).

unions are losing control over their officials and of the government which dominates both workers and officials. The individual who senses the contradiction between the theory and the fact of his relationship with power, as in the above instances, knows that tradition is failing. He may rise in sporadic rebellion or he may accept finally the manipulations of official propaganda used to demonstrate the rectitude of the situation as it is. Clearly, the propagandists are those who have not abdicated their right to an opinion. Propaganda in line with tradition hardly presents a problem, for it is based on a larger power; but propaganda with no governance of tradition is a maturing Leviathan. The indifferent man, the traditionless man, is the powerless victim of propaganda.⁶

There is always, we may say, a given reservoir of symbolism that the propagandist may exploit. When social symbolism is associated with the historic, conservative tradition of justice in the West, propaganda is a self-limiting disease, controlled in the sense that the banks of a stream control the flow of water. When tradition is gone, the identification of a given propaganda with the good and the just (the usual practice) is a meaningless gesture. Propaganda usually seeks to separate groups, in order to exploit the limited and subordinate symbolism of the class. Only in this way can the indirect appeal of propaganda be used to evoke the emotional response of latent symbolism. Propaganda seeks positive immediate action or negative immediate action, but its major effort is to exploit the emotional slant of individuals and social groups. When the action demanded coincides with the affective quality of symbolism, it may be called positive propaganda; when it is based on a contradiction between the action or inaction desired and the affective symbolism it may be called negative propaganda. Since a great amount of official effort is to immobilize opposition, one should not overlook the negative emotionality of propaganda effort.

Ideology is fragmentary in its nature; its aim is not the establishment of systematic philosophical points of view, but the evocation of behavior, let us say immediate political action or inactive affectiveness. The rejection of the com-

⁶ See Peter F. Drucker, *The Future of Industrial Man* (New York, 1942).

plete and consistent viewpoint, characteristic of ideology, means that ideologies are likely to be ethically irresponsible. Because immediate action or inaction is desired the resort to propaganda may be at any level to secure cryptic ends. We may distinguish with Lasswell ideological and technical intelligence, but the latter must certainly, as a political force, seek to dominate the ideological grouping of sentiment. The irresponsibility of propagandists, let us say the irrelevance to them of traditions of justice, suggests a predominantly free-will attitude toward the historic. "The end of ideological policy," says Lasswell, "is favorable attitudes; the most distinctive means are symbols."⁷ The instruments of ideological policy are the means of communication, that is, mass-communications, such as films, the press, etc. "Propaganda is the positive guidance of such material; censorship eliminates." Lasswell agrees that to the extent goals or ends are not clearly formulated (and this is often a technique of deliberate censorship), propaganda tends to be negative in character.⁸ But the critic might insist that the final issue goes back to the substance of ideological policy. That is the issue; it is not the mere technique which must function in the light of a tradition or the lack of a tradition.⁹

Given the objectives commonly associated with propaganda, we may argue that, unlike educative or philosophical endeavor, one of its chief dangers is a contradiction between the symbols of appeal and the sense of reality. In other words, propaganda has a tendency to approach rapidly the limits of social interdependence, a mutuality or reciprocity which is never absolute, but is more like the uneven front of a military action. In war, of course, mutuality reaches closest to complete interdependence because of one,

⁷ Harold D. Lasswell, "The Relation of Ideological Intelligence to Public Policy," *Ethics*, Vol. 53, p. 29, (1942).

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 29, 33.

⁹ Edmond Taylor, *The Strategy of Terror*, rev. ed. (New York, 1942), believes that German and Russian propaganda during the Spanish Civil War manipulated symbols to pull the unwilling their way; it attempted to eliminate any sentiments of neutrality. He states: "... whenever a representation acquires a sufficient affective charge it charges all the representations associated with it, creating a vast complex. The more powerful the emotion, the wider the ring of associations included in the complex." P. 26.

all-embracing factor. Propaganda for such specific purposes thus has a wider range than at other times. The propaganda for world order, for example, seems to be a logical extension of war propaganda, but in so doing it may run counter to the psychological and social realities of a restored peace. Symbolism in this case may elude the comprehension of ordinary, functioning groups.

Now just as mass-communication has broken down the symbolic isolation of the nations, so has it disintegrated the self-dependence of groups and social classes. The results of this breakdown must be various, but certainly one consequence is a greater sense of insecurity in the clearer knowledge of the expansive wills of colliding social interests. Thus communications tend to increase the fear of one social group for another, and the distrust of the farmer for the worker and the worker for the farmer, for example, may easily become the basis of symbolic manipulation. There is cogent political psychology in the efforts of the modern political leader to soften the impact of social fear on the attitudes of the democratic citizen.

In the process of expansion and contraction of symbolic effort, as it is regulated by the strategy of social struggle, one of the common techniques has been the use of ridicule, and the exploitation of the emotional power of the epithet. The modern revolutionaries, those connected with the Third International particularly, have shown themselves more adroit in this than the conservatives against whom ridicule and denunciation have been directed. The enemy must be either a rascal or an ignoramus. The middle classes, from the time of their rise to social eminence, have been subjected to the guerrilla warfare of the pen, and they have indeed survived their ordinary measure of abuse. American conservatism rests it seems on some conception of middle class thought and function; the historic traditions of morality and religious feeling are certainly consistent with its social theory. Moreover, a very large percentage of the American people give allegiance to the middle class idea, whether it is a middle class that has the too constricted middle incomes, the functional or professional groups, or merely a psychological attitude that is bourgeois. To such people the propaganda of the class war is not a statement of the real; the symbolism of class war has often been to the con-

servative extremely unreal, or disconnected with reality. Yet with the Second World War the class struggle for the moment faded into the background as the American Communists came to the defense even of the dollar-a-year men.¹⁰

To the conservative, the propaganda front during the war moved to another tactical point. The enormous development of the controlled economy, the amazing expansion of the federal civil service (nearly 3,000,000 in 1943), suggested that the bureaucratic planners might be bidding for the debased inheritance of decentralized power formerly characteristic of the American way of life. The "expert" has, of course, a strong argument in self-defense in troubled times; he can argue that efficiency and secrecy in government are more necessary than the ordinary procedures of democratic compromise.¹¹ Bureaucratic pressure has reached a point at which it probably equals that of the political leader chosen under the historic custom of representative government. And during the war signs emerged that, like most men of expansive wills, the bureaucratic justification for a continuation of power after the war was in process of statement. Thus a propaganda for discrediting the middle class alternative to the bureaucratic was plainly to be seen. However, in the end the bureaucratic state promised to be no less disagreeable to the socialists and collectivists than to the business and agrarian groups.

In contrast to the United States, England has had no doubt a trusted political class, a class that has been noted for its political restraint as well as its efficiency. Such a class obviously does not have to rely on a propaganda against the tradition of the people, because it has become part of the English tradition of political rectitude and restraint. The unevenness of bureaucratic material in the United States constitutes a real danger, since fear of popular reprisal leads the bureaucrat into a propaganda which implicitly asks the people to abdicate their opinions on politics. Furthermore, the characteristic intellectual posture of opposition to tradition has led intellectuals to sup-

¹⁰ See the speech of Earl Browder before the New York State Convention of the Communist party in August, 1942.

¹¹ See Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Politics* (New York, 1937), pp. 29 ff.

port the new orientation of power. The "lost generation," the decadents who went to Paris after the First World War became, after 1929, socially conscious and ended up by advocating bureaucracy, centralization, and planning. Such may be called a flanking action against the democratic expression of American public opinion.

But we must move on to another phase of the argument for propaganda which seeks to circumvent the action of opinion on government. We have in the modern world a predominance of industrial civilization. At the heart of industrial civilization is the great city, the megalopolis. Within these cities the conditions of life, in America at least, have been such that the historic tradition has become remote from social reality. Tradition has tended to become inert, if not subject to pernicious anemia. However, urban and technological symbolism have tended to coincide, offering to the propagandist a compelling opportunity for the use of his powers. If tradition has been starved in the world city, the human emotion, its attractions and repulsions, has remained; response to symbolic manipulation has been therefore more effective on the primitive level, or at least the argument has rested on the incomprehensibility of social necessity to the average man.

Technological necessity thus may become the backbone of anti-traditional and anti-democratic propaganda. At least it can be anti-democratic in the sense that the common man can be convinced that he knows little or nothing about what ought to be done by those who make significant political decisions. Technologicalism is especially dangerous to Western tradition because it encourages individuals to avoid a sense of personal responsibility for social conditions. It is a social determinism which even exculpates the administrator for his failures. Propaganda has, therefore, a peculiarly close relationship with modern ideological technologicalism. It utilizes the devices of mass-communication which have been produced, but propaganda also exploits the failing belief of the individual in his social power; by its very nature propaganda concentrates on the immediate objective, forcing the individual to neglect the long-run principles of action which have been embodied in the Western tradition of civilized man. The technological interpretation of history tends in fact to destroy the meaning

of history for the individual.¹² But such conditions make, for the conservative, the quest of a coherent, traditional basis of life all the more important.¹³

So far in this discussion little attention has been paid to the revolutionary nature of our times. We realize, or think we do, that the revolution on a broad front has been creeping up on us. Negatively, the revolution is the failure of Western tradition to provide men with social standards and political restraints. In a conservative society, that is, a functioning society, as Drucker puts it, the response to propaganda in contradiction with tradition is so limited that it is not more than a phase of the extension and contraction of civil liberty. But when people surrender their right to opinions, when they become inert and lethargic, their tradition has failed them, and the emergent minority elite, seeing its opportunity, uses its own symbolism for the establishment of a new system of internal cohesion. As a revolutionary device, propaganda is the deterministic, un-free answer of men of panaceas to the problem of getting people to accept the authority they propose. It is, in the end, an evasion of the moral principle of the agreement of free men in a free society. An assertion of the perfectibility of man resolves itself into the perfecting of power, im-

¹² See Emil Lederer, "Technology," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1930), Vol. 14, pp. 553 ff.: "The most modern and most rational technological development is thus accompanied by the appearance of irrational mass movements."

¹³ Space is not available here to explore the relation of perceptible tendencies in national attitude to propaganda. But it is clear that a defeatist or inferior attitude generally held will make individuals more responsive to the cult of the primitive in propaganda technique. As national groups feel themselves inferior, they are the most susceptible to erosive symbolism. May we say that English pride in their own achievement and competence has been a factor in preserving a national coherence unattainable by the best of propagandists? May we also say that the gradual political disintegration of the Third Republic was in part due to the opposite tendency in attitudes? Perhaps the United States shows a little of both.

Taine regarded the English as superior to the French, though not because of intellectual power. "An Englishman," said Taine in *The History of English Literature*, "entering on life, finds to all great questions simply suggested doubts." Cited in Oscar Cargill, *Intellectual America* (New York, 1941), p. 12. Cargill notes further (p. 13) that, since Taine, the French have felt inferior, first to English, and then to the Germans after 1870.

plicitly arguing that man is not so perfect after all. Yet the imperfection of man is basic in our moral tradition; out of it grows our dependence upon a higher will and the justification of humility in men of power and in men of obedience. The revolution begins in a Saturnalia of optimism and ends in a comprehensive system of power. Conservatism does neither.

But the conservative, when he says that man is evil and is dependent upon a will of restraint for his goodness, runs a gauntlet of dangers also. If we say that man is evil, then, like Pascal, we may arrive at conclusions more Machiavellian than Machiavelli. Or, if one is a conservative realist, the state may be given a foundation independent of both religion and ethics. In either case the way is open then for the non-violent use of amoral techniques, *i.e.*, propaganda as a governing device. The believer in an ethical order must recognize the imperfection of man and at the same time control him within the pattern of moral behavior. In truth, it is a balance, which the moderation of conservatism may provide.¹⁴

The propaganda of peace may marshal the frustrations and anger bred by war, but if tradition fails in peace whence may man go for assurance? We know now, or ought to, that the war of nerves, like economic war, ends in real war. Here is the weakness of the idea of propaganda as an independent and peaceful agency in national politics.¹⁵ Historical conservatism has attempted, with only limited success, to provide an alternative to the power manipulation of cohesive symbols. Its answer has been balance in society which allows diversity within harmony, *i.e.*, freedom. Conservatism has moved to the position, as with Burke, that tradition will give us canons of behavior which will enable us to show enough restraint for men of different capacities and interests to live together under a common rule of law. Propaganda and its obverse, the revolution, demand centralization and unleashed power simply because diversity or freedom is incompatible with the power

¹⁴ Babbitt, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

¹⁵ See Taylor, *op. cit.*, for the argument that before September 1, 1939, Europe (outside of German ruling circles at least) was convinced that the threat of war was just a war of nerves. This glorification of propagandist technique ended in the inevitable.

of those who benefit by disintegration. Propaganda becomes a means of emancipating government from responsibility and limitation. The tradition of constitutional government stands in the way. Conservatives must say that there is nothing inevitable in the political and economic tendencies which grow out of the psychology of traditionless man.¹⁶

Neither conservatives nor revolutionaries have, we believe, understood the currents of public sentiment that have been at work since the outbreak of the French Revolution. On the one hand, we may point to the failure of conservatism during past generations, but the prophetic powers of the revolutionary movements are, if anything, more erratic. The literature of Marxism, for example, over past decades did not promise the actual conditions of the twentieth century to its believers. May we say that in spite of the forces of war and diplomacy, a transmogrified revolutionary nationalism won out in the twentieth century which would be unrecognizable by either nineteenth-century conservatives or revolutionaries? Europe of the last century is a condition in embryo of the century that is ours.¹⁷

Can propaganda reconcile social interests to the extent that order and consensus will prevail? Tradition of course can perform such a function, but propaganda is more characteristically a weapon in the class war; it can in theory be nothing more than a stop-gap, though as a device it tends to destroy further the force of implicit social coherence. The generation of hate, in opposition or to the opposition, makes man incapable of considering the social results of his action, and the citizen of hate is the first and most enthusiastic victim of propaganda. He is, indeed, what Jefferson meant by the corrupted citizen. Such is

¹⁶ The conservative, as inheritor of the Western tradition of justice, may well argue that as one descends from the moral and ethical to the primitive and emotional, the deterministic element in behavior grows increasingly large. Conservatives recognize, it seems, a parallelism of pattern and freedom at all times. But freedom itself is real as man labors in search of the rational and the right.

¹⁷ Cf. Ernest L. Woodward, *Three Studies in European Conservatism: Metternich, Guizot, The Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century* (New York and London, 1929).

the profound meaning of Dr. Johnson's statement that patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel.

Tradition is the great support of democracy. It suggests self-control to the electorate and to leaders of parliaments. It is essential in the working of any orderly political system, because it is within the circumference of tradition that the practice of political compromise may work.¹⁸ Mass action, in its deterministic pattern, tends to be centralized action; it is low in its level of spiritual appreciation, and therefore the ideological appeal becomes linearly debased.¹⁹ Propaganda is a device to discipline society when tradition no longer does it, but it establishes no inbred loyalty under the vast uncertainties of institutional life. That a society without tradition must attain discipline from some other source may be admitted. How can tradition be reborn? Surely not by an endless and uncertain reformism which becomes a growing cause of insecurity and political emotionalism, producing in turn a more energetic supporting propaganda of word or deed. By propaganda a ruling group may reach decisions if there is no volition and no information on the part of the citizens, but such decisions cannot always keep the emotion and volition so created directed against the enemies of the government.²⁰

The conservative indictment of the use of propaganda by the revolutionary centers on its failure as a permanent social discipline. In the conservative view tradition is a cure or restorative to citizenship, while propaganda is a habit-forming drug which requires increased and more vio-

¹⁸ Cf. Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, pp. 294-295.

¹⁹ See T. V. Smith, "Compromise: Its Context and Limits," *Ethics*, Vol. 53, p. 7 (1927), for a statement of the relation of action and ideals: "(1) The quantity of compromise in society varies directly with the area of action; (2) the quality of ideality surviving compromise varies inversely with the size of the collectivity." Thus the quantity and quality of ideality for action are incompatible and so vary inversely.

²⁰ Quincy Wright observes: "Thus wise defenders of the *status quo* have usually preferred propaganda, economic controls, or argument as methods for settling controversies, avoiding violence and war to the utmost." *A Study of War* (1942), Vol. 1, p. 128. Schumpeter notes that in Russia the workers have been so disciplined that a strike becomes constructive treason, and that managers have more power than capitalistic employers. Trade unions have thus become a means of authoritarian discipline, and there are no intellectuals to create opposition as in capitalism. *Op. cit.*, pp. 216-218.

lent doses. The structure of leadership, the exploitation of groups and group-traditions are the important elements in the conservative view, but social structure itself must be bedded in the social tradition of the West. It must be bedded in the principles of restraint and submission to the conceptions of justice and class reciprocity. Leadership cannot be a complete substitute for the individually accepted obligation; it cannot be a substitute for the energy of tradition. If the propagandist would, like Rousseau, get rid of tradition in the name of feeling, the conservative is sometimes in danger of getting rid of tradition in the name of reason. Tradition must be defended critically and selectively in the name of reason. Tradition is a dynamic force in history, and it must be governed accordingly. To the extent that propaganda creates symbols to control the imagination, and through the imagination the will, it is like religion and education; but education and religion, let us say, seek to create the self-responsible imagination that is a counter-weight to the power of any self-appointed ideological director.

When human energy is so ill-directed as in our time, the conservative may find it difficult to await the results of experience. If after a long period we reach again rational and restrained behavior, even on the level of economic effort, we may feel that the age of propaganda will fade into an epoch of revitalized tradition.

THE POLITICAL THEORY OF VICHY

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Any effort to analyze the various aspects of the Vichy régime at this time is beset by two almost insuperable obstacles: a scarcity of available materials here in the United States and the danger of drawing premature conclusions regarding a story which is still unfolding. Cognizance must also be taken of the fact that since the German occupation of the whole of France in November, 1942, it has been impossible to get any light whatsoever on what is actually happening in France. Therefore, any consideration of development since the German occupation must be ruled out for the time being.

The attempt to determine the basic political theory of the Vichy régime constitutes a baffling problem. Some observers have denied that the Vichy régime had any theoretical basis at all and have claimed that it was no more than a creature of accidental circumstances.¹ That view, it seems, is too simple, although the observer of Vichy must constantly keep in mind that the régime was never a free agent, but was sharply circumscribed by the German overlords in Paris and pushed from one collaboration measure to another.² We cannot forget, too, that Vichy, insofar as the political and economic life of continental France was concerned, was a rump state, consisting at its inception in 1940 of 10,000,000 population and 8,000,000 refugees, many of whom later returned to their homes in northern France and Belgium.³ This rump state produced but fifteen per cent of the agricultural output of France and contained but

¹ Lt. Col. Pierre Tissier, *The Government of Vichy* (London, 1942), p. 53. Col. Tissier believes that the "pretended programme of the so-called 'National Revolution' is merely an ideological mask covering measures made for the occasion or mere expedients."

² *Ibid.* Tissier believes that hunger and distress have dictated most Vichy measures.

³ While most of the French Empire remained under the control of Vichy until November, 1942, it is impossible to discover what proportion of the products of the Empire went to France merely to be transferred to Germany.