

merit and the usefulness of Mr. Schlamm's book. To its production he has brought an intimate knowledge of European affairs, acquired during a distinguished journalistic career, and a mind refreshingly free from pedantry and ideological preconceptions. The result is a volume whose intellectual vigor and critical discernment place it well in the van of most of the recent obituaries on European democracy. It is, moreover, a work offering a challenge to action which America, as the chief surviving democracy, can hardly ignore. If there are still those who believe that free institutions are a miraculous manifestation of divine benevolence or a kind of automatic phenomenon of nature, they will do well to read what Mr. Schlamm has to say.

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*The Statecraft of Machiavelli.* By H. BUTTERFIELD. (London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd. 1940. Pp. 167. 6s.)

This volume is a tight little book from the tight little island; it should take its place among the important contemporary interpretations of Machiavelli. While it argues a case, it is in no sense a tract of the times, though this may be, indeed, a time to return to the "Machiavellian" interpretation of Machiavelli. Mr. Butterfield insists that the central effort of Machiavelli's work was to establish a science of statecraft based upon the knowledge that one may gain from a study of the past. There is no willingness to save the great Florentine from the charges made against him by his contemporaries or later critics. The picture here drawn is of a man whose own precepts could not save him, who was out of touch with the world of politics in the exile's study, and who advocated a consistency in the use of power that even the casual gentlemen of the Renaissance could not stomach.

"The same maxims recur in *The Prince*, the *Discourses*, the *History of Florence*, and the private letters; the statecraft in all these writings is continuous and the exposition is of the same texture throughout; our judgment of Machiavelli and his science is independent of that special pleading which is so often done on behalf of *The Prince*" (p. 20). Machiavelli was original most of all, argues Mr. Butterfield, in contending that statecraft could be erected into a permanent science, a proposition which was rejected, for example, by Guicciardini, who held that in politics no rule holds good. To establish his science of statecraft, Machiavelli turned to history; but his use of history has three important aspects. He believed that great men might be imitated; that since political situations recur, the present problems may be solved by maxims derived from the past; and that as a guide to human behavior the history of the ancient world was superior to all other. The ancient world taught by maxims and examples.

The author asserts that Machiavelli believed the man who was wholly good might be admirable, but he despised the wicked man who could not be wholly wicked (p. 101). "Machiavelli's system was to make men more consistent and scientific in their political cunning, so the effect—the very intention—of his remarks on morality was to clear the path for the more general acceptance of the kind of statecraft that he had to teach" (p. 113). Regarded as too violent and extreme by his fellows, Machiavelli wanted to be the reformer of the ineffective statecraft of his day. He was a doctrinaire of the principle of thoroughness.

Two other aspects of this work deserve attention. Mr. Butterfield offers a remarkable analysis of the Renaissance cult of the ancient world and of the rise of the inductive method in order to place Machiavelli in his background. But, turning to England, he examines the political ideas of "the notorious politician Bolingbroke," a case of the genuine influence of Machiavelli's ideas. As the author showed the indebtedness of Machiavelli to his past, so he shows how many of the Florentine's ideas were used by Bolingbroke.

The hypothesis so ably presented here has the merit at least of consistency. It suggests that Machiavelli said often just what he meant, and that his own contemporaries could read as clearly as Machiavelli could write. This volume presents a convincing argument for a modest but intelligible theory.

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*The Coal Industry.* BY GLEN LAWTON PARKER. (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs. 1940. Pp. 198. \$3.00.)

Dr. Parker has ably analyzed the attempted solutions of the coal industry's problems as exemplified by the Bituminous Coal Code of the National Recovery Act, the Coal Conservation Act of 1935, and the Coal Conservation Act of 1937. Some attention is given to stabilization through the sales agency as practiced under the Appalachian Plan. His legislative approach to the coal problem is strengthened by several chapters dealing with the economic and social aspects of the industry, the effectiveness of private management, and a discussion of some of the legal concepts involved in the relationship of government to the coal business.

Political scientists will be interested chiefly in the author's appraisal of the efficacy of the various legislative efforts. Of N.R.A., he states: "The major defect of the code was the decentralization of authority. An industry as chaotic as the coal industry needed a strong centralized authority to prevent a renewal of old-time anarchy . . . it failed to control new capacity and did not attempt to plan market conditions." He concluded that much more success would have been achieved if a code authority had