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ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

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Chapter I

The Social Scientist and His Values

BY FRANCIS G. WILSON

I

For some time it has been apparent that taxonomic studies of intellectuals and the values they hold would throw light on both intellectuals and the nature of contemporary society. The purposes of this inquiry are, first, to offer some definitions and descriptions of the intellectuals as a group or a class; and, second, to suggest a plan of classifying intellectuals by the system of values or social theories they hold. Value systems are, indeed, the root and the meaning of the history of intellectuals, or, to say it in more impersonal terms, of intellectual history. The whole essay will be governed by what is conceived to be, in rather general terms, a Thomistic theory of state and society. We may profit by a sociology of the intellectuals, just as we have gained by social inquiries into nearly all of the groups in modern society. There is, no doubt, some resentment against a general inquiry about intellectuals, for the intellectuals, especially those who are devoted to scientific work, seem to believe they can stand in judgment on all others.¹ Such endeavors have reflected the controversies within intellectual life, as well as the functional exclusiveness or separateness of the intellectual from other members of society.² At a somewhat vulgar

1. See my article, "Public Opinion and the Intellectuals," *The American Political Science Review*, XLVIII (June, 1954), 321.

2. Josef Pieper has observed that there is an exclusiveness among the learned which is an expression of their difference from the many. But this separateness or exclusiveness is not an attitude toward the many, or it should not be; and such exclusiveness does not give rise to a difference in social class. See "On the Idea of the 'Academic,'" *Thought*, XXX (Winter, 1955-56), 593-594.

level, it has resulted at times in the amateur psychoanalysis of the opposition, culminating in the charge that conservatives are a little psychoneurotic because of a concern over "status." In addition, it is suggested, often by implication, that those who are religious are inclined to be authoritarian in their personalities.³ A sociology of the intellectuals would submit the *libertas philosophandi* to the criticism to which any and all social groups are subject.⁴ Such a "process" suggests that as much intellectual activity arises from a metaphysical position as from the traumas resting uneasily in the subconscious. It suggests even that the scientific principle in human relations is the expression of a metaphysical choice. *Quis custodiet custodes?* is always a good question. Who are to judge the intellectuals? Are they above the judgments made by the vulgar, or by individuals outside of the groups of specialized function? Intellectual life has at any moment both the element of metaphysical choice and the fact of function in society.

R. H. S. Crossman has held that the educated elite must subject any conclusions it reaches to the acid test of inept common sense, as represented first by the elected politicians, to whom they are responsible between elections, and then by the masses, when they assert their sovereignty at the polls. Crossman insisted at the Milian Cultural Freedom Congress that political wisdom has very little to do with formal education and that character is more important than either knowledge or quickness of wit. He further concluded that the quality of political discussion does not noticeably improve as one ascends from the masses to the experts. Just because a man may know more, he is not necessarily wiser.⁵ Both the intellectuals of the right and of the left may have, and often do have, a warm feeling and sympathy with the ordinary mind. Woodrow Wilson

3. See Richard Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt," *The American Scholar*, 24 (Winter, 1954-1955), 9 ff. See in general Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It*, Knopf, 1948, Ch. X, on "Woodrow Wilson: The Conservative as Liberal." The most influential contemporary work treating intellectual positions in the light of Freudian analysis is, of course, T. W. Adorno and Others, *The Authoritarian Personality*, Harper, 1950.

4. Robert B. Sutton, "The Phrase *Libertas Philosophandi*," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XIV (April, 1953), 310-316.

5. See *The New Leader*, May 7, 1956, Section Two, p. S13. This section is a report of the Milian Cultural Freedom Congress. Harter and Sullivan have suggested that the intellectuals provide the brains for both the defense of the

liked Walter Bagehot and Bagehot liked Shakespeare because he had "a broad tolerance and sympathy for illogical and common minds," and because he had a great ability to understand inferior minds. Bagehot, a sober conservative, had a strong love of the common man with his ordinary opinions. Like Burke, both Bagehot and Wilson saw the common judgment as the cement of society. And at least Bagehot and Burke might agree that only dull nations like the Romans and the British could remain self-governing.⁶

II

It is clear that the formation of values comes through traditions in teaching, in which the intellectuals are the more powerful force. What is meant by intellectuals? When Russell Kirk edited the first number of his new conservative review, *Modern Age*, he said of Julien Benda, "By *clerics*, Benda meant those persons of learning and taste, particularly writers and teachers, whose duty in every age it is to preserve the integrity of moral ideals. They may or may not be clerics; they may or may not be professors; but, if true to their calling, they always are guardians of the Truth. In Benda's eyes, the Truth is the Hellenic view of man and nature."⁷ The modern use of the term "intellectual" seems to have emerged in the time of the Dreyfus matter, when the artists and scholars in a sudden political articulateness rallied to his defense. No doubt at the same time they sensed alienation from the dominant bourgeois life of the French nation. The intellectuals demanded justice, and

ruling class and for the revolution. "Though these people, being human, indulge in a lot of self-deception and wishful thinking, their attitudes spring from consideration of ideologies, social movements, history, science, and logic. Whether or not their attitudes or opinions are sound is a delicate matter of value judgments." D. Lincoln Harter and John Sullivan, *Propaganda Handbook*, Twentieth Century Publishing Company, 1953, p. 139.

6. Woodrow Wilson, *Mere Literature and Other Essays*, Houghton Mifflin, 1896, 83 ff.

7. See Russell Kirk, "The Treason of the Clerks," *Modern Age*, I (Summer, 1957), 97. This was a review of Robert J. Neiss, *Julien Benda*. On education and the classical view of man, see H. I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'Éducation dans l'Antiquité*, Éditions du Seuil, 2nd ed., 1950, pp. 297 ff. and *passim*. Marrou noted that the humanistic values in classical education have served the Greek state, Roman civilization, and God since the rise of Christianity.

they were intellectuals in the classical sense, but they were also serving in society in given ways, and they were performing a function in the order of politics.

Such a functional view has been characteristic of much of Continental left-wing discussion of the intellectuals, and, indeed, of the social group, the "intelligentsia." In 1957 Alfred Kantorowicz fled from East to West Germany and denounced the Communist regime as one in which a "wave of terror" was directed against the intellectuals. There has been in East Germany "lawlessness, exploitation of the workers, mental enslavement of the intelligentsia, tyranny by a clique of discredited people who disgrace the conception of socialism. . . ." ⁸ When Mao-Tse-Tung gave his now noted speech on February 27, 1957, which included the Chinese aphorism, "Let a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend," he considered the problem of contradictions among the intellectuals. Diversity was permitted for the development of the arts, science, and a socialist culture. China needed intellectuals for the mighty tasks of socialist construction, but it was obvious that Mao used "intellectual" in a very wide sense to include all educated people who are not capitalists. It covered writers and journalists, university and school teachers, scientists, doctors, and engineers. In Soviet classification, intellectual has, in truth, come to include all who are not peasants and manual workers, thus giving the label of intellectual most surely to the civil servant. ⁹

We may say, broadly, that on the Continent the "intellectuals" are generally regarded as functional groups, and a judgment of the quality of the mental operations of an individual is not necessarily included. In America there is something of both definitions, though apparently in recent years an effort to formulate the code of a self-conscious functional intelligentsia has been made. Of course, if the intellectual is defined simply as a functioning person, a person with some peculiar technical or verbal skill, then the quality of the mind is not part of the definition of that person as an intellectual. To

8. See *The Bulletin* (West Germany), August 27, 1957.

9. See supplement to the *New Leader*, September 9, 1957, p. 39, for the comment by G. F. Hudson of Oxford University. Also, Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*, Praeger, 1957: the new class is the class of oligarchs and bureaucrats who have seized a monopoly of power in the Communist state.

define the intellectual in terms of the "rightness" or "oughtness" of his mental operations implies a philosophical foundation for a conception of the intellectual. Milton M. Gordon, in contrast, has defined the intellectual as a person who has a serious and relatively informed interest in ideas and the arts. ¹⁰ Unhappily, he seems to omit the person who has scientific knowledge and technical capacity in its application.

There seems to be, however, an effort in the United States to define an intellectual as a "liberal," which might be shown from the American contributions to the recent Milan Cultural Freedom Congress, or in some of the explorations of academic freedom during the past generation. ¹¹ These current controversies over academic freedom, and by implication the role of the intellectual in contemporary society, have grown in large measure out of the attack on the right of Congress to inquire into the Communist affiliation of professors, government employees, journalists, artists, theatrical performers, and lawyers. Peter Viereck has argued that the defense of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy was grounded in old-fashioned populism and progressivism, which has long carried within it a characteristic mistrust of the intellectuals. ¹²

But in the very definition of the intellectual as a liberal, that is, in terms of the value formation he represents, there is a judgment of how "intellectual" he is. To attack some persons who are intellectuals is not to attack intelligence, reason, or all intellectuals. Unfortunately, any attack on some intellectuals is considered an attack on intelligence. If one defends value against those who base judgment on either fact or instinct, then the value of knowledge is being defended, and *a fortiori* science itself. Such an attack is certainly not "anti-intellectualism" in a proper sense of this much abused

10. See his "Social Class and American Intellectuals," *AAUP Bulletin*, 40 (Winter, 1954-55), 518.

11. The files of the *Bulletin* of the American Association of University Professors would contain much of the best literature on this problem, though there is a distinguished bibliography in book form on this subject. A book like Morris R. Cohen, *American Thought: A Critical Survey*, The Free Press, 1954, supports this idea, at least in the selection of materials.

12. Peter Viereck, "The New American Right," *Arizona Quarterly*, 12 (Autumn, 1956), 197 ff. He comments on what is called the "status-resentment" thesis about the motivation of conservatives, included in Daniel Bell (editor), *The New American Right*, Critteron Books, 1955; Richard Hofstadter's Freudian interpretation of the conservatives also appears in this volume.

word. A critic or intellectual, for example, may be praised for resisting the anti-intellectualist trap, and at the same time such a person may say in the construction of his normative political theory that all religion is pernicious superstition, that sex life should be based directly on a sort of human process of natural selection, that political movements are absurd, and that all of the recent wars, say against the Nazis and the Communists, are lacking in any rational determination of justice or injustice. In not infrequent instances, the term anti-intellectual is simply a pejorative term for theological inquiry, and philosophy that is not pragmatic or empirical in its epistemology, or even efforts to demonstrate the reasonableness of humanistic values. One may be opposed to some intellectuals simply because one is in favor of using intelligence in attacking social and political questions.¹³

In most situations, the quality of mind and the functional skills within a given "public" become involved. By intellectuals we may thus mean, among others, teachers at nearly all levels and in all kinds of institutions; writers, journalistic and otherwise; the practitioners and critics of the arts; scientific and technical people, such as financial experts, doctors, lawyers, engineers and the vast staffs of scientific and research institutions; management in industry; and civil servants in the higher professional brackets.

Now in every such group of intellectuals there are methods of expressing the common interest. Language here is the vocabulary or the "jargon" of the skill, and the ideas accepted by the intellectuals concerned.¹⁴ Among all intellectuals there is a traditional and accepted rhetoric that is used to discipline the group internally and to defend its interests against outside critics. Often such modes of expression are not suitable for communication with just anyone; in this case the common and general language of controversy must

13. Consult C. S. Lewis, *The Abolition of Man*, Macmillan, 1946, pp. 21 ff., for a brilliant discussion of the doctrine of Objective Value, including the Chinese idea of *Tao* and the Western principle of natural law.

14. Jargon applied to contemporary social science suggests the unnecessary invention of technical words, often Latinate in origin, but which do not carry a precise enough meaning to advance in reality "scientific" discourse. Or, as Webster's Unabridged Dictionary suggests, it is "The technical, esoteric, or secret vocabulary of a science, art, trade, sect, profession, or other special group. . . ."

be used.¹⁵ Intellectuals become marked as groups largely because of traditions in learning, religion, judgment, and philosophy. A social scientist who is a Catholic becomes conscious early in his career of profound differences in the traditions within his discipline, and particularly in social sciences other than his own. He becomes aware that the roots of a value system, which is being both preserved and reformed by teaching, constitute the chief problem of intellectual history. Ideas are weapons, intellectual history is a weapon, and value systems are the weapons of those who teach. In this sense, the study of the formation of values is the reason in intellectual history.

III

The more important proposition to begin with is that a discrimination between value systems leads easily and properly into a classification of intellectuals. It is more meaningful than trying to place them in a scale of the "middle class."¹⁶ If one is at all committed in the intellectual sieges of the present, a sense of difference in quality and kind of intellectual is certain to arise. And for a Scholastic thinker who stands inevitably somewhere outside the postulates of positivistic liberalism, a knowledge of conflict rewards one with a deeper perspective, a further dimension of understanding, than the contentant living merely within some secular system can have. While the secular mind has attempted to ignore Christian thought, and more particularly Catholic thought, for the Thomistic thinker it is simply impossible to be unconcerned with those

15. Mortimer J. Adler has said that "with exceptions so rare that even they may be doubted, philosophers do not actually join issue. Philosophers fail to disagree because they fail to achieve the minimal topical agreements prerequisite to genuine disagreement." Adler believes that the next significant advance in philosophy will come from a developed art of constructing philosophical controversies, in which the issue between individuals will be understood and will be joined. See Adler, "Controversy in the Life and Teaching of Philosophy," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XXX (April, 1956), 19, 16-35.

16. Milton M. Gordon, "Social Class and American Intellectuals," *A.A.U.P. Bulletin*, Winter, 1954-55, p. 524: ". . . the most plausible hypothesis is that the basic social status position from which the intellectual looks out on the level are drawn upward to it by aspiration, intellectuals below this level are drawn down by participation."

with whom one is inevitably in conflict. A Thomist, thus, will know more about both Catholics and liberals, than the traditional liberal will know about Catholics.

Intellectual history is often a kind of taxonomic effort that charts the evolution of intellectual elites. It offers a history of the philosophic, professional, and learned types who have attained sovereignty in particular centers of intellectual work, such as the historically famous universities and national capitals. One thinks readily of Italian university towns, or of the University of Paris through a long and changing history. The type of person in power illustrates a change in the kind of intellectuality that has been respectable, or, the kind of metaphysical choices that such an elite makes. In some instances the differences have been chiefly in modes or styles of expression. Modern social scientists, for example, seek to attain a technicality, distinctness, and objectivity in expression that fulfills at least the literary requirements of scientific method.¹⁷ While there have been many significant changes in style in Catholic intellectual life, they have been more deliberate and less experimental than among other intellectuals.¹⁸ Here again is one of the reasons for the sense of perspective that the Catholic intellectual

17. Edward L. Bernays, for example, has assumed the general social applicability of much of the findings of contemporary social science. In *Public Relations*, Oklahoma University Press, 1952, 215, he has urged that those engaged in salesmanship should use the new knowledge of man being developed by America's thirty thousand social scientists, and thus gain entrance to the hidden markets of the human personality.

Obviously, such a problem involves finally questions of academic freedom, freedom notably to differ from the orthodoxy of a given discipline, or "state of the science." See Russell Kirk, *Academic Freedom; An Essay in Definition*, Regnery, 1955, pp. 135, 136: "Now I think that what the doctrinaire liberals—more properly called disintegrated liberals, perhaps—like Mr. Commager, Mr. Taylor and Mr. Hutchins fear is really, in their heart of hearts, themselves. Their neat little world of Progress and Civil Liberties Committees and Welfare Legislation and Goodness of Humankind has dissolved, overnight into its constituent atoms. . . . The reader may have gathered that I do not much respect the present opinions of doctrinaire liberals on the subject of academic freedom." Note Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger, *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States*, Columbia University Press, 1955. Also Journal Kahn, "The Threat To Academic Freedom," *Proceedings*, American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1956, pp. 160 ff.

18. See for example, the conclusions that may be drawn from a Thomistic history of philosophy. F. J. Thonnard, *A Short History of Philosophy*, trans. by E. A. Marziaz, Declé (N. Y.), 1955. There is both continuity and change in the deliberate moderation of philosophical style.

may have in relation to his critical fellow citizens in the City of Learning.

IV

Now the social sciences form a group of disciplines in the contemporary university. As university disciplines, the social sciences are young; they are still a little like budgetary and curricular experiments. Political science, for example, can be considered either very old, as it is assumed to be in the study of the history of political thought, or it may be considered to be exceedingly young, not being introduced into American university studies until late in the last century. It can be regarded as either an off-shoot of history or of political economy. It may be considered the lineal descendant of Aristotle's *Politics* and the brilliant Greek inquiry into government. But in relation to the value systems of a society, the social sciences are not new, and the interpretative mechanisms of all of the social sciences are correlated with the methodology that is popular at a given time. Logical method, mathematical systems, such as geometry in the seventeenth century, history, biology, the analogy of physics, and the modern formulation of a "scientific method," have all influenced the study of society. But the concern for method, especially a quantitative, empirical and value-skeptical method, is predominant in the social sciences in our time.

On the other hand, the social scientists must make their metaphysical choices in the larger contexts of life, just as all other intellectuals must. In each instance, the social sciences extend from inconsequential and small jobs of calculation, enumeration, or classification, to the abstract ideas one may find in the most significant of the political philosophers. In some of the social sciences there is a greater unity of method, postulates, and subject-matter than in others. Sociology, for example, is more monolithic in what is respectable method and postulate than political science; and economics falls closer to political science than to anthropology and psychology. A political scientist, thus, has more freedom than a sociologist both in the formulation of his value system and in the expression of it. In other words, one may say that some social sciences have more "jargon" than others, and some resort more to the

Latinate vocabulary than others. But whatever one may say, the social sciences are struggling desperately to be sciences, to have a share in the training of public servants and in the formulation of good and evil entail. Indeed, it has been said that many intellectuals are not anti-Communist because scholarly detachment is not compatible with believing in evil, the evil of people or the evil of movements such as communism. Richard Weaver has suggested that such intellectuals must continue to dance in the excluded middle.¹⁹

One thing is certain: the Thomistic social scientist becomes conscious of the different sets of presuppositions used by his brethren. He must make a choice of allies within his discipline. And he must make this choice in the light of an already accomplished formation of values, and in the light of a formation of judgment that is constantly in process. With a Catholic perspective, the social scientist can see readily the newer trends in subject-matter and method, for methods of inquiry are often used to discriminate between philosophical positions. It has been proposed that the foundations, notably the Ford Foundation, allocate a large sum to subsidize the publication of works in the social sciences. It is almost certain that such a sum would be spent largely in the light of "doctrine" and the experimental testing of the proper methodology for social science. Such a program would not, in the condition of the universities today, be neutral between the metaphysical positions that are actually taken in the secular academic world in the social sciences. Intellectuals who might control such funds would have an enormous power; a power which would operate as a lever toward conformity in the subject-matter and method acceptable and respectable in professional life. It might eventually operate as a kind of monopoly power in the formation of the minds and spirits of whole classes of university intellectuals.²⁰

19. See in general Richard M. Weaver, *The Ethics of Rhetoric*, Chicago University Press, 1953. With every episode like the invasion of Finland, the Nazi-Russian pact, the war in Korea, and the suppression of revolts in Eastern Europe, notably Hungary, a number of intellectuals leave the Communist parties, as well as fellow travellers who publicly repent.

20. On group conformism in America in general, including the intellectuals, see William H. Whyte, *The Organization Man*, Simon and Shuster, 1956. See especially Chapter 18.

V

A central purpose of this essay is to offer a preliminary classification of intellectual groups through the values a Catholic social scientist must live with as a member of his particular profession. The shading of intellectual positions on values is so complicated that no brief statement can be complete. However, the larger and more precise positions may be sketched, and other values can be grouped with these in such a way that the meaning is not distorted. Moreover, the values within a given profession, as they relate to the dialectic between the Thomist and the non-Thomist, are not exclusive to that group. Value systems run through modern life, and they clearly run through different social sciences. But there are changing emphases, and a social scientist of one discipline will not state a proposition in the same manner as the member of another. A political scientist will not speak the same way as an anthropologist, and the anthropologist will not speak as the economist, though the anthropologist and sociologist will come closer together than some of the others. Nor will the proposition involved be held at the same level of importance or intensity in two different social sciences.²¹

Three classes of social scientists may be observed. (A) There are those who consider values as nothing more than the subjective commitment of an individual. These social scientists are generally concerned with newer developments in the theory and practice of method. (B) There are those who are indifferent to values, or who think of them as very simple incidents in the examination of social and moral issues. (C) Finally, there are those who do not consider values to be subjective, and who will admit that acceptable ones are subject to rational proof. Implicitly, then, some order of rational judgment about values is possible.

(A) Let us consider the first class, or those who believe values

21. No extraordinary claims for classification are made. The author is impressed with Eric Voegelin, *Order and History*, Vol. I, *Israel and Revelation*, Louisiana State University Press, 1956, pp. 62-63: "The intelligible order of history cannot be found through classification of phenomena; it must be sought through a theoretical analysis of institutions and experiences of order, as well as the form that results from their interpretation." We must reach above the level of construction of empirical types.

are subjective preferences, or commitments of the will. To begin with, two subclasses may be observed. (a) The first group is preoccupied with empirical study in the social sciences, the behavioral sciences, or the policy sciences. Notable sums have been given by the Ford Foundation to advance behavioral study, and some highly-publicized occurrences have taken place, such as the jury wire-tapping case, in which the deliberations of a jury were recorded without the jurymen being aware of it. Indeed, attempts seem to be made to change the general name of the social sciences to the "social and behavioral sciences." At least this is the reference of the volume of *American Men of Science* that has been in preparation for the social sciences. Many believe that the new and broader development of the social and policy sciences is to take place precisely in the area of the study of behavior. Thomism comes in conflict with the empiricist when more is claimed for behavioral methods than can logically be asserted, or when it is claimed that scientific methods show there is no system of proof beyond the empirical and the quantitative. The denial of values becomes often quite as intuitive as the assertion of them. The denial of the rational proof of value which comes within behavioral methods must, in truth, be a matter of proof, as much as any other aspect of social study. Formally, the behavioral intellectuals profess an indifference to religion and to theistically inspired values. But in fact there is no neutrality, for religious values are not considered subject to proof in their theory of method, which is in fact a theory of proof. We have been reminded that they labor at the "frontier of research," and at times they may speak of the revolution of the behavioral sciences as having already occurred. Game theory, for example, is one of the fields of investigation, just as the recent studies of "the authoritarian personality."²²

22. See Stephen K. Bailey and Others, *Research Frontiers in Politics and Government*, Brookings Institution, 1955. It has been suggested that the consensus of the Milan Congress was that there is no longer any need for an explicit system of beliefs, and it is futile to distinguish between socialism and free-enterprise. See *Encounter*, November, 1955. Cited by Frank S. Meyer, "Politics and Responsibility," *National Review*, April 4, 1955, p. 21. Professor John P. Roche has said, in disparagement of principle: "Every society, sociological research suggests, has its set of myths which incorporate and symbolize its political, economic and social aspirations. Thus, as medieval society has the Quest for the Holy Grail and the cult of numerology. . . ." we have in our time the dream of impartial decision-making. What objectivity in this case

The type of social scientist just discussed is becoming more and more prominent and powerful in both the universities and the foundations. Never before has so much foundation money been available for distribution to those who accept the current orthodoxy in method and in political position.²³ Obviously a Christian philosopher is not opposed to empirical and behavioral study in social relations, or more particularly in politics and sociology. But a Thomist is bound to be critical of some forms of empiricism, or of a position which denies or minimizes the possibility of philosophical proof. He will say that a man rebels at being nothing more than a social animal; in the midst of the Freudian "darkness" he would retain the image of charity in man. However, the pervasive development of "group research" and the vast sums that are available to those who engage in the proper kind of research may be on the point of remaking the whole university structure of the social sciences. There is some encouraging development in Catholic social study, but it often seems to be living in separation and isolation. Method, in other words, is often a sectarian weapon. In the behavioral sciences philosophy seems at times to be held as nothing, and as Parain has said the fact has been deified in order to humiliate the thought.²⁴

Of late there has been a remarkable extension of Freudian ideas might amount to, under the impetus of behavioral method, is that the Constitution, for example, could become what social scientists say the majority consensus is. See Roche, "Judicial Self-Restraint," *The American Political Science Review*, XLIX (September, 1955), 762.

23. In the 83rd Congress, 1954, the Reece Committee, the Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations, created an enormous staff and extended statements in defense of tax-exemption were offered, among others, by the Rockefeller Foundation and the General Education Board. The Ford Foundation, and its Fund for the Republic, became a central issue because of the doctrinal positions and the political activity of the Fund. It is fairly obvious that tax-exemption, plus philosophical and political positions, pose a long-run problem.

24. Brice Parain, "Against the Spirit of Neutrality," *Confluence*, 4 (January, 1956), 380-381, but see pp. 359 ff. Parain says (p. 387): "We are paid scholars on reprove for deserting; let us carry on our profession as students. One thing we do know, and that is that our people are in despair. They sense that they are getting nowhere. . . . All they hear is nonsense." Albert Moraczewski, O.P., "The Contribution of Science to Religion," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XIII (January, 1957), 31: ". . . It would be well to observe that both science and religion have a growing core of established, permanent truths. These are not, and can never be in conflict. Surrounding this core is a penumbra of doctrines, facts, and theories in various stages of proof."

to the study of the whole personality, with correlative applications to public policy. The person is viewed as a psychological whole, as a system of syndromes, of clustering ideas and evaluations of people and situations. On the one hand, the restriction of absolute majoritarianism by some form of natural right is repudiated in the defense of the majority; but, on the other hand, the majority is condemned by others who resort to Freudian or Freudian-related explanations of behavior. Frank S. Meyer has reminded us: "It is the triumphant production of a deep-psychological explanation for the obvious which gives one the sensation of dealing with the victims of a mass delusion as one reads the papers of the 'psychoanalytically oriented' social scientists. . . . Every sign of individualist or traditional resistance to the tyranny of contemporary conformity is attributed to the authoritarian personality."²⁵ One is tempted to use Freudian concepts to explain anti-Thomist value systems, but the Thomist is committed to philosophical or rational discussion.²⁶

(b) The second subclass may or may not be concerned with the current methodological inquiry. Here, the social scientist is informed by hostility toward religious values, considering them to be mere superstitions, or dangerous barriers to rational social behavior.²⁷ While a social scientist in this category is formally a defender

25. See Frank S. Meyer, "Symptoms of Mass Delusion," *National Review*, February 8, 1956, p. 23. See, of course, T. W. Adorno and Others, *The Authoritarian Personality*. The literature that has been inspired by this volume is truly remarkable. It is not only difficult to get the book out of a university library, but it is also unlikely that one can avoid being subjected to at least part of the "F" or Fascism scale, the "Berkeley F Scale."

26. On one occasion Peter Viereck said that anti-Catholicism is the anti-Semitism of the intellectuals. See Iago Galdston, M.D., "Psychopathic Intellectuals," *The Pacific Spectator*, X (Spring, 1956), 100-101. Galdston not only psychoanalyzes the intellectuals in the usual libidinous terms, but he also suggests the pattern of mental response. For example, "the intellectual—*qua* egghead—is an enthusiastic planner, an unconscionable manipulator of man, society, and the universe, and a glib sucker for everything that carries the label of science. . . . The intellectual's framework of operations is a derivative of the intellectual bias developed in and by eighteenth-century science." Galdston's criticism is not anti-intellectual, in his view; rather, it is pro-intelligence.

27. Robert E. Lane, in describing the authoritarian syndrome, says that one characteristic of this personality is a "tendency to accept superstitious or super-natural explanations and to avoid scientific explanations." He may be slightly more extreme in his judgment than the original work on the authoritarian personality; but this might be a matter of argument. See Lane, "Political Personality and Electoral Choice," *The American Political Science Review*, XLIV (March, 1955), 176.

of liberty, such as civil liberty and academic freedom, as defined in current public controversy, there is always a point where he will decide that suppression, censorship, and counter-propaganda through the control of the media of mass communication is proper and legitimate. The comic-strip mind may have no rights, but the defender of the general welfare may not restrict comic books.²⁸ While these situations are commonly recognized and applied during war, the issue here is the application of such ideas in normal times. Furthermore, the extension of Freudian ideas to politics has produced what may be properly called a Freudian theory of liberal suppression. The point is simply this: the authoritarian personality is not suited to the democratic process, and the government is justified in restricting, controlling, and directing such personalities in the share they may have in the course of democratic politics. The authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* say, in what is probably the most important and revealing passage in the work: "In our present-day struggle to achieve a strengthening of the tolerant, liberal point of view we may have to avoid presenting the prejudiced individual with more ambiguities than he is able to absorb and offer instead, in some spheres at least, solutions which are constructive. . . . Efforts to modify the 'prejudiced' pattern may have to make use of authorities — though by no means necessarily of authoritarian authorities — in order to reach the individual in question. This follows from the fact that it is authority more than anything else that structures or prestructures the world of the prejudiced individual. Where public opinion takes over the function of authority and provides the necessary limitations — and thus certainties — in many walks of daily life, as is the case in this country, there will be some room for the tolerance of national or racial ambiguities. It must be emphasized, however, that the potentially beneficial aspects of conformity are more than counterbalanced by the inherent seeds of stereotype and prejudice. These latter trends are apt to increase in a culture which has become too complex to be fully mastered by the individual."²⁹

28. Cf. John Courtney Murray, S.J., "Literature and Censorship," *Books on Trial*, June-July, 1956, pp. 1 ff.

29. Adorno, *op. cit.*, 486. Bernard Berelson, in his discussion of the application of quantitative studies of public opinion to the theory of democracy, has suggested that the authoritarian personality is unsuited to the democratic

In the minds of many social scientists both suppression and control may be used against persons who are considered to have ideas that are superstitious, who are ignorant, prejudiced, insane or who are like maniacs influencing the ignorant, who suffer from other forms of mental ill-health, who are irresponsible or demagogic in public discussion, who show sympathy for the Fascist forms of subversion and conspiracy, who would restrict the right of the scientific professions to determine public policy, or who, finally, would retard "adjustment" to the American way of life. A little reflection will show there are numerous ways in which individuals holding such ideas or exhibiting such behavior may be dealt with, even within the customary pattern of democratic politics. Since to such intellectuals the historical and Western religions, except the most diluted forms of deism and ethicism, are disvalues, these individuals are particularly hostile to Catholic views on the natural law, marriage, and the teaching authority of the Church. On these issues it will be insisted that Protestants, though basically as unrealistic as Catholics, are less dangerous to the march of progress. The criticisms of Catholic positions fall into a modernized, streamlined, and urbane form of free-thinking, but such thinking has, of course, been characteristic of liberalism from Condorcet, for example, through John Dewey.³⁰

(B) The second large class is essentially value-indifferent, but values are accepted to some degree at least. The point here, however, is that social and moral ideas are simple questions, and they are hardly worth discussion. Technical men, such as engineers and social scientists whose minds are formed in an analogous manner, are often in this category. The technical man is, thus, in mental process, like the social scientist who is concerned almost exclusively with the description and charting of his subject-matter. There is little interpretation of social process, or of social purpose, and little

process. He is not clear whether he would support some device that would exclude such people from the various forms of political participation. Democratic theorists have indicated, by implication in any case, that participation in a democratic life is a therapeutic agent which would be lost if the proposals of Adorno and Others were implemented. See Berelson, "Democratic Theory and Public Opinion," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, XVI (Fall, 1952), 313 ff.

30. See my article, "What is a Conservative American Economy?" *Current Economic Comment*, 18 (February, 1956), 23.

sense of the possible meaning of events as history. At times there is a stubborn reluctance to engage in any evaluative discussion, partly one assumes because of a lack of knowledge or skill in philosophical discourse. When values become simple problems, the reasons adduced in their support are often contradictory and disordered. Yet, in contrast there are individuals who think they know much more than they really do about philosophy and theology. Such a condition is not unusual with all of us perhaps, but is peculiarly acute with the social scientist whose thinking is technical and descriptive.

(a) The primary subclass seems to be characterized by a sort of jelly-fish religious affiliation. These intellectuals may go to church, but they hardly seem to have any doctrines. They are quite indifferent about the existence or non-existence of the supernatural, and those with a firm belief are considered to be objects of mild amusement. Subclass two (b) seems to be in general composed of scientific intellectuals who do not know or do not care about philosophical inquiry, but who nevertheless are likely to be deterministic in social and moral theory, explaining human behavior by curiously simple conceptions of motivation drawn from economics and psychology. Adhering to either an economic or psychological view of life, moral issues are subordinated and without importance. In spite of ineptitude in social knowledge, scientists are at times notably vocal on political issues rather remote from public policy dealing with their own areas of specialization.

(C) The first group of social scientists overlaps, of course, with a third group who in some form admit there is a philosophical proof of values. Those we have already discussed would admit only a purely empiric, statistical, or quantitative proof of values. It would be a behavioral or "scientific" proof and not a philosophical argument. (a) Now, the first subclass in the third class follows the tradition of the French Revolution; these intellectuals are hostile to religion as the Enlightenment was, or as Latin liberalism has been. Positive science is regarded as the only basis for progress.³¹ Other

31. See the able criticisms of positivism in Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, Columbia University Press, 1952, Introduction, 1 ff.: on p. 8: "The use of method as the criterion of science abolishes theoretical advance." All propositions concerning facts become scientific if they are gathered in the proper manner, and in this case all facts tend to be equal. Hallowell has said: "The

than deism, such as reflected in the writings of Montesquieu, for example, religion is unacceptable, and neither poetic intuition nor spiritual insight can be a foundation for social advance. And a choice of values is to be effected through the instruction of pragmatism, or of some form of neo-utilitarianism. Values are proved in terms of a pragmatic epistemology, by a test of workability that is difficult to define, a theory of the content of science in the relations of men, in terms of a hedonistic calculation of human behavior, or in the light of facts or instincts. We are dealing here with a profoundly wide cleavage in the study of politics in America, for the neo-Scholastic would surely seek for justice, and he would assume the correctness and validity of what Walter Lippmann in 1955 called *The Public Philosophy*. Moreover, he would reject the left-wing materialism of the Marxians. France, the home of the philosophy of the Enlightenment, is torn today by the schism of the soul that is born of the conflicts in philosophy that have stemmed from the eighteenth century. Men who are loyal to a philosophy are sometimes driven to uncertainty in their love for a disordered fatherland.

(b) The second subclass has a recessive religious background; as individuals these intellectuals retain their youthful religious attitudes, though they are primarily concerned to support temporal or political "causes," such as the United Nations, the New Deal, or other humanitarian or reformist movements. Numbers of writers and political leaders of the Progressive Era in the United States might be cited, as well as many holders of academic chairs.³² Woodrow Wilson is surely of this type, and one whose remarkable career spanned from the graduate school, the professorship, and university presidency to being President of the United States. The

³² inadequacy of positivism. . . is proven in this fact: that the positivist cannot avoid engaging in the metaphysical speculation he claims to have dispensed with." John H. Hallowell, *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought*, Holt, 1950, 321.

³³ One may be reminded of the professor before World War I who taught his students there were three essential reforms to bring about the best possible social order: woman's suffrage, prohibition, and a League of Nations. Obviously, many Progressives had to look for new reforms to advocate in the 1920's. Something like this may be used to explain softness toward Communism in the early years after the Russian Revolution.

campaign speeches of 1912, "The New Freedom," may well be cited as evidence of this kind of attitude.³³ Such intellectuals are often friendly, or they try to be so, tolerant, and sometimes even sympathetic toward the Thomist intellectual. A large number of the "traditional" types of social scientists falls into this class. They are concerned with their specializations, without being hostile to the idea that a rational defense of values is possible. Nor would they lean upon the thesis that conservative political and economic attitudes today have no relation to rational ideas, or that they are simply the evidence of a Fascist-like or authoritarian personality structure. Often these intellectuals are not sharply aware of philosophic issues and terminology, but they are convinced that the proper choice of demonstrable values is the heart of any social science. Like Thomist intellectuals, they are often willing to work with intellectuals outside of the university elite. At worst they may simply weep for those who disagree with them, or with those who break over the lines of "doctrine" or respectability, and at best they understand that one tolerates a human being rather than the ideas he may hold.

Subclass three (c) affirms religious values at the foreground of social science, and religious discussion blends readily into philosophical inquiry. Indeed, there are times when the non-Thomistic intellectual may have a greater concern for religious issues at the forefront of politics than is commonly found among Catholic intellectuals. The Thomist perhaps distinguishes more sharply the spiritual and the temporal, and the philosophic finality of the state is grounded more in natural law theory than in purely theological propositions. Here, one often finds the Catholic, Protestant, and Jew united in common human enterprises. Practically all of the intellectuals in this class would view the troubles of the present as a moral crisis. Such intellectuals turn to a moral analysis based on

³³ John W. Davidson (editor), *A Crossroads of Freedom: The 1912 Campaign Speeches of Woodrow Wilson*, Yale University Press, 1956. This volume clearly replaces the long traditional compilation of these speeches, *The New Freedom* (1913). Very soon after the election of 1912 there was a loss of interest in reform, which was not revived until the depression and the rise of Fascism in the 1930's. Cf. Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The New Freedom*, Princeton University Press, 1956, 468-69.

reason or revelation to help resolve, if possible, the questions of the day.³⁴

VI

Let us make some observations by way of conclusion. The rituals of the Thomist intellectual are, first, those who hold values are subjective preferences and who are actively hostile to religious beliefs; and, second, those who reject the concept of value as subjective preference but hold to the judgments of the Enlightenment, and more especially to an emergent American version of the anticlericalism of certain European and Latin American countries.

The function of the Thomist intellectual in these circumstances is twofold. He must understand the historical matrix out of which a value arises, and he should use such opportunity as he may have to present the elements of theistic philosophy and the social prudence that is grounded at its beginning in the *philosophia perennis*. Communists often speak of the duty of the party members and workers to maintain contact with the masses. With uncertain success, this is precisely what the liberal intellectuals seek always to do. In some periods it has been peculiarly true of Thomist intellectuals. It was true in the time of the Counter-Reformation; it was a powerful factor in the Catholic revival during the nineteenth century; and we may watch it even today with approval in those areas where the struggle with Communists has been most acute. When some intellectuals say that the people cannot govern, it may mean only that a chasm exists between the self-appointed intelligentsia and the unpretentious man.³⁵

Many social scientists are becoming insistent on the right to

34. See Hallowell, *op. cit.*, *passim*. One of the most distinguished of contemporary Thomistic thinkers is Jacques Maritain. Of his many books *Man and the State*, Chicago University Press, 1951, is probably the best to cite for this line of thought. See *Social Order*, November, 1955, for discussions of Maritain's ethical theory by Francis J. Marren and Philip S. Land.

35. Did not John Stuart Mill say, in the Introduction to his *On Liberty*: "Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion?" But who is to judge whether there exists a state of barbarism?

govern, assuming that social science training, especially in the behavioral sciences, is the proper apprenticeship for membership in the political class.³⁶ In implication a monopoly of social intelligence is claimed by denying it to others, such as those holding religious beliefs or who are conservatives. Lionel Trilling has said: "In the United States at this time liberalism is not only the dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition. For it is the plain fact that nowadays there are no conservative or reactionary ideas in general circulation. . . . But the conservative impulse and the reactionary impulse do not, with some isolated and some ecclesiastical exceptions, express themselves in ideas but only in action or in irritable mental gestures which seek to resemble ideas."³⁷ There are, of course, equally sharp replies, and it can begin with the application of Freudian ideas to the critics of the Thomist and his allies. If conservatives have status trouble, as Hofstadter, following *The Authoritarian Personality*, suggests, so may also the liberal intellectuals, particularly the critics and the social scientists who have not been given the recognition in governing that they seem to believe they should have. It has been suggested, indeed, that many of the modern intellectuals all over the world, and particularly in the West, have suffered a kind of trauma, and particularly from seeing the world and reality as it is, and which prevents them to hold philosophies that are contrary to those who actually have a considerable degree of influence. American intellectuals, it is said, are suffering from a trauma, a schism of the soul, a sense of guilt at having made great mistakes in their judgments about history, and their inability to provide for the realization of policy in a disordered world.

The first trauma was, perhaps, a premature sympathy for Bol-

36. Edward Shils, "Freedom and Influence: Observations on the Scientists' Movement in the United States," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XIII (January, 1957), 17: "The self-esteem of the intellectuals does not, however, foster academic freedom when it expresses an extreme belief that the only proper regime is that of the 'philosopher king.' The fundamental nature of the free society—a plurality of autonomous spheres bound together by a sense of affinity and the collaboration of equals—is infringed on and harm done to all sides when scientists and scholars esteem themselves to the point where they regard the elite of the political and economic spheres as unworthy, incompetent, and repugnant."

37. *The Liberal Imagination; Essays on Literature and Society*, p. ix.

shevism and the Russian Revolution as a means for uplifting the common man; the second trauma was, perhaps, involvement in the United Front during the 1930's, when in fact Fascism was resisted at the price of assisting Communism; in a third instance, the liberal social scientists affirmed their separation from the masses and probably the majority in resisting the efforts in Congress to expose Communism, as in the campaign against the Dies Committee and its various successors; and, finally, in "breaking" Senator McCarthy there were times when the statement of issues was hardly up to the standard of rational discussion. Milosz has insisted that the alienation from the masses, which many intellectuals sense in anguish, is one of the forces which makes intellectuals turn toward Communism, and in times past toward the totalitarian movements in Germany and Italy.³⁸ And Diana Trilling has noted that "most anti-Communist liberals have been through the Communist mill, or frighteningly close to it."³⁹

Should the new elite, the elite of social science intellectuals, who in the universities, in government, and in the foundations, already have such great power, be successful in their claims, it would be a catastrophe and a disaster for Catholic and Thomist intellectuals. It would not merely exclude them from their inherent rights as citizens to be consulted in a pluralistic society, but it would exclude from the calculations of policy the whole corpus of ideas associated with natural law and Christian morality.⁴⁰ All intellectuals, Tho-

38. Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind*, Knopf, 1953; see also "Murti-Bing," *The Twentieth Century*, July, 1951, p. 12: "The great longing of the 'alienated' intellectual is to belong to the masses. It is such a powerful longing that, in trying to appease it, a great many of them who once looked to Germany or Italy for inspiration have now become converted to the New Faith [Communism]." See also Gabriel A. Almond, *The Appeals of Communism*, Princeton University Press, 1954. It is unfortunate that Freudian techniques are used to explain why people become Communists, just as the same techniques are used to explain why one is either a liberal or a conservative. One of the most common uses is to say that the religious conversion of a former Communist, e.g., Whitaker Chambers, simply shows a need to submit to authority. Adorno, *op. cit.*, *passim*, considers this desire to submit an evidence of precast tendency.

39. *Partisan Review*, May-June, 1950, p. 486. Used by Towner Phelan, St. Louis Union Trust Company Letter, January, 1952, No. 59.

40. Morris R. Cohen said in 1954: "It is reasonable to expect that the contributions of American Catholics to Catholic philosophy, which are just beginning, will eventually assume large proportions. All the indications to date make

mist as well as others, want opinions to count, and they are aware that people remote from power can be so tolerant that all ideas become in color like a nondescript gray. In such situations, when there is a loss of taste or form in both ways of living and in moral ideas, people may want little more than the enjoyment of a well-being assured by the state. In the end, it may be assumed that the Thomist intellectual can accept as pluralist democracy neither unrestrained majoritarianism, nor a control of government by social science intellectuals who have only a recessive moral sense. Any intellectual should recognize that by definition he is part of an elite, either by the gifts of a trained intelligence or by the preference of professional duties. He might well remember what Woodrow Wilson said to the Princeton undergraduates on election evening in 1912: "The lesson of this election is a lesson of responsibility . . . I summon you for the rest of your lives to work to set this government forward by processes of justice, equity and fairness."⁴¹

it probable that the contributions of American Catholics to social ethics will be more American than Catholic." *Op. cit.*, p. 188. Clearly, it is easier to distinguish the national adjustment from the universal within the Church than from without.

41. Davidson, *op. cit.*, p. 525. One of the notable publications in this area is Daniel Lerner, Harold D. Lasswell and Others, *The Policy Sciences; Recent Developments in Scope and Method*, Stanford University Press, 1951. Robert K. Merton and Lerner analyze the problem of "Social Scientists and Research Policy," and on p. 292, say: "If he [the social scientist] is to play an effective role in putting his knowledge to work, it is increasingly necessary that he affiliate with a bureaucratic power-structure in business or government." If he affiliates here, he loses his position in academic circles, but if he stays with the academic he usually loses the resources to carry through his research on a significant scale. At one point these authors speak of the "bureaucratic intellectual."

As it stands, the functioning elites in public policy do so without outside criticism or responsibility. But the advocacy of a social science elite, while hesitant, is quite real. Hofstadter has urged an "elite with political and moral autonomy." This is taken from his article in *The American Scholar*, already cited above. But see Bernard Rosenberg, "The New American Right," *Dissent*, III (Winter, 1956), 45-50. Rosenberg notes that Talbot Parsons wants a new American elite, a social strata with a sense of political responsibility. It is not at all clear what will happen to democracy, if democracy means an effective freedom of public opinion to determine public policy. Cf. G. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, Oxford University Press, 1956.