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(Reprinted from The Journal of Politics, Vol. 1, No. 3, August, 1939)

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# The Journal of Politics

Vol. 1

AUGUST, 1939

No. 3

## POLITICAL SUPPRESSION IN THE MODERN STATE

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"Men rarely love humanity more fervently than when they are engaged in deadly conflict with each other . . ." declares Professor Becker.<sup>1</sup> It happens all too frequently that liberty is allowed with hatred, and suppression and intolerance are defended in the name of love. The will to give liberty is, on most occasions, limited, but the will to suppress is often boundless. Aside from the multitude of effective and cruel devices of social pressure, the gift of liberty is organized through the state, and suppression is attempted likewise through government.

Suppression, in greater or less degree, exists in every social form. A social structure is a kind of prison to the rebellious individual, though to the conformer liberty and freedom are realized effortlessly in the social stream. The state is always trying to suppress some types of behavior, though it can hardly be said that it is ever entirely successful over a short period of time, or without the assistance of collateral types of pressure. In our own day the suppression of minorities has become an issue of overwhelming importance, simply because of the variety of attempts to use political power to blot out the dissentient voice or the counter-evolutionary and revolutionary pressure.

We know the state is seldom completely effective or ineffective in attaining its purposes; we also know that state action frequently results in consequences that were little dreamed of when a given policy was adopted. Through history we can observe the death of ideas and the gradual accumulation of lost causes.

<sup>1</sup> Carl L. Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers*, 144; New Haven, 1932.

The lost cause, the dead idea, is the perfect example of repression, yet it may be urged that the state has in many instances had little to do with the death of an activating idea. Time rather than the state is the great repressor; the *Zeitgeist* is always sovereign.

One may inquire first of all: Under what circumstances does the state resort to suppression? A period of repression for any group is a time of strong emotional drives or deep feelings of resentment and affection. The tolerant days are those of indifference. In the French wars of religion during the sixteenth century, those who favored the toleration of both Protestants and Catholics were largely indifferent to religion; they were tired of fighting over sectarian differences and they wished to turn their attention elsewhere. It was the exception rather than the rule when a thinker favored toleration on Christian principles rather than for reasons of political or economic expediency.\*

It is difficult to explain why a given public psychic condition develops. The lassitude of indifference may be produced with time, but so may be that condition under which men develop "the will to psychic annihilation."<sup>†</sup> Means may be wanting, but in the emotionally disturbed circumstance that produces intolerance there is always the desire to exterminate the enemy. The feeling that your opponent is determined ultimately to annihilate you bodily or intellectually is perhaps even harder to bear than actual physical repression. The agony of passionate silence is sometimes less to be endured than physical torture. On the other hand, the very psychic will to suppress, even if it does not reach the stage of using political power to attain the end, tends to give the ideas under fire and the emotional reaction surrounding them an importance that they otherwise would not have. Emotional reaction produces an alternating fungus-like growth of further depth of feeling.<sup>‡</sup>

\* Cf. Henry Hauser, *François de la Noue*, 159; Paris, 1892.

† Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, tr. from the German, 34-35; London, 1936.

‡ Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, tr. from the Italian, 4 vols., Sec. 1757; New York, 1935.

Psychological conditions appropriate for a period of repression arise, no doubt, from a great diversity of circumstances. Economic disorganization and conflict, racial distrust, religious difference, institutional or ideological misunderstanding may all play a part. It is a simple matter to project to another individual or group the resentment and pain of misery or defeat. Whatever the explanations offered of social and economic disorganization, it is generally recognized that such a period is peculiarly suited for the techniques of suppression. But here repression is simply an evidence and a concomitant factor of social disturbance. The strong and the confident can afford to laugh at their enemies. Socrates drank the hemlock of the suppressed, but his condemnation has been regarded as useless and stupid simply because his doctrines were a concomitant effect of social disintegration. The condemnation of Socrates could, therefore, have no effect; his death was demanded as the useless reaction of losing, decadent conservatives.

Not only must the social condition or the ideological factors involved in any system of suppression be considered, but also a distinction must be made between the efforts at suppression conducted by the governing strata and the policies of intolerance that receive mass support. It is fairly obvious that repression is most successful when the official policy of government is faithfully representing a broad and basic interest of the population. Repression conducted solely because of the desire of a ruling but decadent elite to remain in power is foredoomed to failure, since the agencies of enforcement falter as they touch the mass of citizenry. On the other hand, mass intolerance unsupported by the state must resort to various means of social pressure which, however, are more likely to succeed than a government that is repressing in the face of either hostility or indifference on the part of the populace. It is recorded that suppression in France from 1748 to 1770 became increasingly severe; particularly was this the case in regard to the printers and the publication of certain critical works. However, the enforcement of the regulations of the government was consistently ineffective, and it was

not considered to be in any sense a lack of patriotism to flout the efforts of the government.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, the Inquisition in Italy and Spain is generally reputed to have stopped the advance of the Reformation in these two countries. There was no mass movement, however, in support of the reformed faith, and the minority of intellectuals and humanists who were interested in it was not large.<sup>7</sup>

It is of fundamental importance, however, to inquire as to the limits on the effectiveness of the use of power by the state. To say that ultimately the state cannot be subjected completely to law or that the state is power, however moralized, is not to say that the state as a social institution is omnipotent. Whether the state is repressing a minority, or whether it is planning the economic life of a society, it must be borne in mind that political efforts are often in the end short of the mark; and unforeseen consequences are as significant as those that were predicted. As Professor Merriam has observed: "Embedded in the poverty of power lies much of the liberty of the world, safe from the hand of the aggressor who would take it away."<sup>8</sup> All governments use force, yet all of them profess to be founded on reason. Some writers, as Mosca and Pareto, have urged that with or without universal suffrage a government is always an oligarchy.<sup>9</sup> History may show, indeed, that tyranny is not of necessity short-lived. The endurance of the control of the Shogunate by some Japanese families, extending over several centuries, the life span of the Spartan and Venetian oligarchies, their exercise of force in suppressing dissent among the governed classes, their fall before external forces, at least in the cases of Sparta and Venice, all help to indicate that power politics has an endurance that may be underestimated in a democratic age such as ours.

<sup>6</sup> See Daniel Mornet, *Les origines intellectuelles de la Révolution française*, 129ff; Paris, 1933.

<sup>7</sup> See Henry S. Lucas, *The Renaissance and the Reformation*, Ch. 41, New York and London, 1934.

<sup>8</sup> Charles E. Merriam, *Political Power*, 183; New York and London, 1934.

<sup>9</sup> Pareto, *op. cit.*, Sec. 2183; Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, tr. from the Italian, *passim*; New York, 1939.

Technical organization in conducting repression is vitally important, though there is no certain increase in efficiency in political devices. For the moment let us concentrate our attention on the problem of political means. One of the most profound of the lessons of the current situation is that the liberal state is capable of effective repression only under exceptional circumstances, particularly when there is wide mass intolerance, as in the United States during our participation in the World War. On the other hand, the whole tradition of liberalism is against such suppression. Civil and political liberty are geared into the constitutional system, the ideal of the rule of law and responsibility before the courts robs the public servant of the arrangements necessary for efficient repression. It is true that the liberal government cannot maintain itself without some forms of repression, but any extraordinary use of power in this direction is immediately the subject of intense controversy.<sup>10</sup>

When the liberal state creates the political or the ideological criminal, most would agree that it is going beyond its structural principles and violating its historic genius. Suppression, to be effective, technically requires the creation of enforcement agencies with a wide and sufficient discretion in dealing with those who are to be suppressed. Discretion, especially of the executive, has always been the hall-mark of tyranny. Yet liberalism may have to be partially tyrannical in order to preserve itself from destruction at the hands of the greater despotism. The existence of the ideological criminal is indisputable evidence of incoherence in the political substructure. Genuine control and punishment of the political criminal involve going beyond the law, as interpreted by liberalism, toward the techniques of the

<sup>10</sup> For instance, democratic governments today are faced in certain cases with the question of whether to suppress political party uniforms and semi-military party organizations. Is suppression in this case compatible with liberalism, in that Rousseau's old solution of tolerating only those who tolerate can be applied? In certain countries policies of suppression against such organizations have been adopted in the name of liberalism, as in Czechoslovakia, Norway, Holland and others. Karl Loewenstein, "Autocracy versus Democracy in Contemporary Europe," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 29, 773-774 (1935); "Military Democracy and Fundamental Rights," *ibid.*, Vol. 31, 417 ff., 638 ff. (1937).

authoritarian state which are peculiarly designed for suppression and the punishment of such persons.

Liberalism is slow and deliberate in the determination of guilt and in meting out punishment; the authoritarian state is characterized by celerity in such matters, especially where political crimes are involved. Under liberalism military justice or emergency dictatorial powers most resemble the principle of authoritarian government; yet liberalism generally feels that the techniques available in time of war or emergency must not be used in repressing the peace-time dissident political minority. The authoritarian government can work in secret when it desires, and it can, with the aid of the radio and newspapers, give the most pitiless and one-sided publicity when it feels that the ends of policy will be better served thereby. As a phase of the political technique of repression, rulers must be able to reject the Kantian transcendental principle that all rational policies must be capable of support in the light of the most unreserved publicity. Furthermore, judicial independence is one of the surest havens of the undesirable thinker or leader. The authoritarian state has been forced, in developing effective repression, to turn to executive justice, to the political court.<sup>39</sup>

The comparison between the political techniques of liberalism that may be used for suppression and the means available to the authoritarian state has, however, its lights and shades. Modern repressive governments claim to be democratic and righteous. Technically, the process of politics is much the same in the hands of Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, or any other of the modern autocrats. The party system is preserved, but the opposition ceases to be "loyal" and patriotic. The rule of law is preserved, but it is a law that sanctions the bitterness of social reprisal. Voting continues to be a duty of the citizen, and the percentage of those participating in elections is phenomenally high; yet the elections

<sup>39</sup> In *The Book of Lord Sheng*, translated and edited by J. J. L. Duyvendak, 171; London, 1928, we read of the Machiavelli of ancient China: "Indeed, ordinary people abide by old practices, and students are immersed in the study of what is reported from antiquity. These two kinds of men are all right for filling offices and for maintaining the law, but they are not the kind who can take part in a discussion which goes beyond the law."

rob the citizen of a real choice of rulers. Responsibility to the community, class, or nation is praised; yet enforcement of this responsibility may easily be construed as treason. Ideals were never higher than under the modern Caesar. Education is developed; yet teachers become automata for the indoctrination of the true doctrines of the new republic of tomorrow. These ideas are not new, perhaps, for it is recorded that Lilburne, the leader of the extremely democratic Leveller movement in England in the seventeenth century, would have only "the well-affected people" given full political rights. Likewise, the Jacobins questioned the *civisme* of their opponents.<sup>40</sup>

We have emphasized so far the importance of an energetic and flexible political structure in the organization of repression. It must be remembered that political structure is only one phase of the issue we are discussing. Equally important is an understanding of the conditions and policies necessary in order that suppression can be effective. It should be clear that indecisiveness is one of the greatest faults of those who embark on strong political policies. No group of rulers can hope to succeed in suppression if they are not willing to resort to the last ounce of political energy in attaining their ends. Indeed, one may say that indecisive and partial suppression is often more of a benefit to the oppressed than to their enemies.

No policy of government, it has been shown, is ever completely successful, but the experience of governments resorting to repression indicates that a measure of success can be attained only when the policy is complete and permanent. Repression as a governmental end can be attained only over a considerable time. It must last, if need be, from generation to generation. No government should undertake the policies we have been describing unless it can resort to the most complete use of force. On the other hand, the use of violence may produce a greater use of

<sup>40</sup> See Carl Schmitt, *Verfassungslehre*, 230; München und Leipzig, 1928. A Japanese War Office pamphlet supports its argument for vast additional military preparation by observing that "the military strength of the Empire is a sane, powerful force, with which to crush evil actions and heretical doctrines, and thereby to declare the Empire's law of justice before the world." Quoted in Walter Millis, "The Future of Sea Power in the Pacific," *World Affairs Pamphlets*, No. 9, 30; 1935.

force on the part of those the government is attempting to suppress. The successful repressions of history must indicate either a fortuitous but correct judgment on this matter or sharp insight into the social circumstances under which force was freely used. It has been recognized as a common characteristic of declining ruling classes that they are more inclined to make concessions than to repress. Humanitarianism is frequently merely a sign of weakness. Louis XVI of France fell, it has been said, because neither he nor his advisors knew when and how to employ force in self-defense. In a revolutionary period it is force and not humanitarian theories that counts most heavily.

It must be recognized, of course, that a ruling stratum in a given society may be so decadent that the open resort to force rather than concession or ruse will only precipitate its fall. Decadent groups seldom realize when they are near the end. To use force may provide the long-needed excuse for the opposition to begin the revolution that will alter the complexion of those holding political power. If, on the other hand, the governed are not in a position to reply with violence, the government is able to use force much more widely and much more successfully than otherwise would be the case. The use of force is always a problem in social or political evaluation.

The more successful rulers have been able to sense the proper types of policy to be employed.<sup>18</sup> When John Calvin was re-establishing his authority in Geneva, he did not hesitate to use force or to resort to the arbitrary execution of dangerous persons in the opposition. The penalties of exile and death were freely accepted as the proper techniques of power. Calvin has been pardoned because he was successful, for nearly always, achievement is accepted as the standard of right and wrong in statecraft.<sup>19</sup> In ancient Rome the Catholic persecution of paganism was much more systematic, complete, forceful, and permanent than was the earlier persecution of the Christians by the pagan governments. No small part of the success of the Christian persecution must be attributed to the establishment of the correct

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Pareto, *op. cit.*, Secs. 2170 ff.

<sup>19</sup> See Ferdinand Buisson, *Sébastien Castellion*, Vol. 2, 69 ff.; Paris, 1892.

type of policy for success in suppression. Yet it should be observed that Roman religion had few abstractions or dogmas, and it was singularly non-metaphysical. A religion of such a character is not likely to take full advantage of political techniques in persecution or of its opportunity to rid itself of enemies.<sup>20</sup>

Any persecution is a heavy drain on the social energy of a people, the resources of the national economy, and upon the ability of a government to perform what may be called more ordinary functions. It is fundamental, therefore, that as few types of repression as possible should be undertaken simultaneously. To be persecuting a variety of minorities gives cumulative strength to the opposition and involves a proportionately more heavy drain on the political force of the community. It has been the advantage of Soviet Russia to have its policies of suppression concentrated within a comparatively narrow ideological field. Racial and linguistic minorities have been given ample freedom provided there is no political opposition to the regime. As the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie faded from the picture, internal oppositions have been treated in the same fashion, as in the case of the "old Bolshevik" trials and the harrying of "Trotskyism" out of the Union.<sup>21</sup>

Assuming a government has available the political techniques suitable to suppression, such as swiftness in decision and secrecy in execution, it must, to be successful, resort to propaganda in order to build up mass or popular support and to draw the teeth of the opposition. Propaganda has in recent years played an increasingly significant role in the policies of repression. Under the authoritarian principle of government, propaganda is pri-

<sup>20</sup> In the persecution of Carmath, an Arabian prophet who pretended to complete the law of Mohammed, Gibbon remarks, "a timid persecution assisted the progress of the new sect." Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (Modern Library Edition), Vol. I, 829. See also Mosca, *op. cit.*, pp. 190 ff.

<sup>21</sup> Fascist leadership in Italy has likewise concentrated the victims of suppression on those who oppose the official party ideology on the political plane; with religious opposition some sort of compromise has been accepted. The National Socialist regime in Germany, however, has not been sufficiently cautious in this respect. It has accumulated its persecuted minorities without regard either to the strength of opposition internally or to the aggregates of hostile opinion abroad.

marily in the hands of the state. It is official, while the account of the opposition comes through to the public in the form of rumor or in fragments. The opposition has enormous difficulty in evaluating the totality of its position.<sup>18</sup>

In the totalitarian state, moreover, propaganda merges into education. Propaganda is no casual effort on the part of the government to secure acceptance of its policies. Education is directed toward the indoctrination of the younger generation, and in this policy is involved the recognition that propaganda, like direct repression itself, must be continued indefinitely in order to succeed. Such education is in effect a kind of repression that must be brutal and complete in order to attain the desired end. At best, however, the educational weapon has its uncertainties. It is reported that most of the Roman Christians were educated in the pagan schools, and that at one time most of the enemies of the Christian religion in France were educated by the Jesuits. The same may be said of the leaders of the French Revolution. Other factors than education in its simplest form often play a part, though in ordinary circumstances the effectiveness of school indoctrination is admitted.

Suppression is always a problem in social equilibrium. It is, in effect, an effort to restore a social balance that has been tottering or is destroyed. It is always directed against a particular social group or class, and its success depends in large measure on the character of the class being repressed. Quite naturally, therefore, in a period of accentuated class feelings, such as the present, there is a greater resort than before to the technique of suppression. The outcome of the post-war efforts to liquidate social groups is yet to be seen, since it is too early to predict the success of the communists in Russia in destroying the mental attitudes of the bourgeoisie; and the survival value of communism and socialism in fascist countries has not been accurately measured. Time alone will reveal the answer; yet it is clear that the

<sup>18</sup> Official propaganda has the overwhelming advantage of choosing the issue upon which to concentrate. Its chief objective, of course, is to discredit the victims of repression, to destroy the moral credit that a minority may have had in the eyes of the population generally. With a suddenness equal to its appearance, the whole problem may fade from the public attention and another issue be raised.

situation is favorable to repression in all dictatorial countries because of the development of the political devices most suitable to success in pursuing this type of policy.

Even with the eventual failure of repression, there may be a new alignment of forces that constitutes in fact a partial triumph of the repressive impulse. The Catholic Church, for instance, was unable in early Christian centuries to suppress the more deeply ingrained popular festivals of a pagan type. Hence, what could not be destroyed without wrecking the Church itself was transformed and taken over into the calendar of Church feasts. A compromise of this nature was reached particularly in the northern countries of Europe, such as Great Britain, Gaul, and Germany, where the ancient rites had more vitality and the gospel was preached at a later date.<sup>19</sup> While such a new arrangement cannot be regarded as a complete success of repression, in result there is the establishment of a new interpretation of popular and customary observances which means a partial, permanent, and effective suppression of the ancient manner of thought and behavior.

In the rural sections of the declining Eastern and Western Roman Empires, the pagan rites, sometimes disguised, were observed long after they were dead in the cities. Perhaps it was characteristic of decadent paganism that its adherents tended to obey the edicts of the government rather than to become martyrs, a fact that is in sharp contrast with early Christian courtship of the crown of martyrdom. No doubt the servility of the Roman Senate and the concentration of political power in the hands of the emperor had much to do with the adoption of repressive policies toward paganism, but it is clear that the urban populations were in no fighting mood for the defense of the ancient faith.<sup>20</sup>

If the above considerations are generally true, one must assume a greater flexibility and receptiveness to new ideas on the part of

<sup>19</sup> Pareto, *op. cit.*, Sec. 1001 ff.

<sup>20</sup> Gibbon, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, Ch. 28. On the suppression of paganism and the persecution of sects in the late Roman Empire, see Otto Schilling, *Die Staats und Soziallehre des hl. Augustinus*, 1 ff; Freiburg im Breisgau, 1910.

city people than is the case with the agricultural population, whether peasantry or nobility. In the sixteenth century the proletariat experimented with radicalism, e. g., as in Münster, but they were likely to return to the old cult, particularly in the rural sections. The peasantry showed a much stronger loyalty for the Catholic Church than was found in the cities. Perhaps one should urge that this was simply another case of the failure to suppress historic Christianity, a continuation of the failure of the pagan state of the ancient world. But just as paganism was loved in the rural sections longer than in the cities, so was the ancient Catholic Church among the peasantry adhered to longer and more devotedly than in the cities.<sup>20</sup>

The Emperor Julian saw the uselessness of persecuting the Christians and attempted to reach a compromise by offering toleration to all, but the Christian spirit of the time could not be so bribed into submission.<sup>21</sup> Lutheranism gained adherents rapidly in France in the sixteenth century among the common people of the cities, while the nobles and the peasants remained unresponsive. This reformed faith was, no doubt, by the same token more easy to extirpate in France.<sup>22</sup> A distinction should be drawn, however, between the political support of a religion and its political repression. Government protection of the Catholic Church in France has appeared in modern history of little value in the development of religious sentiment, at least if anti-clericalism is taken as evidence.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, the position of the Catholic Church in England from the time of the reformation to the emancipation in 1829 might indicate that government hostility had a very definite effect in reducing the influence of this religious body. There has been a marked growth of Catholicism in England since the emancipation, which stands in sharp contrast to the stagnation of the faith before that time.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>20</sup> See Lucas, *op. cit.*, 622.

<sup>21</sup> Gibbon, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, 767.

<sup>22</sup> Georges Weil, *Les théories sur le pouvoir royal en France pendant les guerres de religion*, 62; Paris, 1891.

<sup>23</sup> Pareto, *op. cit.*, Sec. 1851.

<sup>24</sup> See G. Constant, "Les progrès du Catholicisme en Angleterre," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1 Août 1935, 519 ff.

One of the great modern failures in attempted suppression is the war against liberalism during the nineteenth century. Liberalism did come to power later in the century in some of the countries involved, notably Italy, but its victory in Austria and Germany was a shortlived post-war phenomenon. The Holy Alliance failed clearly to prevent the rise of liberalism in Italy, France, and other countries; yet it must be admitted that the situation was very complex. In Russia, for instance, liberalism never really attained power; the first revolution in 1917, won by the proletariat, nevertheless, thrust power into the hands of a reluctant and immature bourgeoisie. The October revolution was, in this sense, merely the assumption of power by those who had won the overthrow of the czaristic régime. In Italy, moreover, the resistance of the liberals, their willingness to die for their cause, was powerfully stimulated by the fact that aliens were placed in power by the reactionary European movement, and by the fact that Austria, the hated enemy, was in virtual control of Italian politics. The rise of fascism and the decline of liberalism coincide to a remarkable degree with the destruction of the ancient enemies of Italian unity. One can hardly avoid the conclusion that the capacity of liberalism to produce martyrs has been a somewhat occasional phenomenon.<sup>25</sup>

We have already insisted that successful repression requires not only favorable social circumstances, but that it must be organized directly and indirectly.<sup>26</sup> Often the permanently organized indirect suppression is the most effective part of the program. Direct suppression involves the imprisonment or death of believers and leaders in a point of view; indirect suppression consists in a system of weights brought to bear upon these same persons in addition to the direct impact of governmental policy. One of the most important aspects of indirect suppression is the denial to the repressed of the ordinary tech-

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Frederick B. Artz, *Reaction and Revolution*, Ch. 5; New York and London, 1934.

<sup>26</sup> See Robert L. Hale, "Force and the State: A Comparison of Political and Economic Compulsion," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 35, 149-201 (1935), for a discussion of many indirect types of suppression in relation to American constitutional law.



niques that facilitate social organization and group consciousness. An ability to secure a wide hearing before the populace is often fatal to suppression. Not only is a conspiracy of silence often used by governments, but the repressed have as much silence as is possible forced upon them. The repressed are given no place on the ballot when elections or plebiscites are held; they do not have the right to publish openly their own newspapers, nor are they permitted to use the columns of the authorized papers. For instance, toward the end of 1936 when Edward VIII of England was forced to abdicate, the newspapers were first silent and afterwards presented only the view of the government, while the defenders of the king, including the king himself, were unable to use broadcasting facilities or to get their point of view expressed in the newspapers.<sup>28</sup>

Collateral penalties are significant in indirect suppression, and to be effective they must be meshed with the social conditions surrounding the problem of repression. In general, experience might indicate that indirect penalties for followers of a movement are more effective than for the leaders. The leader suffers heavily, either death or enervating imprisonment; the follower needs constant pressure brought upon him to move in the direction desired by the government. Direct punishment is often made to appear as an application of the liberal principle of equality before the law, that is to say, every person who says or does certain things is defined generally as a criminal. Because of the tendency of political or religious agitation to become public, especially if an appeal is made to the masses, such persons are more easily apprehended than in conventional criminal activity.

It is always injurious to social coherence to permit the organization of large groups in favor of the policy of the government, that is, the policy of giving the widest possible hearing to those who favor suppression. Any policy of suppression, to be in accord with social equilibrium, needs the support of organized groups; this is the mass basis of governmental action. Economic and religious groups are particularly useful in this regard. The pressure of these organized bodies on the repressed constitutes an important phase of the technique of indirect suppression. A government organized and stimulated by boycott, whether economic or social in character, is of vital assistance to the government in its application of political penalties, both direct and indirect.

ization of inequality before the law to attain a too far-reaching development. But that inequality before the law is to be applied as a means of pressure on the more obscure followers of a movement, is generally recognized. However, for the group to which indirect penalties and pressures are applied, inequality before the law must not permit effective outlets in other directions. Thus, if a group is denied access to the bureaucracy, to positions as officers in the armed forces, to teaching and other occupations or professions, a corresponding pressure is brought to bear to keep proscribed persons from concentrating upon economic activities. Under the partial toleration allowed the Huguenots in France after the religious wars, they were not permitted to occupy many honorific positions in the state; they were forced into economic activity, and when the revocation of the Edict of Nantes took place, France suffered a severe disorganization of the conduct of economic enterprise.<sup>29</sup> The Emperor Honorius, as a means of indirect suppression, refused to permit non-Catholics and Aryans to serve in the army and occupy other social stations; yet this policy, while effective, has been regarded as a fatal step in weakening the resistance power of the state.<sup>30</sup> A more neutral, but no less effective long-run policy, was the denial to heretics of the right of inheritance. Such an indirect punishment of the children for the sins of the fathers dissolved some of the most hardened convictions.<sup>31</sup>

Suppression, like any other policy of government, is related to the objective circumstances or conditions of technology. While the development of modern means of communicating ideas has

<sup>28</sup>See Werner Sombart, *Le Bourgeois*, tr. from the German, Paris, 1926.

<sup>29</sup>Gibbon, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, 1087.

<sup>30</sup>*Cf. ibid.*, Vol. 1, 971-974. Variation in the pattern of repression can be observed also in the relative position of two or more types of social or political offenders. As an indirect means of suppression, the impact of the law in the one case may be lightened and in the other can be maintained in full rigor. The policy of the enforcing agents of the state is of the utmost importance in this respect, and the discriminative use of the pardoning power is evidence of the drift in the indirect forms of suppression. Before the World War in France, for example, amnesty was granted to those who had engaged in anti-military propaganda, but it was refused at the same time to those who had preached the Malthusian doctrine and the morality of birth control. Pareto, *op. cit.*, Sec. 1345.

rendered it much more easy than formerly to learn of the thinking of other groups, it has also placed additional means of indirect suppression in the hands of the government. Censorship, for instance, is a problem that alters as rapidly as technology, though in some cases repression is made easier by the same means. All censorship is directed toward stopping the circulation of ideas, though it can never be assumed that just because a principle is passed from one person to another it will be accepted as true. Much depends on the character of the idea itself and the circumstances under which it is spread. The suppression of meetings and the confiscation or prohibition of certain kinds of printed matter are among the older forms of this type of repression. Clearly, however, a partial policy of repression is often worse than none at all. Permanence, rigor, and energy over long periods of time are necessary for this form of repression to have much effect.<sup>20</sup>

It is difficult, if not impossible, to control the broadcasting practices of neighboring states, yet it is possible to bring about an effective control of the radio programs within a single state. With a measure of popular support, single individuals will be afraid normally to listen to programs emanating from proscribed sources. Likewise, the control of the content of motion pictures is fairly easy under modern conditions of distribution. But in carrying out policies of repression dealing with the press, assemblies, the radio, and motion pictures, the enforcing agencies must have a wide and final discretion, and the opposition to such policies must be prevented from having a free and general right of criticism of what the government is doing. Indirect suppression of this sort is very similar in effect to the control of the

<sup>20</sup> There is little doubt but that the Soviet Union has had a large measure of success in suppressing meetings and the circulation of printed matter advocating what may be called "counter-revolutionary ideas." Mass indifference to such ideas, as well as the effective organization of political supervision, must be given credit for the success of the policy. The czarist regime had little success in preventing the spread of socialistic thought, which gained rapid headway among the intellectuals. If there is a coincidence of governmental policy and the desires of the intellectuals as to a given form of literary censorship, it is very likely to be a success. When the publicistic element in a state is in opposition to the government, the latter can hardly hope to achieve effective censorship.

schools: where the regulation of the curricula is relatively easy. Motion pictures are not a genuine means of engaging in political discussion, and, therefore, even under liberalism they can be censored without undue opposition. In many cases the throngs that crowd the moving picture palaces are unconscious of the selective process that has gone on behind the scenes before the public release of a particular picture.<sup>21</sup>

Suppression is frequently undertaken to avoid revolution or to solidify the achievements of a revolution just completed. Suppression must be used, if it is to be successful, in such a way that further revolution will be avoided. The rulers must, above all, judge the social circumstances under which the political machine of repression is set to work. On the eve of a revolution a government is seldom effective in its policies of repression, for the same reasons, indeed, that the revolution of tomorrow is to be a realized fact. Prolonged economic depression, which has occurred at various times in Western history, is likely to produce mass movements. These movements may be expressed indirectly in religious feelings as in the past, though one of the characteristics of the present-day world is that mass movements are directly economic, and generally they are only remotely religious. Effective suppression against the contemporary mass movement must be developed on a wide front. Social security legislation in the United States, for instance, is part of the necessary answer to the fantastic economics of the Townsend movement.

Post-war dictatorships in Russia, Italy, and Germany, for instance, draw no small part of their strength in repression from the fact that the political principles upon which they operate are organically compatible with the economic policies they are pursuing. State power must be developed in any case as far as it can be in order to reach the totalitarian society. Under liberalism, one may talk of economic planning or social collectivism, but unless the state power is freed from the restrictions traditionally associated with liberalism, no results of a substantial character will be observed. By implication at least, the socialist rulers and thinkers have recognized that the liberal party system and parliamentarism are incompatible with both

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Carl Schmitt, *Verfassungslehre*, 168; München und Leipzig.

pure collectivism and with the tendency toward state planning and control.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, the same situation prevails in fascist thought. Drennan has declared that the economic theses of fascism have been developed in Anglo-Saxon countries, but there has been no "development of either the political or moral background necessary to put these theses into practical operation."<sup>23</sup>

It has been suggested above that one important social aspect of repression is the attitude of the publicistic and intellectual groups in the state. If they are opposed to the policy of the government, it is hopeless to make the attempt to reach effective control of published material or of public gatherings. If the intellectuals are liquidated, as in Russia in 1917, little is to be feared on this score; or if indirect means of suppression strike ruthlessly at the economic and social position of this group, as in Germany since 1933, the way may be cleared for effective control on a wider front. The failure of the French government before the revolution to control the intellectuals was one of the deeper reasons for the death of the old régime. Intellectuals have never occupied seriously the seats of political power, but they have been the literary brokers of ideas that have fed the spirit of all social classes. If the intellectuals and the publicists cease to be loyal to a principle of social organization, and if they in turn criticize it, the activist leaders are deprived of their source of ideas and the ultimate basis of their propaganda. Intellectuals are generally mistrusted by both the masses and the ruling stratum. Few, if any, revolutionary leaders have been willing to trust the outcome of their effort to the leadership of intellectuals.<sup>24</sup>

In contemporary liberal states, active repression of the intellectual.

<sup>22</sup> Christopher Dawson, *Religion and the Modern State*, 36; New York, 1935.

<sup>23</sup> James Drennan, *B.U.F.: Oswald Mosley and British Fascism*, 235; London, 1934. Cf. Robert S. Dower, "Thomas Carlyle," in F. J. C. Hearnshaw (editor), *The Political and Social Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Victorian Age*, 49; London, 1933.

<sup>24</sup> This interpretation is amply developed by Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution, passim*; Chicago, 1927; see Mornet, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

lectuals is likely to be resorted to long after their work has in effect been completed. In such circumstances repression itself will no doubt fail, or at least the successful use of suppressive tactics will be reserved for those who replace the decadent élite. At the present time the dominant stratum of society seems to enjoy ridicule of itself, as did the effete leaders of France under the old régime. Suppression is often a reaction to a period filled with suicidal attitudes; it is employed only too often when it is likely to be least effective.

Why is it that repression is resorted to so frequently when it is least likely to succeed? This question is one of the most difficult to explain, and it is one of the most characteristic of the situations arising in the dynamics of social repression. Perhaps it may be asserted that repression is most needed by a ruling class when it can do the least good. That is to say, either the ruling group has been unable to foresee the necessity of repression in the future or it has been denied the time to develop logically its governorship of the state. It would be assuming too much stupidity, no doubt, to believe that leaders employing suppression do not know that the chances of success are often slight. Repression springs from the same social uncertainties out of which revolution, civil war, and international war are likely to arise.

All governments may be oligarchies in the end; the difference between democracy and authoritarianism may be that oligarchy in the latter case is more visible to the naked eye. One falls back on repression while the other is restrained. Yet the "democratic" oligarchy may be following its nature in its policy, in the acceptance of its inability to be an effective repressor. The "government of the few," as Lord Bryce spoke of it, exists in a democracy under relatively peaceful social conditions, or at least in an atmosphere of compromisable issues. Its methods are suited generally to normal circumstances, and the opposition can be endured in part because the opposition can endure the dominant party. A measure of responsibility can be enforced without resort to revolution, and a choice between the "ins" and the "outs" is really a choice between them. Naturally, the democratic oligarchy cannot be assumed to be permanent any more than an oligarchy of any other kind. Yet democracy continues

to be, in no small measure, because a social situation exists in which repression is not needed. By its nature its political technique is limited to this kind of situation; it cannot become authoritarian and still remain democratic and liberal.

Throughout this paper it has been implied that the successful use of suppression is an extraordinarily complex political and social problem. Suppression has been both successful and woefully ineffective. But the activity of the state in this field of policy might suggest that it is a simplistic solution to say that the state is bound to fail. If the state can plan the national economy, it may also perhaps plan the minds of its citizens. Every situation in which an attempt at repression is made is an individual or particularized problem; generalizations are likely to be faulty. Yet all should agree that the state is in some degree competent to suppress oppositions; the picture to be drawn from the probabilities of historical behavior may run for or against the government. Since the consequences of governmental action are not to be catalogued accurately beforehand, some efforts at repression may be surprisingly successful, while others may be dismal catastrophes because an essential but simple factor was ignored.

We have attempted here a study in political process, an examination of one aspect of political behavior. The issue of whether the state should or should not resort to repressive measures has not been touched, except to indicate that effective and continued repression is done, for the most part, in the name of high ideals, public welfare, and the canons of right. The justification of suppression has always been essentially the same. Thomas Hobbes may be balanced against Benedict Spinoza. Hobbes is the defender of suppression and a believer in the practicability of such a policy. Spinoza postulated an inherent limitation on political power; the state cannot control the thought of the individual, and the right of the individual against repression grows out of this fact. In the Soviet Union, in Germany, in Italy, and in the authoritarian state, it is believed that the government can control what goes on in the citizen's mind. This belief is the final foundation of the principle of political repression, and on its pragmatic realizability rests the fate of a large amount of contemporary political policy. Many modern states, like the

state in the age of Augustus, are seeking to contrive that "in the enjoyment of plenty, the Romans should lose the memory of freedom."<sup>36</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Gibbon, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, 518. Niccolo Machiavelli in *The Prince*, Ch. 6, observes: "Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by force."