

the features of the bill which the press had considered most objectionable. As Premier Blum saw it when he made an impassioned plea before the Senate for his proposals, the Commission did not "limit itself to amending the text of the Chamber, it completely overthrew it." And actually the Senate did remove the teeth of the bill.

The proposal compelling periodicals to form corporations bound by law to divulge the sources of their income was eliminated. The provisions regarding the dissemination of false news were modified, and libel cases were not to be transferred from the Assize Courts. The Senate also rejected the article authorizing the government to prohibit the exportation of journals. Thus modified, the bill was returned to the Chamber where it was consigned to the Commission for further study.

There the matter stands. Blum on several occasions attempted to rearouse public sentiment on the question, but the favorable moment had passed. The resignation of the Blum Ministry in June 1937, and the succession of the Chautemps and Daladier cabinets left the bill little chance of passage in its original form.

Thus died the reform movement, the victim in large part of political factionalism and of a press which did not relish the idea of being reformed. To some extent the Blum bill was handicapped by the provisions which tampered with the traditional freedom of the press. It is worth noting, however, that some of the journals which campaigned most bitterly against being "reformed" by Blum, now seem quite willing to be "censored" by Daladier. By means of the unusual powers voted to him because of the international situation, Daladier has brought a considerable pressure to bear on the press. As this is written, he has not decreed any general press regulations, though he has established a drastic censorship on news of military importance. If peace continues throughout the summer, he may of course merely hold the threat of additional decrees over the press. It is possible, too, that any decrees he might issue would have the specious appearance of reform measures, but their basic purpose would undoubtedly be the establishment of a censorship.

## PUBLIC OPINION: ER

of Political Science at the University of he will join the Political Science Department. He is the author of *Labor in the ents of Modern Politics*. During 1931-32 l Science Research Council to study the ion. This article provides an interesting es and Public Opinion," also in this issue.

re passed since publication of *Commonwealth*, the work upon can reputation has been based. mixed feelings. It is clear that emocracy was a closed issue; rogressive form of government rld were to struggle. His comad in the light of his resolution of opinion is governed by his ug the political career of Robert : remarked that no one since of democracy, and that no one n of Disraeli's household suf-rank enemy of democratizing enough to see the beginning cratic movement, but not long ned as it is today.

re of Bryce in the succession of on. In fact it can be said that it of modern scholars in mak-f the problem of opinion. For

*raphy*, 1903, p. 309. Bryce observes (p. cret that the masses will as readily vote

a generation, Bryce set the pace in the study of opinion, and while his method is now outmoded, his stimulation continues to be effective. A critical student will no doubt say that *Modern Democracies* (1921) is a work far inferior to *The American Commonwealth*; it is to the latter work that we must go to find the full-rounded and optimistic outlines of his theory of public opinion.

For almost a generation we have been busily engaged in shattering the democratic "myth"; we have been realists in the study of social behavior. Consequently, the Victorian observation of "facts," so characteristic of Bryce, seems alien to our own understanding of politics. Either the United States has changed enormously since Bryce wrote, or Bryce failed to see what the American political stage was really like. If our British statesman was correct in his method, then we have come from a period of consolidation in politics to one of sharp transition. In part this must be true, yet it seems that Bryce took all facts without distinction (there was no aristocracy of facts as Pareto claims) and painted them verbally with his myopic bias. The plain fact is that Bryce did not really see the United States; he found what he wanted to find. But optimism was characteristic of the first generation of readers of Bryce; no doubt they felt that the author of *The American Commonwealth* was a profound observer.

### BRYCE ON DE TOCQUEVILLE

A touch of irony may be suggested by a comparison of Bryce's criticism of Alexis de Tocqueville's method and our similar criticism of Bryce. Tocqueville was mistaken in many of his observations, argued Bryce, since he was seeking in America the ideal or type of democracy. British institutions were insufficiently familiar to him, and therefore many things commonplace in the Anglo-American political structure appeared novel or striking. Tocqueville did not see the basic similarity between English and American democracy—this is the flat assertion of the author of the *Commonwealth*. In addition to mistaking the transitory and the permanent, Tocqueville did not know the mentality of the middle

tal to nineteenth century America.<sup>2</sup> at, carrying the image of France in serve *Democracy in America*. Now criticism that we must make today nion in the United States. Just as e wanted to see. Perhaps today we but certainly it is true that we can- ce saw when he was studying our

ited above must have been written ally finished *American Common- ically*, Bryce recognized himself in udents of American democracy. ly fifty years after the publication work appeared approximately fifty *Democracy in America*. It is now ad it may be that the bitter words are not to be in the same tradition American politics just mentioned. ski or others might be mentioned may not be willing to accept the

to the study of public opinion in ie is the rule of public opinion in at sovereignty with no fear; rather ie of the foundations of American of American government was in- rol of opinion. Presidential power, om the people, and the President n members of the legislature. Pub- ough the President, though Bryce against "one-man power" in the

Hamilton and de Tocqueville," *Johns Hopkins Science*, 5th series, Vol. IX (1887), pp. 22 ff.

United States. "Nowhere is the rule of public opinion as complete as in America, nor so direct, that is to say, so independent of the ordinary machinery of government."<sup>3</sup> Likewise, the Supreme Court feels the touch of public opinion, since public opinion is stronger in its influence in the United States than anywhere else. Judges are only men, observed Bryce, and when the meaning of the Constitution is in doubt, it is natural to follow the lead of public opinion.<sup>4</sup> Behind the legislatures, the executives and the judiciary is the power of opinion. In the end the people approve or disapprove of an interpretation of the Constitution. This is so even when the interpretation goes beyond the letter of the Constitution.<sup>5</sup>

In Bryce one can discover the beginning of the distinction that in subsequent years has so troubled the student of opinion, the distinction between opinion and "real" opinion. Bryce declared that in orthodox democratic theory "every citizen has, or ought to have, thought out certain opinions. . . ." On the other hand, there is very little individuality in American opinion (the ghost of Tocqueville?), especially among average men. There is, indeed, little substance in their opinions. "It is, therefore, rather sentiment than thought that the mass can contribute. . . ."<sup>6</sup> The upper classes, on the other hand, entertain ideas concerning their own interest, though they are often wrong, in contrast with the lower groups where there is more sentiment. In proof Bryce observed that the masses favored the attainment of national status in Italy, and in North America during the Civil War. Nearly all great political causes have made their way first among the middle or humbler classes. But it is the aristocrats who furnish the masses with ideas.<sup>7</sup> Opinion as sentiment, however, is fundamentally passive. In nineteen out of twenty men opinion consists chiefly of sentiments, while a small active class is busy making and sounding out opinion, along with the formative influence of education.

<sup>3</sup> James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, American edition, 1891, Vol. I, pp. 62-3.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 267.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 376.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 242.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 243-4.

tion on the part of the leaders is, edge of popular sentiment. The critical importance in this respect, tzerland where the initiative and e leaders have fairly constant in- public mind. Like the pyramids, lar government is not its wisdom that is sufficiently vague, perhaps, times.<sup>8</sup> Our author continued by opinion has ruled, the more abso- jority likely to become, the less o arise, the more are politicians : in forming opinion, but in dis- it."<sup>9</sup>

melancholy in this statement, yet ne. Time and inevitable decay had government, insisted Bryce, may eing subject to continuous control .ency is toward this result in the s is closer to the continuous gov- her country in the world. In the mass of American citizens are as their power as the citizens in the The citizens of Republican Rome on because they left more power rates than did the Greek democ- nited States was thus regarded as government under a check-and- cy is reinforced by the fact that nited States, while in Germany, ic opinion is the opinion in effect

ized the fact that the ruling class in England dding of opinion than in the United States.

## FUNDAMENTAL VS. MINOR ISSUES

Today our appreciation of democracy is shadowed by per- sistent discussion of issues that seem in nature to be irreconcilable. In large measure the future of democratic government and the usefulness of government by public opinion depend on the solu- tion of these issues. Bryce was not faced with fundamental issues upon which discussion rapidly degenerates into the passionate affirmation of a position. His day in America was a time of con- solidation or of convalescence after the stirring times of the Civil War. Thus he could say with a clear conscience: "Questions on which the masses have made up their minds pass out of the region of practical discussion. Controversy is confined to minor topics. . . ."<sup>12</sup> But such a judgment would not be valid today when, in all of Western Europe, political controversy deals in- creasingly with fundamental rather than minor issues. Bryce may be accused of having been too optimistic, but so were all of his contemporaries. The relief of American democracy after the Civil War, the feeling that the great issues had been settled, that the future was bright with promise of political and economic advance, could not fail to infect the student of our democracy. *The Ameri- can Commonwealth* appeared at a time when throughout the western world there was general agreement about the funda- mental rightness of democracy. And the survival of American federalism, with its Lincolnian revival of the principles of the Declaration of Independence, only added to the prevailing attitude.

In the study of Hamilton and Tocqueville we see Bryce con- gratulating the United States that the ominous tendencies ob- served by earlier students had not continued. But as the previous scholars failed to see needed solutions, so Bryce failed to see the germs of renewed controversy on fundamental problems. When

There is, therefore, more average political intelligence in the United States than in Eng- land. In the United States opinion is not made, he said; it grows. Likewise, there is a higher percentage of the qualified electorate that votes in the United States than in Eng- land. Those who do not vote leave their will in the hands of those who do. *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 252, 315-17. Cf. my article, "The Pragmatic Electorate," *American Political Science Review*, XXIV (1930), pp. 17 ff.

<sup>12</sup> Bryce, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 335.

r were settled, there was less cause, as to trouble themselves about public politicians saw their field left free; if the country under the politicians, as voted more intelligently in this other country except Switzerland. Interworks that of the professionals opinion expressing itself constantly in the press, and more distinctly at the box."<sup>13</sup>

if having a systematic approach to use a Chinese figure of speech, his a river that overflowed everything. We must make an effort, however, definitions he offered. Early in *The* public opinion was tied up with the press opinion. In turn this implied a in large measure of political parast to his conception of the nature is not defined. Parties are not the since the people stand behind them:

and conscience of the whole nation, are included in the parties, for the parties . . . Yet it [public opinion] stands and larger-minded than they are. . . . number of minds than in any other ably sovereign. It is the central point<sup>14</sup>

ce declared that public opinion in ion of the whole nation, because ween classes. Here especially there

*scies* (1921), Vol. I, p. 153, Bryce declared pub-ews men hold regarding matters that affect or stood, it is a congeries of all sorts of discrepant spirations."

is no ruling class to modify the opinions of the elected representatives. The representatives themselves are unable to appeal from the classes to the masses. In support he argued that in the United States the opinions of both employers and workers on non-labor matters are essentially the same, making opinion more easily ascertained and more powerful.<sup>15</sup> In contrast with this view, however, Bryce argued that very little of a man's opinion is really his own, since he has been told how and what to think. Thus opinion at its simplest is "the prevalent impression of the moment." But if this is the case, opinion tends to crystallize through private discussion and through newspaper treatment. Action may be required finally, and the people called upon to vote on the issue.<sup>16</sup> While there may be differences of opinion and two sides expressed in the voting, there is no inclination to refuse to abide by the results of an election.

#### "NEWNESS" OF PUBLIC OPINION

Like other students of public opinion, Bryce was torn between its "newness" and its early historical appearance. With David Hume, Bryce recognized that opinion is the chief and ultimate power at all times in nearly all governments, that is, the opinion of the masses of the people. While military tyranny, as in some of the Greek city-states, had been able to ignore opinion for a time, even in Eastern despotisms Bryce is constrained to recognize the support the masses implicitly give the government. On the contrary, Bryce recognized that we speak of public opinion as a new force, "conspicuous" only since governments began to be popular. Only in the last generation, said Bryce, statesmen had looked on it with suspicion. He quoted a letter written in 1820 by Sir Robert Peel in which Peel spoke "with the air of a discoverer" of "that great compound of folly, weakness, prejudice, wrong feeling, right feeling, obstinacy, and newspaper paragraphs, which is called public opinion."<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, Vol. II, pp. 260-1.

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 239-40.

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 247.

and the love of order, according to the strongest forces in human nature and the earliest political societies opinion is rather than support. In free countries, they usually support the government. There are stages in the development of opinion, the second involves conflict between the first and the third and last phase is the fourth being prophetic or suggesting rather than argued that if one could know the future rather than once in a while at the end of the world "not only reign but govern."<sup>18</sup>

The major phase of Bryce's treatment of the expression of opinion. Under this phase are those agencies which the author of the book is being most effective in giving examples of public thought. We must mention the press, and the political party. Bryce is more concerned with the expression of opinion than its formation with his times, he had no confidence in the expression of opinion through the democratic technique which, in his view, there was no question in his mind that the press, some comment must be made. The press, as invented by the ancient Greek and which has spread to the rest of the civilized world, there has never been complete satisfaction. The machinery has been invented to overtake the progress in the electoral process. The press is the regalia of the sovereignty of public opinion, a purist, since he recognized that the press is a far more complicated problem than

simply holding an election. Without developing the implications of his statement, he noted that plural voting based on property and educational qualifications was rejected in England because the rich had other ways than the ballot of influencing public policy.<sup>19</sup>

How does public opinion express itself? Are the organs of expression adequate? These questions led Bryce into the problem of the press in modern democracies. He remarked that the newspapers are the chief organs of opinion; that United States newspapers contain "more domestic political intelligence than any, except perhaps two or three of the chief English journals." On the other hand, our party press is regarded as less powerful than in Europe. We must look to the press as the chief mirror of public opinion.<sup>20</sup>

The American press serves the expression of public opinion and subserves the formation of opinion better than does the press of any part of the European continent. Our newspapers, insisted Bryce, are above the level of the machine politicians. While in Europe the public meeting, discussion, and conversation are more important than in the United States, our general habit of reading newspapers makes this less necessary.<sup>21</sup>

#### BRYCE DISCOVERS "PROPAGANDA"

It was not really until after the World War that Bryce began a more systematic examination of the press, and then it was in connection with international relations. By that time he had also discovered "propaganda," and the press was viewed in part as an agency of propaganda rather than as a mirror of public opinion. In 1922 Bryce was willing to say that the press was more frequently an influence for ill will between nations than for peaceful relations; the press is more dangerous than the politicians since it can-

<sup>19</sup> *Modern Democracies*, Vol. I, pp. 151, 153. *ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 286, another undeveloped idea is to be found. He makes a fundamental distinction between public opinion and the rule of the ballot, though admitting that an election is one way of ascertaining public opinion.

<sup>20</sup> Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, Vol. II, pp. 262-5.

<sup>21</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 267-70.

agreed that the purpose of the press colored the use of the newspapers by acts, as was the practice with Bismarck set an example for other governments necessary on the sharp change in his the newspapers.<sup>22</sup>

aware of the corruption of party opinion led him to assert that public opinion led party politics. How can this be? First look at the total American backwardness here another of those Brycean optimistic and aristocratic pessimism in Bryce's day to be charitable on the bosses; today we might say a reflection of public opinion as a

the education of public opinion is in *Commonwealth*. The reason for that he accepted almost at face value the achievements and future of democracy the education or elevation of public opinion, and some collateral influences of public opinion. Bryce was deeply impressed by the ignorance of Americans in the people and government. He could not escape the fact at that time that truth and justice prevail in the long run. Without serious doubts we can feel that a group is proved to be right. Sometimes the existence of the

<sup>22</sup> Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, pp. 142, 143, 182. Vol. II, p. 231. In *Modern Democracies*, Vol. II, and spirit of "faction" are evils in that intelligent party. But party government gives organization to an educative force. On the other hand (*ibid.*, Vol. I) a number of people really influence voting. Often in which case the few really decide. Democratic of the nation.

majority is accepted as an act of divine providence. In other cases the will of the people is accepted like the irresistible forces of nature. But reason in this position is found by Bryce in the fact that Americans on the whole are more educated than any other people, except Switzerland, parts of Germany, Norway, Iceland, and Scotland. He admitted, however, that the education of the masses is superficial. How these two estimates of our people are to be reconciled we leave to Lord Bryce.<sup>24</sup>

#### SECTIONAL VARIATION

Whatever Bryce may have thought of public opinion in general in the United States, he had little appreciation of the South. One is inclined to believe that most of the people he talked to were northerners or westerners. The South is an example of backwardness rather than of the general march of democratic progress. Hence he was profoundly impressed by the ignorance of the Negro in the southern states. "If one part of the population is as educated and capable as that of Switzerland, another is as ignorant and politically untrained as that of Russia."<sup>25</sup>

Following in the footsteps of Tocqueville, Bryce detected differences in American and European public opinion because of the absence of a predominant political capital in the United States. The European capital, such as Paris, becomes the central and focal point of public opinion. Paris is the chief factory where French opinion is made. Because of this fact, public opinion crystallizes less rapidly in the United States; the temperature of opinion is not so high as where there is a great capital. No one city tends to dominate the American scene.<sup>26</sup> Local self-government provides in the United States a welcome counterbalance to our great centers of thought and action, and particularly against the capital city.

<sup>24</sup> Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, Vol. II, pp. 275-8. One of the forces controlling American opinion, in Bryce's view, is Christianity, which influences us more than in the so-called age of faith.

<sup>25</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 309.

<sup>26</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 660, 665. *Modern Democracies*, Vol. I, p. 296.

ought to be many important provincial political trends of a country.<sup>27</sup>

playing an increasingly dominant rôle of opinion, but the subject is not discussed in *Commonwealth*. After the World War, however, the elements of politics, began to deal with the masses were superficial, and his observations on the subject. The issue of the manufacture of public opinion is treated in *Modern Democracies* and in his *International Relations*. While wealth may be curbed, the influence of public opinion seems "to defy all regulation in a free country, is to disprove false and artificially created and factitious opinion, and the use of propaganda, is particularly dangerous because it has multiplied the menace of the influence of the masses. If there is a process of clarification of public opinion—chiefly its streams of sentiment—then the number of electors indifferent to the establishment of universal suffrage. We find in the nineteenth century Bryce giving away before the post-war world.<sup>28</sup>

clear in his brief analysis of the new propaganda campaigns." But these campaigns were increasing and after the war by peoples who were ignorant. "Propaganda," he said, "is a new force. It can work through non-official channels. It is a statement appealing to opinion and opinion. It is covered that propaganda is quite an old thing. It is the proclamations of the French revolution. It had been used since in the nineteenth

century. Vol. II, p. 502, Bryce showed his appreciation of homogeneity. It may not avert class wars, [it] helps each class of the masses of the others, and can create a general opinion in a nation. In view of this, Bryce recognized the "swing of the pendulum" of public opinion once it is formed. The pendulum swings. Vol. II, p. 364; Vol. I, pp. 286 ff. Vol. II, pp. 483-4; Vol. I, pp. 154-7.

century incitement to revolution, particularly in Germany and Italy. Following the war, the anarchists and communists continued the older traditions. The most recent propaganda noted by our author was called "ethnological propaganda" in favor of Pan-Slavism, Pan-Turanianism, and Pan-Islamism. These efforts have arisen because the masses have escaped from the control of their former rulers and are seeking to gain control of public opinion. But fanaticism, warned Bryce, may be more dangerous than obedience used to be. Bryce was sensing the contrast between his latter years and the lost world of *The American Commonwealth*.<sup>29</sup>

#### MODERN CLASS WAR

Our last problem in the study of Bryce must take us from his early treatment of the issue of majority tyranny to the rude awakening of the modern class war. The mid-nineteenth century treatment of democracy was profoundly concerned with the tyranny of the majority; today we are not so sure that tyranny must always come from the majority. We know that it can also come from the expertly organized minority. But somehow Tocqueville and Bryce (in *The American Commonwealth*) missed the minority as a potential tyrant. They were impressed with what the majority might do with its power. Bryce was concerned in large measure to refute Tocqueville's charge that the majority in America was tyrannical. From Aristotle to Tocqueville the capital fault of democracy was this tyranny, and Tocqueville held it to be the chief defect of the United States. Bryce denied that the American majority mistreats the minority.<sup>30</sup> Tocqueville urged that he did not know any country in which there was less independence of spirit and less real liberty of discussion. Bryce replied that the

<sup>29</sup> Bryce, *International Relations*, pp. 20-4. Bryce believed that democracy has one marked advantage in defending itself against the submarine war of wealth: it can use publicity and the force of opinion. Democracy may rely on law and opinion, but opinion is the better prop. Opinion gives "tone" to political life, and tone can go down and it can come up, as in England in the days of Chatham and in the United States since 1890. *Modern Democracies*, Vol. II, p. 487. On this problem in South America see his, *South America, Observations and Impressions* (rev. ed., 1914), pp. 539-40.

<sup>30</sup> *American Commonwealth*, Vol. II, pp. 337 ff.



inion at its heyday in America, but has been less violence in political erance among people. It may be uine opinion is surrounded by a din of voices, that there is no is to find remedies for acknowl- to stop the power of opinion if it ican people suffer from adminis- ce, but nevertheless there is no

tually not tyrannical there is dan- e "an undue confidence in their eedom."

; "is a sort of atmosphere, fresh, that of the American cities, and noxious germs which are hatched Bryce had words of praise for the or in no country does a beaten 1 all groups there is a feeling that This is true at least in the North. outh before the war," he granted, racy, and its public opinion was chiefly the faith in publicity that air peculiar buoyancy and what ess in discussing even the weak

the contrast. He indicated that air submission to the majority. e submerged in the nation; the men are fitter," said Bryce, "to o strive against it."<sup>34</sup>

dependent schools of opinion in the United they are acquired, insisted Bryce, though ods, e.g. the Know-Nothing Party. Bryce

The discovery of the class war must have been one of the more profound shocks in Bryce's long and active life. His understanding of it is narrow, and he did not know quite how to fit it into his cosmogony. The class war and general strike, he challenged, did not come from democracy; they are an attack on it, and the physical force that was once needed to establish democracy is now used against it.

"Public opinion restrains the selfishness of an individual," he said, "but the public opinion of a class possessed by the sense of a common interest confirms the individual in his selfishness and blinds him to his own injustice."<sup>35</sup> Did Bryce realize here that the great tyranny is that of the minority?

#### BRYCE'S FAITH

This article should be concluded with a part of Bryce's confession of faith in *Modern Democracies*. A wise and tolerant public opinion requires the interest and intelligence of the voters, but it also requires agreement on certain fundamental political doctrines. We must give Bryce credit for seeing nearly twenty years ago, if dimly, what we see so clearly today, that tolerance and disagreement on essentials go ill together. But let us also hope that Bryce was right when he said that man is not an irrational animal; that truth will win in the long run, though its victory may be long delayed by self-interest, prejudice, and ignorance; and that, as he said, the spirit of democracy may rise above that of machinery.<sup>36</sup>

merely noted the power of corporations, but did not, apparently, consider them much of a menace. "In no country does one find so many men of eminent capacity for business . . . who are so uninteresting, so intellectually barren, outside the sphere of their business knowledge." *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 282-3, 292.

<sup>35</sup> *Modern Democracies*, Vol. II, pp. 580-2.

<sup>36</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 158, 160.

# POLITICAL PARTIES AND PUBLIC OPINION

By JOSEPH R. STARR

Dr. Starr is a member of the faculty of political science at the University of Minnesota, and has studied in England on a fellowship of the Social Science Research Council. One of the results of his investigation there was reported in the October 1937 issue of the *QUARTERLY*, in which particular attention was given to the research activities of British political parties. The present article, in a sense a continuation of the former one, places political parties in both philosophical and practical relationship to public education. The reader will find it interesting to consider Dr. Starr's article in connection with "James Bryce on Public Opinion: Fifty Years Later" also in this issue.

Many of the standard treatises on political parties say that one of the functions of the party is to serve as an agency of political education. In the United States at least this has remained a rather vague notion, and the books say little about how the parties perform this function, if indeed they perform it at all. Apparently little more is usually intended than that the party is an agent in the formation of public opinion. It is widely believed that political parties crystallize public opinion at election times by presenting statements of policy to the voters. Yet everybody knows that voting behavior is conditioned by many other factors besides possible agreement with the policy formulated by one or another political party.

The writers who did most to discredit the belief that public opinion is the continuous ruling force in the state—Wallas, Lippmann, Lowell, Dewey, and others—were well aware of the existence of political parties as possible forces in the betterment of public opinion. But the services of political parties in this respect did not lead them, at least up to the time of writing of their principal works, to a different conclusion.

These writers did not, however, consider their task as one of constructive inquiry. They were concerned on the whole with the destructive work of exposing the fallacies of democratic theory,