

FRANCIS G. WILSON

The Revolt of the Sophists

THE UPSURGE of the behavioral scientists is a modern version of the revolt of the sophists in the better days of Greece. The primary analogy is the training of the youth to seek power. Much of a university curriculum is devoted to what might be called the humanities, the tradition of civility, and humane learning. Behavioral science is leading the social sciences away from the influences of humane learning. In this, in Greek terms, it is engaged in buying with fellowships its graduate students, and in creating sophists rather than philosophers.

The great difference between this and an earlier generation is the hundreds of foundations in the United States, the greatest ones being liberally inclined and enjoying as well the advantages of tax exemption. There has recently developed a close connection between faculties devoted to empirical and quantitative study and the foundations, for the administrators of foundations are of the same persuasion. They will accept readily the recommendations of the behavioral scientists for research grants to faculty members, to young scholars, and to advanced graduate students. Beyond this there is another element, the sympathy of the bureaucracy for the kind of training given in behavioral science. It is a triangle of power: the empirical-liberal faculties, the foundations, and the bureaucracy whose members have been produced or re-educated under such influences.

(This essay was delivered as a lecture at an ISI seminar in Indianapolis on December 29, 1965).

Dr. Wilson, professor of political science at the University of Illinois, is the author of *The Elements of Modern Politics*, *The American Political Mind*, *The Case for Conservatism*, *A Theory of Public Opinion*, and co-author of *Political Thought Since World War Two*.

I refer here to the power structure of the revolution. And this situation is, indeed, different from those in the past where the demand for a "scientific study" of social relations has been more or less theoretical. This new arrangement is immensely powerful, and it is no surprise that its adherents feel confident. They seem to know that the future belongs to them. They are the ones who will form the intellectuals of tomorrow. In Eric Voegelin's terms, these liberals and intellectuals are Gnostics and the Gnostic revolution has arrived.

The search for a science of society is nothing new. There have been repeated episodes of such a search ever since the rise of Western society. From the time the Greeks began to explain the cosmos to the present, the idea of applying wisdom, or *sophia* or perfect scientific knowledge, to the organization and functioning of society has been with us. But there has been conflict in regard to the nature of knowledge. Physical theory and the theory of numbers and dialectic were most important to the Hellenic philosopher; to Israelites it was the wisdom of religious intellection that counted most. Still, one cannot avoid the general conclusion that *sophia* or *scientia* in mathematical and physical knowledge was the beginning of technological inventiveness in the West. Clearly, when men stood on the verge of the great period of rationalism it was mathematics which was the profound science, and it was the foundation from which rationalism made its leap. The claim was inevitable that knowledge from mathematics was rational and stood on a higher level than any conclusions that might be drawn from other inquiry. Mathematical knowledge was *scientia*, it was the Greek *episteme*, while the knowledge one might have from dialectics or theology was *doxa*, or belief. Thus, the pre-eminence of Greek, Roman, and Christian philosophy was sacrificed to the theory of an absolute, unquestionable knowledge.

hists


lower structure of the situation is, indeed, the past where the study of social relations is more or less theoretical. It is immensely powerful that its adherents seem to know that the intellectuals of tomorrow, these liberals and the Gnostics and the Gnosts. The science of society has been repeated ever since the rise from the time when the cosmos to the applying wisdom, or scientific knowledge, to the functioning of society there has been a concentration of knowledge. The theory of numbers is most important to the Israelites it was the intellectual that we cannot avoid the *sophia* or *scientia* physical knowledge technological invention. Clearly, when men had the great period of mathematics which was founded and it was the foundation of liberalism made its inevitable that knowledge was rational and more than any conclusion drawn from other knowledge was *scientia episteme*, while the Greeks have from dialectics or belief. Thus, the Roman, and Christianized to the theory of rational knowledge.

However, it is clear that an opinion based on common experience, a *doxa*, stood on a higher level than uninformed common opinion. And furthermore such a *doxa* was testable and subject to common, critical discussion.

The modern revolution in science was generally moderate in spirit toward the historical social order. Astronomy, with the correlative statement of the "scientific problem" by Galileo, was not revolutionary in social theory. Statistics was quite early applied to governmental information, including economic data. In this sense statistics has been from the outset a potentially ideological type of quantitative measurement. Hobbes surely was a firm advocate of public order, and if Locke was a theoretician of the Whigs it is only accidentally that he gave encouragement to the left. His contemporary, Isaac Newton, was a mathematician who had a side interest in magic, but his discovery of some of the laws of celestial mechanics gave a powerful impetus to the idea of scientific method in society. Newton was later used as a foundation of the revolutionary criticism of society in the 18th century. Liberalism and the revolutionary doctrines of the modern world are generally dated from the 18th century, though few single or separated ideas can be given the accolade of "original." I think one may say that the revolutionary ideologies of the early modern period and the development of scientific theory in the 17th century had separate origins. But when the humanism which emerged from the Renaissance found religion to be unessential, and when there occurred a junction between the humanistic spirit, the new mathematical method, and the slowly emerging idea that society can be structured the way men want it, the foundation for the age of the liberal revolutions was laid. It may be said that it was not the English revolution of the 17th century or the American Revolution of the 18th century which added the foundations of civility in the modern world; rather it was the French Revolution and its brood of ideologies which introduced political irresponsibility as a principle of political action. Somehow it all happened, but as to just how or why there are divergent explanations indeed.

OUR DISCUSSION involves contemporary events, and we must therefore turn to the near present. Following World War I there was a resurgence of interest in political science as a science. Of course, there had been such interest before, and especially in the 19th century when biology was the premier science. On the other hand, there was only intermittent interest in the study of politics as a quantitative enterprise, owing mainly I suppose to the long-standing interest in the history of institutions. For the most part, governmental statistics has developed in connection with mathematics rather than with the social sciences. One of the characteristic statements about the science of society was in Charles E. Merriam's *New Aspects of Politics* (1925), in which he alleged without hesitation that we now have enough knowledge from anthropology, sociology, psychology, combined with political science, to create a valid science of society. When social scientists write like this they talk only in generalities; they do not tell us what we know from these so-called sciences. In 1923 an ambitious National Conference on the Science of Politics was held, which was reported in *The American Political Science Review* in February, 1924. The reports of different sections of this Conference are unimpressive reading today. What they and a thousand others have so often expressed is the aspiration that there will be at some time in the future a science of politics. Walter Bagehot once called it *Physics and Politics*, and at a later time William Bennett Monroe of Harvard used the same theme.

Still, the inevitable happened. Suddenly after World War I there was crisis and ideological passion, rather than the promise of achievement which the national administration gave us during that war. There was a gradual change in intellectual style, with the intellectual moving back to the passionate affirmation of the truth of values. Political science has become, somewhat in Julien Benda's phrase, "the betrayal of the intellectuals." It is notable and curious that the same pattern has occurred after both World Wars. First, there is the ideological passion of war, and mass national movements during the war. Second, there is the turn of the intellectuals away from moral judgment to the insistence on science and methodology. (Even one of the recent de-



Isaac Newton (1642-1727)

crees of the Vatican Council spoke of centers of study and documentation, not only in theology, "but also in anthropology, psychology, sociology, and methodology . . .")

For the social scientist, however, methodology is not an adjunct to moral judgment but a means of escaping from it. Moreover there had been an accentuation of intellectual violence in World War II. There was, I think, a greater ideological fury in World War II than in World War I, and it has continued in various forms since the end of the war. But it is clear also that the demand for scientific method now in the social sciences is not only more passionate, but it is more widespread and it extends outward from the academic institutions to the foundations. One notable difference in our time is that the foundations have come to the assistance of the academics. Here is both a quantitative and a qualitative difference between the end of World War I and World War II. In the 1920's the intellectuals rejected the passion of the war, but now there have been no very successful revisions in the analysis of the late great conflict for the mastery of the world. Now, let us hold our breath, for the next crisis in human affairs, the next crisis that involves the intellectuals will sweep them from devotion to scientific method and they will turn even to war in the defense of values which they will affirm are surely the truth.

Thus the issue we face today is the highly complicated theory of the social sciences as exact sciences rather than as hu-

manistic studies. This commitment to science is combined with an angry commitment to what we should call the ideology of liberalism in America and simply "the left" in European countries. And both seem more complicated than in the past. Not only have many techniques of investigation of a mathematical and model building sort been added, but the philosophical issue seems also more complicated. We have moved far beyond a relatively stuffy adherence to British empiricism and its basically difficult doctrine of sense-data. Today positivism has robbed William James of his concept of radical empiricism. The principles of analysis make many of our statements somewhat meaningless, and linguistics moves on in stride. But including American pragmatism, which has mostly descended to those who do not care to engage in more arduous analysis, the continental Europeans seem to be mainly concerned with the problems of phenomenology and existentialism. However, Marxism and Christian philosophy battle stubbornly for their places in the intellectual world.

In a rather picayune way we may note that hardly any articles in the social sciences are published without inexpressive mathematics and charts. In addition there is much verbal model building as techniques of classification in the treatment of intellectual history. The point is that one must not classify epochs in terms of ideas or doctrines, but in terms of principles or orders that describe the behavior of those who are being studied. We can do this sort of analysis with the history of nationalism or with any of the ideologies. Ultimately, in the social sciences there must be some element of the quantitative or mathematical in the model that may be constructed.

IN THE PRESENT swirl of empirical-quantitative-positivist research writings, in the learned journals, one faces many issues. Richard Weaver in his *The Ethics of Rhetoric* has written with great force of the jargon of social science. It is a jargon that must convince us first of all that it says something other than ordinary, observable, common-sense experience. Part of any jargon has as its chief purpose the exclusion from understanding of the uninitiated mind. But surely those who understand must understand something more than the surface

commitment to sci- with an angry we should call the in America and sim- ean countries. And icated than in the many techniques of ematical and model ded, but the philo- o more complicated. beyond a relatively itish empiricism and cctrine of sense-data. bbed William James cal empiricism. The make many of our eaningless, and lin- stride. But including which has mostly de- io do not care to is analysis, the conti- 1 to be mainly con- ems of phenomenol- . However, Marxism hy battle stubbornly intellectual world. e way we may note es in the social sci- without inexpressive ts. In addition there l building as tech- . in the treatment of e point is that one hs in terms of ideas rms of principles or he behavior of those . We can do this sort istory of nationalism eologies. Ultimately, there must be some tative or mathemati- may be constructed.

' swirl of empirical- ist research writings, s, one faces many is- in his *The Ethics of* ith great force of the e. It is a jargon that t of all that it says ordinary, observable, nce. Part of any jar- purpose the exclusion the uninitiated mind. understand must un- ore than the surface

statement. In the end, it must be held that the statement in the language of the discipline says more than common sense. It may say something of the limited and special experience that the essence of science would attribute to it. We do not have any information on the number of practitioners of a discipline, such as political science, who read the journals with attention. I have heard a number of colleagues say that they do not try to read the statistical re-statements of the data on a given subject, or that they do not read the *American Political Science Review* at all. However, there are two parts of a social science review: the "scientific" part and the part which expresses the liberal ideology which seems to predominate in the academic journals. Thus, once the jargon has been mastered one must proceed to the question of whether the material involved makes some scientific advance in the statement or re-statement of knowledge. Of course, this is the major question, for neither the jargon nor the ideology must be considered the central question.

No doubt great steps in methodological advance have been made. Those who use these methods believe that ultimately they will reach such a level of scientific formulation that they will have a science of society adequate to the needs of the government, that is, of the bureaucracy. Even the most sanguine are hardly ready to claim that they have achieved science; what they will say is that they have a system of theories on which social science may be built. Furthermore, there are distinguished and divergent theories of what science is. The philosophy of science is a growing and notable field.

Pursuing the question into the area of value theory we reach one of the most perplexing and disturbing issues. It is clear that the behaviorist will talk about value theory, as David B. Truman does in one context, and he will recognize the existence and force of values as political facts, *ex consuetudine* one might say, but he will decline to include any judgment of the validity of normative judgments in his science of politics. There have been numerous statements like this, such as the proposition that values are important politically, that morality is something we may all take into account, and so forth. If pressed, such a be-

havioral scientist will seldom, if ever, admit that one moral theory is better than another, or that one value *qua* science is better than another. Value judgments and morality are not subject to scientific evaluation as to their truth or falsity. In any case, nearly all of the behaviorists would be on the side of Felix E. Oppenheim, rather than Harry V. Jaffa, in the notable debate several years ago in the *American Political Science Review*.¹ Jaffa argued the natural law position, asserting that moral judgments are just as cognitive as empirical or factual judgments. In another sense, the question is whether there can be a philosophy of morality or values, of right and wrong, and so forth, in addition to what is clearly recognized as a philosophy of science.

Now the critic of the radical empiricist will reject Hume's venerable distinction between fact and value. He will concede that there can be both a history and philosophy of science, but he will assert that philosophy itself is an independent body of knowledge, that is, an independent discipline, and that it has ways of testing the opinions, the *doxa*, it may propose, and that these testable judgments are solutions to the social problems that confront us.

AS WE NOW take a closer look at the social scientist, it is startling to observe that he is generally philosophically quite uneducated, that his knowledge of Classical thought is fragmentary, that his knowledge of literature is often limited, that he has read few of the great classics of intellectual history, that he is primarily concerned with his mathematics or statistics and the models of inquiry that he may construct. He is critical of intellectual achievement in the past in the sense that he will commonly ignore it in his analysis of social issues.² Finally, we may say that we reach the issue of whether there is, after all, any value in philosophy. Or, we may ask whether there is any value in any philosophy other than the philosophy of science

1. *American Political Science Review*, LI (March, 1957), 41-66.

2. See my essay, "The Social Scientist and His Values," Leo R. Ward, ed., *Ethics and the Social Sciences* (Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1959), Chap. I.

and various forms of empiricism, that is, positivism or radical empiricism, analysis, and linguistics. Such a position, of course, rejects the largest part of philosophical inquiry.

Traditionally, philosophy has been composed of ontology or metaphysics, and epistemology. The first has dealt with what is, with the nature of things in themselves. The second is inquiry and theory into how we may know anything. It would seem clear that scientific experience is particular or special. It is often the experience of the laboratory investigator. In its narrow range it can be repeated or mathematically analyzed by anyone who may understand. Philosophy, on the other hand, is empirical in the sense that it appeals to the common experience of people, and the understanding that grows out of the common experience of mankind. This does not suggest that the common experience of all mankind is the same, but it does suggest common experience over wide areas, and the possibility of communications between people who are, let us say, grounded in a common culture or tradition.

What seems to have happened in the contemporary world is that the professional philosopher has concentrated on other questions than those of what is in the world, and certainly many of them have insisted that it is impossible to make a statement of the "ought" that is significant. Thus, radical empiricism, analysis, and linguistics among the Anglo-Americans generally have swept away the exploration of metaphysical questions. In mathematics, biology, geology, and evolution, in utilitarianism, and more recently in pragmatism, Marxism, and most existentialism, the enemy has been theology and natural law, or, indeed, any insistence that a moral judgment can be cognitive. The philosopher more and more has concentrated on epistemological issues, to the denigration of any suggestion of metaphysical inquiry. Of course, one may return to metaphysics from these divergent roads, and this may be one of the ultimate values of the revolt of the sectarian methodologists.

Those who defend philosophy in the traditional sense are much inclined to say that the epistemologists have overstated the questions concerned with the nature of *is* and *ought*. The search of the philosopher falls somewhere between absolute truth

(the Greeks would call it *episteme*) and the sheerest customary opinions. One might call the search one that is animated by the virtue of prudence, which is to say the virtue of wisdom, rather than absolute truth or scientific truth. Thus, the philosopher seeks for *doxa*, judgments based on common experience, wisdom from whatever source derived, tested by logic and common intercourse, and by the pragmatic consequences in a particular social order. Such views rest on more than the *mores*, as William Graham Sumner defined them in his great classic *Folkways*. Mortimer J. Adler, that notable teacher of philosophy to those who are not philosophers, has recently written:

*For brevity of reference . . . I propose to call questions about what is and happens or about what men should do and seek "first-order questions" and the knowledge that is contained in tenable answers to such questions, "first-order philosophical knowledge." In contrast, "second-order questions" are questions about our first-order knowledge, questions about the content of our thinking when we try to answer first-order questions, or questions about the ways in which we express such thought in language. The tenable answers to such questions constitute "second-order philosophical knowledge."*³

One question which the behaviorist will tend to evade is: Do you not suggest that there is a preferred philosophy that the respectable political scientist must adopt? And do you not take the answers to a so-called moral question from such a preferred philosophy? I said before that the approved philosophy is some kind of empiricism, perhaps British empiricism, primarily. But empiricism has become in recent times a complicated philosophy. It would seem to range from those who say that a mere fact takes its meaning from the creative additions of the mind, to those who would argue that the fact contains in itself the fullness of its meaning. From one perception to the next, in Locke's view, we create general ideas and the conceptions we hold of the outside world. I suppose we all start like Aristotle with an initial intuition of Being, of ourselves and of the world

3. Mortimer J. Adler, *The Conditions of Philosophy: Its Checkered Past, Its Present Disorders, and Its Future Promise* (New York: Atheneum, 1965), p. 44.

l it *episteme*) and opinions. One might be animated by the wish to say the virtues are not absolute truths but are the philosopher's judgments based on common sense from whatever source by logic and common sense by the pragmatic particular social order. More than the *mores*, as Aristotle defined them in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. Mortimer J. Adler, in his *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, has re-


... I propose to show that what is and happens should do and seek and the knowledge of the tenable answers to the first-order philosophical questions, "second-order questions about our first-order questions about the conditions we try to understand, or questions which we express such as the tenable answers substitute "second-order questions."

the behaviorist will you not suggest that philosophy that the realist must adopt? The answers to a so-called problem from such a pre-emptive point of view are said before that the scientific method of empirical empiricism, primarily has become in related philosophy. It is from those who say that the meaning from the mind, to those who act contains in itself nothing. From one person to another, as in Locke's view, we find the conceptions of the world. I suppose we begin with an initial intuition and of the world

Conditions of Philosophy: Past, Its Present Disposition, and Its Promise (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 44.

around us. So that when we come to a judgment of the virtues we are engaged in complex thinking beyond the things we see. We pull things together and make logical constructions of them, and then our further intention is to say what they mean and how one should judge them. Thus, in one sense we are all empiricists, and the construction of a moral judgment is, of course, an experience of the mind, of the thinking process.

NOW THE following condition seems to prevail in most social scientists: 1) they are not informed in the problems of philosophical dialogue, and 2) they do not see the need in a philosophy of science to discuss the questions of moral judgment. The criticism we could make of these proposi-



tions might run as follows. We must understand intellectual history and the forms of reasoning in humane learning in order to comprehend the world. Science, itself, as a specialized experience, does not give a generalized understanding of the world. Here we have of course the most fundamental of the issues. Some questions, in the second place, are neither wholly science nor wholly philosophy. There may be first the judgment of principle and second the judgment of practical application, or, let us say, a judgment of wisdom or of prudence. If one is either utopian or reactionary, he is not primarily concerned with the application of the principle under the banner of wisdom or of practicality. I think we may say the gray area of politics is moderate or successful political change. One cannot tell in advance what the results of political action may be. It has been said that whatever the

expectations at the beginning of a war, such expectations will be forgotten at the end and in the peace. One must wait in the twilight for the future to reveal itself, before we know what the consequences of our actions are going to be. In politics practically all questions are mixed, for they involve both philosophy and the uncertain complexities of action. I should say the problem of prudential judgment is a problem of the humanities; it is a question that can be answered by returning to the intellectual foundation of the West, to the contributions of Classical culture.

The disinclination of the behaviorist to consider prudence has arisen in no little measure from the almost universal preoccupation of philosophy in recent times with epistemology. On the one hand, the sci-

tists have failed to see that the philosopher is not always asking for absolute knowledge, or *episteme*, but that he is concerned to get judgments, or *doxa*, which may be dialogued in the philosophical enterprise. Thus, often the scientist in his rejection of human inquiry has been kicking at a scarecrow of his own making. However, the manufacture of scarecrows is a prominent part of intellectual history, and it may even have its values. The trend of modern philosophical inquiry, which has culminated in the great enterprise of the philosophy of science, has fed on a variety of epistemological doctrines. American pragmatism is now rather *passé*, but logical positivism of different varieties, analytic and linguistic philosophy, and phenomenology and existentialism, have all contributed to this result. It is to these forms of thought that the social scientist has turned, for he has not

created any of these doctrines. He has simply swum vigorously with the current of intellectual fashion. It is indeed true that the philosophy of one generation builds upon the past, as Hegel showed in his *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, and the errors of the past may be necessary to generate lucidity in the present.

We are all concerned with practicality in politics, but what the behaviorist seems not to realize is that practicality is geared with metaphysical judgments. It is related to ethical judgments, as well as to the pragmatics of arrangements. Or, one might say that the discipline of prudence will affirm that it is not so much that that which works is true, as that which is true in an ontological sense will work. And both might add, in the end it will work. Naturally, there are different kinds of criticisms of the behaviorist. One is purely practical: he makes more claims than he can justify, and his scientific results are often less than profound. His reply must be: Science cannot be wrong and in the end we will have the social achievements of science to offer. But the most profound of all the issues was stated with unusual clarity in the Oppenheim-Jaffa debate cited earlier. These articles met the conditions of profound philosophical debate because there was something quite remarkable about them: there was a meeting or joining of the issues. Following this, came something equally remarkable: discussion of the issue. There was, in other words, both confrontation and dialogue in the noblest sense.

In debate about moral order, or the natural law thesis, a central question is whether the values of a moral order are any less cognitive than the knowledge one derives from science. Jaffa denied there is any proper ground for making a distinction between empirical cognition and moral cognition.

I shall show there is no ground for such discrimination. What Oppenheim calls "intrinsic value-judgments" and what he calls "empirical knowledge" are both, in principle, cognitions of an objective reality, or neither are . . . Empirical knowledge, properly so-called, is a synthesis of sense data with definitions, universals, in terms of which the sense data are ordered. . . . No so-called judgment of value can be more nor less a cognitive judgment than any judgment of fact. . . . The question

*then is whether we are to treat all our empirical knowledge of man, which must perforce include our knowledge of human qualities, as merely hypothetical, and in this sense arbitrary and subjective.*⁴

The import of the discussion to this point should be in measure much like a renewal of the ancient controversy of Plato with the sophists. Many an ancient sophist was a rather mean-souled character, but I do not think of necessity the contemporary behavioral scientist-sophist is so vicious a character. Still, some have been inclined to argue that though this may be the case, and though there are few today who affirm they are atheists, the underlying motivation is a continuation of centuries of attack on religious views. For the modern, it is an attack on church institutions and on theology as a form or branch of knowledge, just as the attack of the philosophers of the Classical world was often an attack on the gods. On the other hand, one thing seems clear: in so far as the behaviorist (along with his scientific allies) separates philosophy and theology, he is quite correct. And the philosophy of which I have spoken is not to be considered as a part of theological inquiry.

WE SHALL NOW consider what may be called the ideological expression of behaviorism. Nearly all behaviorists in America seem to be liberals. A liberal in the American sense is, of course, quite different from most liberals on the continent. From the time of its emergence early in the 19th century, the left-wing has been in dialectical tension with the idea of revolution, that is, the revolution which will destroy traditional society and the new economic society of the industrial free-market order. But just why should the moral indignation of the radical and revolutionist be associated with "science"? How can the remote objectivities of science be a foundation for the theory of utopia? Science, which is timeless, has been turned against history and tradition, which have produced the institutions of the modern European order. Such a connection is hard to trace, just as it is all but impossible to watch the parturition of any one of our universals. The war of the classes and the war for equality have been the ancient cries,

4. Harry V. Jaffa, *Equality and Liberty: Theory and Practice in American Politics* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), Chap. IX.

to treat all our em-
an, which must per-
nowledge of human
ypothetical, and in
! subjective.⁴

scussion to this point
much like a renewal
rsy of Plato with the
cient sophist was a
racter, but I do not
contemporary behav-
so vicious a char-
been inclined to ar-
may be the case, and
oday who affirm they
lying motivation is a
es of attack on reli-
odern, it is an attack
and on theology as a
vledge, just as the at-
ers of the Classical
ack on the gods. On
hing seems clear: in
rist (along with his
ates philosophy and
orrect. And the phi-
e spoken is not to be
f theological inquiry.

V consider what may
deological expression
y all behaviorists in
liberals. A liberal in
of course, quite dif-
als on the continent.
emergence early in
left-wing has been in
h the idea of revolu-
tion which will de-
y and the new eco-
industrial free-market
ould the moral indig-
and revolutionist be
ce?" How can the re-
science be a founda-
of utopia? Science,
been turned against
which have produced
modern European or-
on is hard to trace,
possible to watch the
re of our universals.
ses and the war for
the ancient cries,

*lity and Liberty: Theory
ican Politics* (New York:
1965), Chap. IX.

though there can hardly be any science be-
hind these two related demands. By sci-
ence we mean the special, limited, objec-
tive, technical and unemotional experience
gained by the investigation of nature.

With the widespread acclamation of
John Locke and Isaac Newton, we observe
the forward march of a new statement of
philosophy—Lockean sensationism, natural
law doctrine, empiricism, and utilitarian-
ism. With Newton's science one might take
Locke's philosophy and construct a science
of society. And that is what was attempted
in the 18th century. The "science of soci-
ety" implied its rebuilding, and the destruc-
tion of what came to be called archaic and
useless institutions. Primarily it seems to
have meant a new heavenly city of the
philosophers.⁵ Liberalism as a word was
invented in the 19th century, but the at-
tack was directed against the institutions of
a Christian society. Only gradually did it
become an attack on a new economic ex-
pansion and productivity, which with Karl
Marx in the middle of the century became
known as "capitalism." In 1791 Tom Paine
prophesied that in another seven years
there would be neither kings nor priests
anywhere in Europe. Thus, in part by his-
torical accident, the claims of men like
Paine came to be called "liberal," notably
republicanism and anticlericalism, and
these claims were associated with attempts
to imitate science in the reconstruction of
the social order.

While European liberals in the 19th cen-
tury defended the free market system
against traditional restrictions on the rights
of trade (such as restrictions on bringing
food and goods into the ballooning cities),
freedom also meant the destruction of
Christianity. In our day as the American
liberal has become silently hostile on ques-
tions of religion, he has turned to new and
socialistic techniques in the war of the
classes and the war for equality. In this
way the American liberal has all but re-
versed the continental version of him, and
some European liberals have gradually
moved toward an increased intervention by
the state in the ordering of society. The

5. Louis I. Bredvold, *The Brave New World of
the Enlightenment*, (Ann Arbor: Univ. of
Michigan Press, 1961), *passim*, offers one of
the best modern criticisms of Enlightenment
social theory.

American liberal has become a collectivist,
a kind of moderate socialist, who will al-
ways lean farther to the left and never to-
ward the right.

However we may list the tenets of perse-
cution in the liberal credo, the liberal in-
tellectuals seem to have captured the uni-
versities and foundations, and they all seem
to be apostles of the new system of be-
havioral science. Adherence to science,
whether in the physics laboratory or in the
political science classroom, does not mean
ideological neutrality. It has meant the vig-
orous assertion of liberal positions, some-
times this and sometimes that, wherever the
new torrent of political passion may seem
to lead. The intellectual, the scientist and
behaviorist, has no observable trust for the
politician, but at the same time he seems
eager for a greater centralization of gov-
ernment in Washington. He is at war with
the people and their customs, their tradi-
tions, and their folkways and mores.

LET US make certain things clear by
way of conclusion. Those who criticize
the behaviorist are not criticizing science or
all of behavioral science. They are defend-
ing the humane tradition of learning in the
social sciences. The defender of the lib-
eral arts—theology, philosophy, mathemat-
ics (the numerical and symbolic sciences),
aesthetics (the practice and criticism of the
arts), literature, history (an art as writing
history), sciences (astronomy and mathe-
matics are the oldest), and linguistics (the
science of language as removed from the
study of literature)—is also a defender of
science. The liberal arts thinkers are de-
fenders of the knowledge and wisdom of
the humanities, and they have a belief that
morality, ethics, and justice are cognitive.
The humanist does not assert that the prob-
lems of social science must be treated in an
abstract manner, without the contribution
of the technical, experimental, or prag-
matic manner of procedure.

In another sense, the critic of the be-
havioral revolution has returned intellectu-
ally to the Classical contribution to West-
ern life, for without the Classical the West-
ern tradition would simply not exist. But in
the Classical he would include not only the
contributions of the Greeks, but the Roman
system of law and constitutional organiza-
tion, and the Christian-Jewish tradition of
insight into the ways of God to man. In

this again the humanistic mind is a Latin mind. If the contemporary liberal would combine the Humanistic and the Scientific he might have his methodology without asserting the impossibility of using philosophy and the virtue of Prudence.⁶ I believe I could have some confidence in a behavioral scientist if he had an anchor in the Latin mind. What the intellectual gets from Classical culture is the discovery of the search for excellence. It is the liberty of the *spoudaios*, as Eric Voegelin describes him from Aristotle's *Ethics*. It is the culture of the mature man. In one sense it is the power and sovereignty of the secular intellectual that is at stake; in another sense it is the achievement of moderation, with the ultimate advancement of the common man as an ideal—within the limits of the realism of the possible in politics. But the intellectual rooted in the Classical will not accept the romantization of any man, certainly not of the contemporary "mass man," nor does he approve of

6. See Charles N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture* (New York: Oxford Univ. Galaxy Books, 1957); José Ortega y Gasset, *The Modern Theme*, James Cleugh, trans. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1933); Guido de Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, R. G. Collingwood, ed. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1927).

the revolutionary who would destroy one order of culture without being able to create another. Though there is bone-breaking power at work in our civilization, the Latin mind would insist that intelligence and creativeness both in the liberal arts and in the pure sciences are the basis of whatever future we may have.

However, our central issues are the "political formula" and the creation of the institutions of a new age. The Latin mind in the past, especially in Italy, developed many of the techniques of armies and war, the principles of double-entry bookkeeping and of fiscal accounting, and the principles of diplomacy. Against the unrealizable idealism of liberalism, they created the principles of political realism, which is another way of saying they helped create the institutions which now help to preserve the modern state. Politics is a world of its own, firmly grounded in time and in style, much as Archilochos of Paros said: "The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing."⁷ The form of government is not so important to the classically grounded intellectual, conservative or liberal, religious or non-religious, as the intellectual attitude on which an attempt is made to ground the political order.

7. Diehl, *Frag.*, 103.

Of Ink Bottles and Ink

A solitary, forest pool of night,
A golden cup with wine of darkest hue,
Whose substance dried upon the parchment's white
Records of stirrings in the mind anew:
Of ruth and mercy, gentleness and grace,
Of apathy, coldness, violence, and hate.
A pied Junas to match our artful race!
A well-stocked Walton, marked with ev'ry bait!
Besides these waters still, the Muses are
To warn the dippers, not a tempest make,
Exhort to communion with friends afar,
Endow with wisdom for creation's sake.
By common wells all stationed at our side,
A beauty only sleeps in slumbrous tide.

KURT CHRISTOPHER BAUER