

MODERN AGE

A Conservative Review



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A program of alternatives to the general's state.

The New Conservatives in Spain

FRANCIS G. WILSON

THE TERM "NEW CONSERVATIVE" seems to have been invented in England just after World War II when the Conservative Party was pulling itself together to resist, if possible, the triumph of socialism. It was immediately fashionable to speak of "new conservatives" in the United States, no doubt because the term itself symbolized the effort of a new generation to interpret our national tradition. A traumatic shock seems necessary to produce the eternal recurrence of young, eager, and militantly conservative minds. The American trauma was the general withering of New Deal ideology and the recurrence of disappointment in war; it became difficult indeed to persuade young intellectuals that a given reform proposal would do much to reshape the political cosmos. In England the onset of socialism after the Labor victory in 1945 had the same effect, just as the fail-

ures of France—defeat in war, colonial disturbance, the overshadowing danger of communism, and the perceptible disintegration of the Fourth Republic—made a conservative revival a political necessity. Or, in Germany the betrayal of national tradition by the Nazis, defeat in war, and a general sourness on war and planned economies helped produce the sobriety of the Federal Republic. In truth, wherever one turns there are in the West "new conservatives," produced by twentieth-century debacle and the sheer necessity of salvaging the possibility of existence in a national tradition.

I am not aware that Spanish conservatives today have called themselves "new conservatives," but they might well do so. A new generation of Spanish conservatives has become active since the *Alzamiento*, the uprising against the Second Republic

on July 18, 1936. In the horrors of one of the world's great civil wars a consciousness of what a new Spain might be seems to have been born. On the other hand, when the twenty-fifth anniversary year of the uprising came in 1960 none could say that the Spanish political scene had become any simpler because of the passage of time. Across international boundaries Spain may look simple, very simple to those who make it merely a country of a fascist dictatorship, or one which is a formidable strategic and spiritual bulwark against the passion of communist mythology. The conservative intellectuals say they are devoted to tradition, for they wish to build a new Spain on a combination of the great traditions of the past and the newer demands of technological advance. They are not Falangists, they are seldom admirers of Generalissimo Francisco Franco, and they are quite likely defenders of the restoration of the monarchy. It is a point of fact that many former Falangists have become liberals, and many conservatives accept the National Movement and *Accion Espanola* for their contributions in the past.

My own observation was that as one got away from Madrid, that artificial, but nevertheless real capital of Spain, there was greater appreciation of the Chief of State, and less certainty about the value of the restoration of Don Juan, the Count of Barcelona. In other words, the Falange might be stronger away from Madrid than in some circles closer to the national government. But there is one thing on which there seems to be agreement—the Second Republic was a disaster; it represents disorder still, anarchy, the destruction of property, the burning of churches, and the desecration of the graves of those who labored for the Church. As José Calvo Sotelo, one of the heroes of the National Movement whose murder may have produced the *Alzamiento*, charged, the Re-

public had retreated from legality in its elections, in the protection of property, and in its respect for the rights of man. It is recorded that on the day when Calvo Sotelo was dragged to his death by the police themselves, Dolores Ibarruri, the noted female communist in the Cortes who came to be known internationally as *La Pasionaria*, already had declared that Calvo Sotelo had said his last words.

II

THERE ARE at least four propositions which the conservative Spaniard will accept as background of his thought about Spain today. First, he will say that the Republic's violent conduct and the disintegration of order it permitted, made a revolt, or further revolution inevitable. Second, once the communists began taking over the Republican government, as George Orwell describes, for example, in *Homage to Catalonia*, the Nationalists had to win in the name of Western tradition, of Christianity, and the sheer possibility of liberty in the future. Third, a restoration of the Republic is quite out of the question under any reading of the times. Any new régime which succeeds that of the Generalissimo must come out of the present political situation. The conservatives hope it will be a restoration of the monarchy, a monarchy modeled on those in northern Europe where liberty and monarchy have remained together in the post-war years. Fourth, to say that the Nationalists had to win the war—they had 70 per cent volunteers in their armies and half the people of Spain openly for them—does not mean that a conservative today is a supporter of General Franco.

WHEN I ASKED how they define answers were given regarded as a conservative like the present. Initiative is first of all life he may be who adhere to *Opus Dei*. The in the sense the olic social teaching *Novarum*, the many other P XIII down to taken as guides policy. In detail must be a pro legislation and worker and his that Spain must vancement of in of agriculture, productivity, an housing, roads, Finally, it must to establish an the freedom of ward its mission any political régime that many prudent made about any what might be best for other countries.

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WHEN I ASKED Spanish conservatives just how they defined their position, several answers were given. The Civil War is not regarded as a contemporary issue, for the conservative like everyone else must live in the present. In Spain today the conservative is first of all a Catholic, and in his own life he may be very devout, as among those who adhere to the daily practices of the *Opus Dei*. The conservative is a Catholic in the sense that he proposes to take Catholic social teaching seriously; the *Rerum Novarum*, the *Quadragesimo Anno*, and many other Papal statements from Leo XIII down to the present Pontiff are to be taken as guides in the formulation of social policy. In detail, this means that Spain must be a progressive country in social legislation and in the protection of the worker and his family, but it also means that Spain must be progressive in the advancement of industry, in the improvement of agriculture, in investment for increased productivity, and in public works such as housing, roads, and government buildings. Finally, it must be progressive in the effort to establish an international order in which the freedom of the Church to carry forward its mission will not be questioned by any political régime. Still, it is recognized that many prudential judgments have to be made about any set of public policies, and what might be best for Spain might not be best for other countries.

2 | A second answer emerged: the conservative in Spain today is a lover and restorer of tradition. He defends the Spanish tradition in the footsteps of the great Don Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, who in the last century almost single-handed was able to

reverse the judgment that Spain had nothing of which an intellectual could be proud. Spain has not only a great tradition of learning, language, literature, and discovery in the human sciences (such as the foundation of international law by Vitoria and Suárez in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), but it has been Catholic and monarchist in its tradition.

The men who are recognized as the creators of a tradition reveal much. José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the young Falangist chief who was executed at Alicante in November, 1936, is now seldom mentioned; Juan Donoso Cortés is given increasing attention as a prophet of traditionalism, while Ramiro de Maeztu and Vázquez de Mella are often discussed as restorers of tradition and the creators of Hispanidad. In government circles today Calvo Sotelo is commemorated as a figure of increasing importance in modern Spanish history. On the twenty-fifth anniversary year of Calvo Sotelo's death in July, 1936, Franco dedicated a monument to him and claimed him as a prophet of the National Movement. Even José Antonio, the fascist leader, had praised Calvo Sotelo in 1934, when he was a leading monarchist in the Cortes. *A B C*, the Madrid newspaper, in May, 1960, spoke of *Acción Española* as a contemporary cultural movement which has summarized Spanish tradition in its program. It has favored from the Spanish past a spiritual Thomism, a generous Hispanidad, and an orthodox, baroque intellectualism.* Bearing in mind that it is a liberal newspaper, one which has separated its religion from its political program, these remarks certainly would not sound like the revolutionary passion of José Antonio.

The richness of its regional traditions is a support for the Spain of the future. Because of its Catholic tradition in doctrine, law, philosophy, and social theory, Spain could not offer a generous welcome to the

revolutionaries spreading out in Europe from the garrets, cafés, and salons of Paris. Spain could not come to terms with the secular and atheistic philosophy of the Enlightenment, though it was seen later that agreement on scientific advance was quite possible, if one could persuade scientists to let metaphysics alone. It is a symbol of the victory of tradition that along with great investment in industrial progress, every historic monument, each mosque, each ancient synagogue and church and each city wall and *barrio*, has been declared a national monument that may be not be changed in a single stone without the consent of the proper governmental officials.

3 A third answer is a profound concern with political régime, and the insistence that Spain is a monarchy, as indeed the law says, having declared the Chief of State to be Regent. It has been said that the actuality of sovereignty is the right to interpret the national tradition. What can be said, I think, is something like this: during the years since the end of the war there has been a slow evolution of conservative opinion toward consensus on what kind of political order should succeed the present Chief of State. Likewise, there has been a growing impatience with the unwillingness of the General to use the last years of his life in establishing and stabilizing such a régime of restored monarchy. Spanish intellectuals are well-informed, if reading the *New York Times*, the *London Times*, and a variety of other notable journals is a basis for being well-informed. Spanish newspapers are almost entirely free in foreign news, though, of course, the censorship operates on news within Spain itself, though nothing ever seems to be said about it. The Spanish conservative knows what is going on in the world, and he studies régimes abroad and in Spain in the light of what he knows. He knows, for example, that the two-party system seems to work only in

Anglo-Saxon countries, and the parliamentary system in only a few others, especially in northern Europe where it has been associated with the institution of kingship.

Now Spanish experience, through both Republics and revolutions, through the failure of political parties and elections to work in an orderly manner, suggests that a doctrinaire re-introduction of parliamentarism would court another political disaster. While the Falangists have said political parties must disappear as well as their always unfulfilled programs, the conservative has countered saying there is nothing permanent about the Spanish experience and nothing that a suitable political evolution toward order and freedom cannot cure. Exiled Republicans, like Prieto recently, have insisted on saying the monarchists want only an absolute monarchy with no authority in the Cortes and a régime of absolute centralization characteristic of the great days of Spanish power. Nothing that the conservatives say or write may be used to support such a thesis, not even gossip in a proper sense of the word—and there is always much gossip in a régime of personal power. Today as in generations past, the reason for the success of British political institutions remains an absorbing question. But the success of the North American republican system demands likewise the careful attention of the Spanish conservative who looks forward to a time when there will be greater political liberty in a Spain of order and stability. In the last century [Juan Donoso Cortés,] the great Spanish mid-century conservative looked with awe or envy at British political success, and at times with hate because it was that very domestic political success which enabled Britain to exercise such influence on the Continent. And it was political instability and internal strife that had reduced Spanish influence to a nullity in the generation immediately after Napoleon.

Just as liberals believe a suitable construction of a conservative monarchy is not only possible but inevitable, the British elite

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and the parliamentarians, especially those who have been associated with kingship. The evidence, through both the successes and the failures and elections to office, suggests that the abolition of parliamentarianism is another political disaster. As the political scientists have said, parliamentarianism is as well as their own, the conservatism there is nothing to be learned from Spanish experience. The inevitable political evolution toward freedom cannot be denied, like Prieto is now saying the monarchism of the absolute monarchy of the Cortes and the centralization character of Spanish power. The conservatives say or write such a thesis, not in the sense of the word but in the sense of much gossip in a newspaper. Today as in general, the hope for the success of parliamentarianism remains an absolute. The success of the republican system demands the full attention of the world. It looks forward to be greater political freedom and stability. In the words of Donoso Cortés, the history of conservative Spain is a study of British political thought with hate because it is a political success which cannot exercise such influence. And it was political strife that had led to a nullity in Italy after Napoleon.

Just as liberals and non-revolutionary socialists believed the parliamentary system to be a suitable means of attaining the destruction of private property, so the conservatives then, as now, approve of the monarchy and the parliament, and the relatively normal operation of two parties in British elections.

Admiration for British institutions has been joined by conservative admiration for ours, just as in the past some Englishmen, like Sir Henry Sumner Maine, regarded our balanced and slow-moving Constitution as our greatest contribution to progress. One of the leading Spanish intellectuals and conservatives of today, Professor Rafael Calvo Serer, has insisted that in a Spanish manner and within the Spanish tradition, democratic liberties, such as are enjoyed in America under a republican constitution, should be assured to Spaniards under a traditional and social monarchy. One of our founding fathers had said that what we must attain is a Republic as much like a monarchy as possible. So now it can be said that Spanish conservatives advocate a traditional monarchy that will be as much as possible like the great North American Republic. They speak of a popular, social monarchy, as in the writings of Ramiro de Maeztu who saw the monarchy as the protector of the people. Such a monarchy would work toward the end of classes and class conflict between the proletariat and the owners of great capital. It should make possible the restoration of a purified middle class, which would sustain equality of opportunity and an increase in the ownership of property that functions in support of the family.

Spaniards realize more clearly than we that we live in an age of great political experimentation and the trial and error method of testing new forms of government. It is a time for the testing of democracy and the creation of new forms of political and

economic liberty. We forget, for example, that the British have exported more than one form of government, that we have generally failed to export our system successfully (as in Latin America), or we have not tried, for in Japan we imported the British parliamentary system. And surely in the political uproar of Asia and Africa the theory and practice of European democracy is hardly applicable. One may remember that the Philippines are an exception, and German constitutional monarchy (with its similarities to the American presidential system) took firm root in Japan before World War II. It is said that England has three systems of government to export. First, there is the Westminster parliamentary system, which has worked well in the Dominions, in India and in a few other colonial areas. Second, there is the University system of the trained civil service which may govern a peaceful area quite well with recessive parliamentary or democratic devices. Third, the Sandhurst or military system, used in times past in the Sudan and Egypt. Even the *London Times* has spoken of the present day as a good time for generals, who though they may not be trained at Sandhurst or in the Pentagon-West Point axis, stand as models for those who feel that a strong man is necessary to preserve order. Of course, it goes without saying that around the world where democracy is not feasible, the Sandhurst system will be imitated, while the Pentagon system will be regarded as a kind of colonial imitation. If to the Spanish conservative democracy of an extreme or Jacobinical kind is not inevitable, he will insist that alternatives do exist under which liberty and the security of rights is possible. In the course of political evolution, there will be transitions between the three British export systems, and little notice will be taken when there is a passage from one régime to another. One thing is clear: there

do not seem to be authoritative explanations as to why parliamentary democracy works with a two-party system and free elections in the English-speaking countries, and why it does not work in others.

The Spanish conservative seems to have little explanation for the disillusioning political history of Spain since the decline of imperial power after Philip II. Northern Europeans like to discuss southern European illiteracy or Latin emotionalism. Protestants like to point to the existence of Catholicism, and blame it for almost everything. I heard an English woman say in Spain that, of course, one had a servant class in Catholic countries. Obviously, these explanations do not explain, especially since the rise of the Nazis in Germany, and the spread of the communist dictatorship over parts of Europe previously dedicated to the life of reason and liberty. But even northern European Latins, as in Belgium, will blame political disorder in southern Europe on occasion on the emotional propensities of the "Latins." Some Spanish conservatives say there is no chance of a restoration of the monarchy, and there will be another "strong man" when the Generalissimo moves to his better life. Perhaps this is a common opinion among present-day Carlists, who do not favor the contemplated restoration.

However, the realities are granted, and the conservative tries to look with clear eyes and head at Spanish politics. It seems impossible to introduce the more extreme form of parliamentary democracy into Spain, but to the conservative, on the contrary, the totalitarianism of the Falange is equally unsuited for a long-run political order. The Falangist and totalitarian effort to transcend all groups and parties through the National Movement is bound to fail. Likewise, syndicalism as the primary means of representation and the chief

means of communication between society and the government can hardly be regarded as an authentic democracy. Equally unreal are statements by the Chief of State that the Spanish democracy is an authentic union of people and government. When a delegation of members of the British Parliament visited Madrid in 1960 a member of the Cortes told them that Spain practiced "democracy" in its own mode which was admittedly different from Westminster's. Spanish "democracy" would, thus, exemplify neither political liberalism, that is a majoritarian and parliamentary system, nor the economic liberalism of the free market economy.

In search of example, the conservative notes that the British have made the transition from a moderate monarchy to a monarchy associated with an unrestricted democracy, and that the same transition has taken place in the United States from a moderate republicanism in the early days of the Constitution to a radical, urbanized, and minority system of democratic life. Thus, one of the conservative queries is this: would not a pre-1832, pre-Reform Bill monarchy-parliamentary system work in Spain? Would not stability be possible under such a system? When experience under this system has resulted in educating and re-assuring the Spanish people, then one might begin taking steps toward a post-Reform Bill system in Spain. Carl Schmitt once remarked that the modern state and modern dynastic politics were invented by the Spanish kings in the Escorial, that vast somber monastery and palace, but it is clear that the parliamentary monarchy, with a broad suffrage and two major parties was invented in Westminster. Some Spanish conservatives would say that the Spanish future belongs to a blending of the politics of the Escorial and of Westminster.

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THE EMERGENCE OF INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY and the agitation of the socialist and economic revolutionary has taught the masses throughout the world that all men should have the good things of life. Poverty is unnecessary; it is a product of economic and political evil that a new régime will change. These are some of the ideas that are found in the discussion of industrialism in Toynbee's *Study of History*. And this is the situation the conservative faces. What about the economic order of the future? One might say to the masses in rebellion that in a poor country, one lacking in the basis of technological advance, not everyone can be made rich by government policy; or, one might say that a division of the dividable wealth would give only a few pesetas to each Spaniard; or, one might say that the payment for social welfare services cannot be imposed on the rich alone, because not even confiscatory income taxes will pay for it. Such services will be paid for in measure by those who receive them because of the shifting incidence of taxation.

Spain's problem of economic régime is not markedly different from that of other countries, except that all recognize Spain is a "poor" nation. Though remarkable economic development has taken place since the Nationalist victory—the indices of production have doubled in twenty years—and much of it surely without any "foreign" aid, the productivity of Spanish labor is low in both agriculture and industry. This means that personal income cannot advance to the envied level of wages in America, where productivity based on immense capital investment is indeed the

marvel of the world. The Spanish government is undertaking to accelerate the training of every kind of worker and professional man in order to provide the manpower for the forthcoming industrial order. The Spanish economist is busy with inquiring into how Spain can attain a higher level in the production of industrial and agricultural wealth, and how it can become steadily more integrated with the European and world economy. If the progress of more than twenty years since the end of the war is continued, one may begin to speak soberly of the rebuilding of Spain, through housing, roads, dams for irrigation, resettlement, and for electrical energy, new manufacturing establishments, and the export of an immense variety of Spanish products.

But what kind of an economic régime is it? It has not been liberal, as the Europeans speak of it, that is, a free-market or laissez-faire economy. The Spanish conservative is not a free-market thinker. His view seems to be that there are three kinds of economic order—the free market, the welfare state, and the planned economy. European liberals want a free market system (while American "liberals" have become secular-minded socialists), and the communist-governed lands are committed to the principle of the planned economy. The traditional economic desire of the European conservative is the institution of the welfare state, in which there is a great development of responsible and practical social legislation, while at the same time there are free-market areas and significant systems of government competition, direction, and control. It is said that all European conservatives, including the Spaniards of course, are for the welfare state, while socialists and communists favor the planned system, and the liberals look hopefully to the theory of Adam Smith and the nineteenth-century Manchester system.

In these distinctions we have one of the most difficult of the issues for the American thinker to comprehend. Our American conservative judgment leads us to advocate the free market against the economic and fiscal irresponsibility of government. Our conservatives have moved toward the acceptance of economic liberalism (the free market system), while our so-called liberals have been trying with success to infiltrate the European socialist attack on private property and economic liberty into the respectabilities of "liberalism" in America. However, there is an explanation, and it is that we have not had in our history any extensive experience with the aristocratic theory of social reform. This theory has shaped the European conservative's attitude toward economic liberalism, and made him from the outset of industrialism a critic of laissez-faire and a person of anti-capitalist and anti-bourgeois mentality. The European conservative theory of reform, monarchic and aristocratic as it is, has always been tilted toward the welfare state, if by this we mean the legal protection of the weaker members of society against the impact of technology. European conservatives have generally been a little anti-bourgeois, a little anti-capitalist, a little pro-proletarian, but they have been bitter critics of the socialist revolution which would destroy private property—often regarded as the opposite of capitalism—and establish the republic of the atheists.

While the formulation of the conservative theory of welfare moved forward rapidly in the nineteenth century, it was erected on a series of different foundations. It reached back into the Christian theory of charity as a social solution, the most dramatic expression of which is probably the magnificent letter on charity written by Donoso Cortés to Queen Maria Cristina in her exile. It extended into the demands

of aristocrats early in the nineteenth century for legislation to correct the abuses of industry. It extended back into the Christian theory of the natural law of the family and of the rights of the worker to have a family, to support it, perhaps in frugality but surely not in destitution, as Charles Péguy once stated with great force. It rested on that principle of aristocracy which republicans can hardly comprehend: responsibility for others less fortunate as a means of preserving the social order. For a Catholic conservative, like the Spanish new conservatives, it has culminated in the affirmation of the social theory of Catholicism, which has been enunciated in numerous encyclicals beginning with the *Rerum Novarum* in 1891.

V

AS EVENTS POINTING clearly to revolution continued to occur in the mid-thirties, there was an impressive shift of Rightists from the traditional Right parties toward the Falange. Traditionalists were charged by the revolutionary movement with being reactionary capitalist exploiters and defenders of the evils of landlordism. They were denounced as being plutocratic and unconcerned both with the plight of the city worker and the peasant. The Falange or the *frente nacional* was, admittedly in the speeches of José Antonio, a fascist, authoritarian, and if necessary revolutionary organization; it was, he said, neither of the Right nor the Left, and in the election of 1936 it presented no candidates. It was unsuccessfully charged in the Cortes with organizing an uprising, and after the war it was on this basis that José Antonio was condemned to death in November, 1936. The supporters of tradition, the

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Rightists, were, indeed, in conflict with both the Falange and with the Republicans, who in part were liberals, in part socialists, in part anarchists, and in part communists who engineered the infiltration of Russian leadership. There was some agreement, however, for all Rightists or Falangists declared themselves against the class war, against socialism and communism, they affirmed their love of Spain, of the Catholic Faith of Spaniards, and they both rejected the liberal philosophy of the French Enlightenment, which came to be symbolized in the ideas of Rousseau.

But the differences were very sharp as well. The Falange (*La Falange Espanola de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista—F. E. de las J.O.N.S.*, founded in 1933 and 1934) attempted to be a revolutionary mass movement, modeled on the movements in Italy and Germany. Falangists wore "blue shirts" and adopted the slogan of "Arriba Espana." No doubt the F. E. shared in precipitating the *Alzamiento*, though it is conceded now that the death of Calvo Sotelo was the most important single factor. In effect the F. E. tried to claim a monopoly of the Spanish nationalist revolution; therefore, it claimed a right to a monopoly of bureaucratic power, the right to dominate the universities and the syndicates organized as alternative to the left-wing trade unions. It was against capitalism and all forms of economic liberalism. It repudiated political parties and the traditional system of parliamentary or constitutional government. It claimed to observe Catholic teaching, but this was a fiercely contested point from the very outset. The conservative asserts that a fascist movement—such as the F. E.—cannot be Catholic. If a movement is truly Catholic, it cannot be fascist. Against these positions, those who revitalized the principles of political conservatism de-

fended the monarchy, they deplored its overthrow on April 14, 1931, and they defended the historic Spanish Cortes. Some of the opponents of the Falange were Christian democrats, supporters of Catholic Action; some were regionalists and decentralists; the ranks of the Carlists, swollen by the persecution of the Church, were against the Falange (though the *Requetés*, the Carlist militia, fought with the Falangists in the Nationalist cause); some were agrarians in political position; and in an over-all sense the opponents of the Falange were legalists and constitutionalists in their defense of the Spanish tradition. The emergent conservatives rejected racialism, for, as Maeztu insisted, Spain was a religious community and not a racial one, while the F. E. was undisturbed by German anti-semitic policy. With the war won, all of the latent differences in ideology were bound to appear, and to the conservative the F. E. in its fundamental meaning was an attack on Spanish tradition.

One of the continuing criticisms of the Falange is that it has tried to create a monolithic society, a society in which there is no autonomous and pluralistic expression of the family, the municipality, the region, the functioning corporation of the economy, and the culture. José Antonio as leader and ideologist of the Falange spoke often of authority, hierarchy and order, of the defense of the Church, and the protection of the country against offense and attack. But the critics of the F. E. contend that the program in practice destroyed the very things in Spanish tradition for which it stood.

Now the defense of the corporate order, an order in which corporations have freedom from the government, reaches back into the middle ages, and into the early modern criticism of bourgeois and capitalistic society. A corporate or functional

order has become a part of the general Catholic statement of the kind of economy that may come nearest to the expression of Christian ideals in economic life. But if the Falange, now become an institutional set-up like Tammany Hall, especially in its regional expression, has in effect supported an order in which syndicates and functional groups are dominated by the bureaucracy, the new conservative would say that taking Catholic thought seriously means autonomous corporations, syndicates, trade unions, or other groups such as universities, cities, regions, and cultural associations. The new conservative would contend there should be freedom for Catholic universities, which they do not have in Spain to nearly the same degree as in the United States. The government, speaking through the Generalissimo, has demanded that the universities share in the National Movement; their liberty must be attained in the context of unity, authority, discipline, and order. Only in this way will they be able to form properly the young intellectuals of Spain. But a Spanish conservative may well point to the United States as a pluralistic, corporate society, with autonomous corporations, cities with home rule, universities operated as they wish, and a federal system in which some autonomy of the states is left. American liberty may seem, indeed, to a Spaniard like a noble example of corporative liberty which is in accordance with Catholic principles of the organization of free society and a new economy. And in Spain it is the groups that assert in effect their liberty, like intellectuals, professional men, and publishers, who are now providing ideas for the government, rather than the more stiff and unimaginative institutions that are dominated by a bureaucratic tradition that evolved from the liberal centralization of the last century.

VI

IN THE SPANISH SYSTEM where there are no elections in a free sense (it is said Navarra has some autonomy dating back to the Carlist wars), the government itself has been very skillful in using and balancing various potential and actual political forces. This has, indeed, been one of the achievements of the Generalissimo. As new forces have appeared, like the *Opus Dei* which identifies in many respects the new conservative, Catholic intellectuals of Spain, they have been used in the government, and censorship has operated only on particular individuals who may have got too far out of line for governmental comfort. While political parties do not exist in our sense, for they do not have a representative function, and as groups their only function is criticism or censure of public policy, the formal groups that might be parties under happier circumstances do exist, and they are included in various governmental agencies. Through the examination system, many *Opus Dei* people have attained university posts. In other words, the Falange become formalistic and institutionalized, has resented the encroachment of *Opus Dei* in all of the institutions of society where intellectuals and trained minds are used. Many critics of *Opus Dei* charge that it is a kind of Catholic Masonry, with secret and conspiratorial purposes. It is charged with having too much power because of the approval of the Church. All this denied by *Opus Dei* people, who assert in return that many Spanish intellectuals are really liberals, because they believe that social science, technology, government policy, and research can be neutral in regard to the

Christian Faith. Falange may indeed have made its accommodation but has ceased to be of a Catholic social order.

Now these new forces whom are part of others who are in fact say they are seen ideas with Anglo-American economic and political countries or not had the deep Weber spoke of a religious vocation. To *Opus Dei* is sacred; the Catholic is utilitarian; he needs organicity in his capitalism possible on the moral sense organization, a *Lebensethik* exercising the skill of the Protestant is sacred, he has a moral duty. Catholic countries need to regard the of moral perspective develop the Protestant. And combining Protestantism with enable the Latin as an expressive. If these Protestants grouped with philosophical and Walter Lippmann "Philosophy," order in a state laid.

Not the least conservatism has been the reconciliation with enlightenment, which

Christian Faith. Furthermore, while the Falange may insist it is Catholic, it has made its accommodations with power and has ceased to be a force for the attainment of a Catholic social order.

Now these new conservatives, many of whom are part of *Opus Dei* and many others who are in full sympathy with them, say they are seeking to combine Catholic ideas with Anglo-Saxon traditions in both economic and political behavior. The Catholic countries of Europe, they say, have not had the deeper sense of *Beruf* (as Max Weber spoke of it) or of the profession as a religious vocation or a Christian labor. To *Opus Dei* thinkers, one's life work is sacred; the Catholic has been too individualistic; he needs the Protestant sense of organicity in his work which has made capitalism possible. Capitalism has rested on the moral sense of belonging to an organization, a *Beruf*, a profession, or exercising the skill of a vocation. But just as the Protestant has regarded his work as sacred, he has also urged as a religious or moral duty obedience to the law. The Catholic countries need both; their people need to regard their work as an expression of moral personality, and they need to develop the Protestant respect for the law. And combining these two qualities from Protestantism with the Catholic Faith will enable the Latin countries to march ahead as an expression of conservative progress. If these Protestant principles can be regrouped with the Catholic Faith and its philosophical defense of natural law, which Walter Lippmann has called "The Public Philosophy," the foundations of public order in a state of moderate power will be laid.

Not the least startling aspect of the new conservatism on the Continent generally has been the willingness to effect some reconciliation with the ideas of the Enlightenment, which in truth in the eighteenth

century was more of a cultural movement, a cultural atmosphere, than a system of philosophy or even an ideology. The natural rights of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, being founded on the conception of a natural moral order, should be acceptable to Catholics if the break between Catholic natural law and rationalistic natural law theory is mended, as indeed it can be and should be.

However, for Spain nothing is simple, and ideas and movements tend to go to excess as Donoso Cortés said over a hundred years ago. But there is among Spanish conservatives a renewed discussion of the issue of French ideas. The French impact on Spain was great in the eighteenth century, but the sense of the issue was enormously sharpened by the French invasion and the war against the French for Spanish Independence, the attempt of the Francophiles, *los afrancesados*, to destroy the Church and to defend Napoleon Bonaparte's puppet on the Spanish throne, and by the memories of Spaniards when they contemplate the damage wrought by French soldiers in Spain, for old bullet marks and historical monuments that no longer stand can speak an eloquent language. Obviously, it is not easy for a Spanish conservative and believer in his tradition to turn to France for inspiration, even with the resurgence of French Catholic and conservative ideas in recent times. The central trouble is, of course, that the French political tradition resembles the Spanish too much. For a new start the conservative can turn to the Anglo-Saxon political experience.

If the Spaniard turns to the Anglo-American political proposition, he discovers much that is similar to what a Spanish conservative would hold. On the level of political philosophy the Anglo-Americans have held to natural law and

rights, the principle of popular consent to a form of government, and to the rule of law symbolized either in the British monarchy after 1688 or in the American Republic of moderation and constitutionalism. In Spain the tradition of natural law and rights and the principle of the consent of the governed was expressed in Catholic terms by the Spanish jurist-theologians of the golden age, in Vitoria, Suárez, Molina, and others. In the light of much recent revision, it is quite possible to build a bridge between the Catholic natural law doctrines of Spain and the rewritten protestant and Whig political tradition of natural law and constitutionalism. May not one suggest that the conservatism of Burke, which sought out its historical roots, has much in common with a Catholic conservatism of the twentieth century?

The Spaniards who tried to use French ideas in the eighteenth century were yet Catholics, though not Catholics in the same sense as today. The eighteenth-century governors of Spain were competent people trying to do a difficult job. They knew there had been no Protestant Reformation in Spain and they wanted none, but they saw that much of the liberalism of the French Revolutions consisted in the advocacy of the use of science in government, and in attempting to bring about the economic advance of the nation. Now as then, it is the scientific spirit of the Enlightenment that Spain can use in making its own type of progress. The eighteenth-century saw in Spain the beginning of a long industrial revolution that has not yet reached an end, though today it may be accelerated with American foreign aid in the guise of counterpart funds.

VII

THE CONSERVATIVES OF LATIN MIND, whether new or old, should be of profound interest to American Catholics and conservatives. This is true not only because there is an increasing interest among Latins in the Anglo-American tradition, but because of the contrasts that may be observed. The commitments of the Latin mind seem to us more profound, and its conflicts seem generally more demanding than those among Anglo-Americans. In consequence, its conservatism may be more real, more lucid in philosophical commitment, even if it remains pragmatic and prudential in the selection of immediate public policies. The Latin conservative, or let us say, the Spanish new conservative, demands that a man live by the truth that is in him. The thread running through everything is the religious question, and on this the conservative may not remain neutral, though he may employ the economic, technical, and scientific means available generally in Europe for the ends of Spain.

*For the Spanish traditionalist, the baroque, beginning in the late sixteenth century, (in the Spanish "golden century," 1519-1665) is not regarded as decadent. Though there was bad taste in the arts at times, it was a period of tremendous political importance, as well as the golden time of Spanish letters. It is associated with the Counter-Reformation, the spirit of the Council of Trent, and it is considered simply as a change of style in Renaissance creativeness. Emilio Orozco Díaz declared before the Spanish Athanaeum in Madrid that baroque culture was the last common effort in Europe in art and literature, in the search for God under the guidance of Spain; the lasting wisdom of the baroque is the validity of thinking deeply of the eternal salvation of the individual and the temporal salvation of European culture. See Emilio Orozco Díaz, *Lección Permanente del Barroco Español* (2nd ed., Ateneo, Madrid, 1956), pp. 57-59, and the literature cited in this monograph.

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