

the role of Ivy League lawyers and the problem of America's allies, and on the role of Bell Telephone executives in the dissemination of information. The important roles in the crisis, of the United Nations, the Organization of the American States, American embassies abroad and foreign governments, are described, as well as the less important roles of such peculiar individuals as Lord Russell. And, finally, even the weather is not overlooked by Abel as, with particular dramatic flare, he contrasts the golden October sunshine of Sunday morning, October 28, 1962, with the macabre expectations of the men around the President awaiting Khrushchev's answer to the American ultimatum, and quotes symbolically a remark of George Ball to McNamara, as they walked into the White House: "It reminds me of the Georgia O'Keefe painting that has a rose growing out of an ox skull."

Photographs from the Defense Department files, an end paper situation map, and an index, increase the value of this most complete account thus far of the Damoclean crisis of October 1962.

Reviewed by HENRY M. ADAMS

Politics and Literature

Equality and Liberty; Theory and Practice in American Politics, by

Harry V. Jaffa, *New York: Oxford University Press, 1965 xv + 431 pp. \$5.75.*

Shakespeare's Politics, by Allan Bloom, with Harry V. Jaffa, *New York and London: Basic Books, Inc., 1964. 150 pp. \$5.00.*

THE DIFFICULTY with these two volumes is that much of the material has been published already. In Jaffa's book five of the essays have already been published in book form, four have been published in

journals, and one has not appeared before. Of the five essays in the Bloom-Jaffa book, two have not been published before. For those of us who have been reading Jaffa, a number of these papers have already been studied, and a total of four essays in the two volumes have appeared in *The American Political Science Review*. There is a question of etiquette involved here, though I am not sure just what this etiquette is. Some of my colleagues would say that when a piece has been published as part of a book, it is not cricket to publish it again as an essay in another book. On the other hand, it has been considered appropriate to republish articles as contributions in books. Such a problem also involves the publishers, and one might say that if they want to take a chance on republishing in a book what already appeared in a book, it should be their responsibility.

These two volumes are united by the fact that both Jaffa and Bloom have been devoted students of Leo Strauss. Their work in measure is a continuation of the model offered by their teacher, to whom both these books are dedicated. Granting this, then, much depends on whether one is an admirer of the contribution of Professor Strauss, a contribution which all would agree has had a notable impact on the political science profession. And Strauss at Chicago, among the alien corn of the behaviorists and some of America's more noted economic individualists, illustrates the unusual capacity in the management of the University of Chicago to keep hiring notable people with very divergent interests, methods, and intellectual positions. The evaluation of the work of Professor Strauss is, I think, far in the future. It would appear also that the ultimate reputation of Professors Jaffa and Bloom depends on such a judgment.

Two problematic themes run through these volumes. Let us refer first to the analysis of political questions from literature. The model is Strauss's work, say *On Tyranny*, an analysis of Xenophon's *Hiero*. Jaffa's long essay on "The Limits of

Politics' is based entirely on *King Lear*, Act I, scene i. Political theory in *Shakespeare's Politics* becomes a problem in criticism; the personality is probed and the last fragment of meaning is sought. I have seen no judgments from social scientists on the value of such an analysis of personality and political situation. Political scientists, among others, are often notably weak in their knowledge of literature. My own view is that all of the liberal arts, the lamps of learning that were bequeathed to us by Classical culture, are profoundly useful in inquiry into human comedy, of which politics is a part. We have the liberal arts of (1) theology, (2) philosophy, (3) mathematics (the numerical and symbolic sciences), (4) aesthetics, including the practice and criticism of the arts, (5) literature, including poetry, drama and essay, (6) history, (7) the sciences, astronomy and mathematics being the oldest, and finally, (8) linguistics, or the science of language removed from the study of literature.

What Strauss-Jaffa-Bloom use is the method of literary analysis, which is part of that particular aspect of the liberal arts. Such a renewal of this study is surely an important contribution to modern learning. In my opinion it is the most important aspect of these two books. For social scientists to appreciate it would require a kind of intellectual revolution, no doubt greater in its contemporary import than the revolution of the behavioral sciences has been. I must say that Bloom's essay on *The Merchant of Venice* has been one of the most illuminating pieces I have read in many a day. It has about it that quality that Gilbert Murray once said the Greeks had: moderation at white heat. Much the same may be said of the essay on *Othello*. Furthermore, most of the essays in Bloom's and Jaffa's literary analyses are worth reading more than once.


The second problematic theme is Jaffa's approach to American politics in *Equality and Liberty*. The great difficulty for the reader is the author's preoccupation with

Lincoln and Douglas, and in general with the Civil War era. Jaffa seems simply unable to drop Lincoln, the Declaration of Independence, and the mistakes or iniquities of Douglas and the Southern states. But the difficulty the reader may have is varied. Jaffa refers with unimpressive repetition to the idea of equality in the Declaration—as Lincoln used the Declaration—but he does not seek the historical roots of it, nor does he analyze the sources from which the doctrine of equality emerged into modern history. Would not Lincoln have been influenced by the Bible, and particularly the New Testament? Did not St. Paul say that among Christians there were neither Jews nor Greeks, neither bond nor free, and that we were all of one membership in the body of Christ? It is very strange that Jaffa does not seek the historical roots of the doctrine he is discussing. Nor does he define it with precision. Whatever he does discuss, he comes back to Lincoln. Apparently, he does not wish to make any serious inquiry into whether Lincoln's doctrine concerning the Declaration was historically accurate. Clearly, it was good politics in preventing the spread of slave territory, but was it not simplistic history?

There are many small points that might be mentioned. On p. 202 Jaffa seems to be a liberal democrat, but he has associated with Republicans and conservatives like Charles H. Percy and Barry Goldwater. Jaffa seems to say (p. 127) there can be no theory if there is only one example (*i.e.*, American experience), which is the definition of the positivist, not of the philosopher formulating a norm for a desirable political community. On p. 87 it is made to appear that the South fought for profits from slavery, while Lincoln and the North fought for principle. I would doubt that in the present race war in America we can go back to Lincoln and the Declaration of Independence with effectiveness, for public order rather than individual rights become increasingly our contemporary issue.

I would say the most notable contribution in *Equality and Liberty* is Chapter 9 in which he defends the natural law thesis. He republishes here his side of the argument with Oppenheim in the March, 1957, and September, 1958, issues of *The American Political Science Review*, which was, I think, a notable philosophical debate, simply because the issue was joined between them. Jaffa's argument is not historical, rather it is a logical analysis, which I would hope our colleagues in the social sciences would read with the profit to be derived from it. If Jaffa can broaden his argument to the historical material which he must know but does not use, his contribution to political science will stand on its own feet and not be a projection of the teachings of his graduate days. At the moment his preoccupation with Lincoln and with a rather vague conception of equality blurs his conception of liberty. However, he does indicate that he approves of the political suppressions advocated by Jefferson and Lincoln: monarchical and aristocratic opinions have no rights in a republican society, said Jefferson. Lincoln held the same on opinions that supported slavery (p. 21) and Jaffa would apparently suppress Nazis and Communists (pp. 30, 179). Free speech "does not extend to the question of whether the community shall exchange its freedom for slavery." Jaffa is vague on the form of suppression he approves, and at times he seems to indicate some sort of exclusion from the democratic process. Would he approve of the exclusion from the mass media of those who criticize the civil rights movement? Jaffa's political science is marred by its lack of specifics, especially in view of his denial of theory in the American tradition and in American political science.

Reviewed by FRANCIS G. WILSON



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Almost "a Bare Hanging"

A man may be capable . . . of a plain piece of work; but to make a malefactor die sweetly was only belonging to [Jack].

Mrs. Jack Ketch. From Dryden's *Discourse concerning the origin and progress of satire*.

The Burden of Time: The Fugitives and Agrarians, by John L. Stewart, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. xiv + 552 pp. \$12.50.

Tillers of a Myth: Southern Agrarians As Social and Literary Critics, by Alexander Karanikas, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1966. xii + 251 pp. \$6.50.

AMERICAN conservatism has many faces and many names. Its champions are as various and as inclined to quarrel among themselves as its antagonists are united—at least in their determination to drive it to the wall. But in one sphere of activity and in one guise a native species of the conservative sensibility has, for the last thirty-five years and more, managed to command a hearing and to hold an audience. And it has accomplished this in the midst of an overwhelmingly antagonistic intellectual establishment. The sphere of which I speak is the republic of letters; the species of conservative, the Southerner (here referring to a state of mind, not an address) as poet, novelist, and critic—as maker and arbiter of taste. To both the hostile and the sympathetic the Southern Renaissance and the critical theory which called the world's attention to and established the stature of that body of literature is an unsettled question of some importance.

However, despite the recognized status and the anomaly of the Southern Renaissance, for some reason its collective emer-

gence and maturation have not (aside from a brief period when a few Southerners became too open and self-conscious in acknowledging what they were about) elicited from either its natural friends or its enemies anything like a coherent, comprehending, or systematic response. Most conservatives not involved in this revival seem to have been put off or embarrassed by its origin. Perhaps they have listened too long and too well to the warnings from the Left (*vide* Clinton Rossiter) that nothing for their use or to their interest can come out of Dixie. Perhaps their obtuseness has deeper roots—in the half-hearted or ambiguous quality of American conservatism in general and in the bad blood which (though we no longer admit it) still stands between the South and other sections of the nation. Or again, it may simply be the total quality of the Southern writer's retrospective empathy with the roots of his culture that frightens his more tentative and pragmatic conservative readers. (Imagine attempting to explain Spanish Carlism to the Chamber of Commerce!) Merely opportunistic conservatism is easily intimidated by a piety more thoroughgoing than its own. And, as Donald Davidson noted some years ago, piety, a contemplative focus on what, in a permanent sense, *is* and not only what supposedly *ought to be*, provides the spiritual substance of the literature of the twentieth-century South.

However, if conservative reaction to the Southern Renaissance has been a bit puzzling, that of American liberalism has been what we might have anticipated. The successes of Southern writers and critics have been accomplished quietly and thoroughly. The area of their performances has been the academy, not the hustings. And the majority of their natural antagonists have so long been confident of their power in the universities and so busy in the consolidation of their authority over things outside the academic grove that they have paid only passing hostile notice to the advocates of the ancients in con-