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THE ANATOMY OF CONSERVATIVES

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I

THE critics of conservatives seem to center on the proposition that the "new conservatism" is not really a properly intelligible position. There is a tendency, often implicit, to say that conservatism has no status as a program, ideology, or political philosophy. The gravamen of the charge is either that conservatives are irrational; that they have lost their sense of reality; or that they represent a form of inverted or reversed utopianism, or doctrinairism, that cannot be taken seriously. However, the denial of status as a political position takes a variety of forms and some of these must be noted before we enter into the positive argument of this paper.

1. In the extreme, critics have insisted that conservatism is a kind of political tropism. The conservative exhibits a kind of inborn inclination, or fixed personality drift, or trait, that is purely and simply negative. The contemporary emphasis on the study of personality, and the view that personality traits are extremely difficult or impossible to modify, have lent support to the contention that conservatives by their tropism are excluded from any connection with rationality. On the assumption that the conservative represents a clinical case of "the authoritarian personality" it has been said that we have only a "pseudo-conservatism" in the United States.[1]

2. Again, the differences between conservatives and others—especially the liberals—is one of mood and bias, rather than discernible stands on public questions. Exponents of this view deny that conservatives have a position or that there can be any serious distinction between liberals and conservatives. Still, Rossiter has insisted on the irresponsibility of the "ultra" conservatives, who are presumably those who reject the "revolutions" of the last generation in both domestic and foreign policy. Pushed to an extreme the "mood and bias" argument would deny also the historical foundations of conservative argument, as well as national variants in conservative thought and program. But it is quite clear that the legitimacy and quality of the conservative's position are minimized to invisibility if the position taken is short of being "ultra."[2]

3. Another denial of the existential quality of conservatism would reduce it simply to a reaction against change. That there is a "situational" element in conservatism can hardly be denied, for the prudential judgments of conserva-

tives differ in different countries, in different times, and there are sharp differences in social philosophy. The conservative, it is said, expresses his nature in opposition, mostly futile, to change, whatever may be its social or political character. Nor is it merely a matter of definition that is involved here, for one is concerned with the existential quality of the conservative mind. Moreover, the struggle to prevent change can be either limited and immediate, or it can be discovered in critical historical situations such as the attempts to turn back the Reformation, to limit the impact of the French Revolution and its revolutions by filiation, to retard the march of democratic parliamentary institutions, and the effort to check the technological revolutions of modern society. Thus, conservatism is situational and positional. The critics have said that on the positive side the "new conservative" is so vague in his immediate political stands and in his interpretation of traditional personalities that conservatism has little or no rational relevance to the modern world.[3]

4. In a view of more savage criticism, it is said that conservatives then and now, old or new, are simply reactionary, unprogressive, and feudalistic characters attempting to steal the social show. Such has been the condemnation voiced by the left-wing revolutionary and more positively by the long sequence of the disciples of Karl Marx. Reaction has been defined in the most elusive manner, and "unprogressive" is surely an epithet of the ideological wars. "Feudal" as used by Marxians has, of course, no relation to any historical or existential meaning. For in Marxism it is an abstract idea, a definitional symbol, used to castigate the enemy. In more specific terms, the conservative as a reactionary has been described as the European "economic liberal," defender of the free-market economy, the defender of capitalism, and the opponent of democracy, popular sovereignty, and liberty. In other situations, the conservative has been identified with the totalitarian minds defending the totalitarian regime, and, indeed, simply as a fascist. Obviously, in such a war of Giant Ideology, as Russell Kirk expresses it, the most extreme example is often chosen as the most typical. In recent times, as well, the conservative has been identified in communist propaganda with the thrust of imperialism, particularly the alleged effort of the United States to dominate the world. Lenin's *Imperialism* is certainly one of the most important of the ideological textbooks against conservatism in our time.[4]

5. At a higher level of dialectic the conservative is charged with being reactionary in his commitment to a philosophy, which is again a denial of rationality and the right to claim honorable status among political positions. The conservative is usually theistic rather than deistic or agnostic; he believes in sin rather than atrophied personal moral responsibility; he asserts the imperfect qualities in the composite of human nature, and he denies that central hypothesis of progressivism, the perfectibility of man. The conservative is likely to be a traditional Christian or believer in a religious faith, while the enemy has emancipated himself from the superstitions and priestcraft of other and more primitive eras. But there have been impressive changes in both the defense of theistic philosophy and of Christian-inspired conservatism. Kuehnelt-Leddihn has written, "There are close ties between the New Con-

servatism and the notions of Burke, von Stein, Görres, A. v. Müller, Chateaubriand, E. L. v. Gerlach, Lacordaire, Montalembert, and even of Peguy, but very few links with the ideology of De Maistre and almost none at all with that of De Bonald or Maurras." In other words, the new conservatism is profoundly hostile to nationalism, while it was not in a previous time.[5]

II

1. The attempt to explain the anatomy of conservatives begins here with the proposition that conservatism must be accepted as a legitimate political position. As a "position" it must be studied both in a general sense and in particular situations. It is a dialectical force that arises when there are political oppositions, such as between liberals or revolutionaries and conservatives. Such conflict and contradiction are found, naturally, where political and social consensus has been in process of breaking down, for where there is deep consensus there is hardly a conscious position at all, and there is no conservatism in a practical sense. When there is conflict about ideals and solutions of human uncertainties in the typically "human situation," there can be a classification of conservatives for the conservative is aware of his commitment or engagement to a position in a changing situation. In any given struggle a pattern of argument emerges, and ideas from the past are incorporated in the present. But a point to be emphasized is this: classification is most effective and meaningful to the student of conservatives when value systems are the groundwork of classification. Surely the great ideas or the great conflicts in ideas must matter most: the struggle between religious affirmation and indifference or hostility; realism in a factual or naturalistic sense, and realism as the attainment of truth and value, or a belief that in the end it is the truth that will work; the struggle between methods of inquiry, between naturalism, even with a theistic interpretation, and intuition or the self-evident statement. No doubt, one of the deepest of all the conflicts is the materialistic insistence on what life is against the spiritual interpretation of man's nature.

To the conscious conservative his commitment is an adherence to order and to the symbols of order that both justify and sustain it. A conservative is more likely to view history as Eric Voegelin has in his magnificent *Order and History,* one of the most profoundly conservative studies of history in our time. He has presented a central theme concerning the attitude of those who would create and conserve institutions: the historical process is to be understood as the movement of decisive civilizations and societies either toward or away from union with God. Every important order has interpreted itself in relation to its conception of an order that is both in nature and is ultramundane, and there is always a search for symbols that can represent this order in the life of a society. In Volume I Voegelin speaks of Israel, and for Israel order was discovered primarily in revelation, as for the Hellenes it was primarily in philosophy. With Israel for the first time mankind learned what it means to have a history and move in time toward the consummation of both man's will and God's intention. This movement and this process of history is symbolized in scripture, in the liturgy of the religion of Yahweh, in sacred poems and secular history, as well as in drama and philosophy.[6] If one proposes

to say that a conservative is a situational thinker, than one must inquire deeply into "situations," for the transmundane interpretation of situation cannot in the more recent views of history be excluded; "situation" cannot be limited to a few details of pragmatic history without the infusion of meaning through value; formal history is not enough in itself to sustain a thesis about the situation in which the mind of the conservative works.

2. Let us consider the problematic of position and situation for the conservative.

a) First of all, there is a level of discussion to be noted. While it is true that the inarticulate man may live either with a common acceptance of tradition or with an uneasy sense of hostility toward those who oppose him, at a more formal level discussion is carried on either by intellectuals, by the writer or teacher, or by the political leader. Intellectuals have been said to sense their remoteness from the masses; hence their willingness to become members of the Marxist movement, which promises them an end to their alienation. The conservative intellectual is, no doubt, more successful than the revolutionary in integrating his personality with non-intellectual people. Still, it is especially part of the work of the politician to insist that he has contact with common men and to discuss the politics of issues that are understood at least to a limited extent by just anyone who may happen to hear.

The eloquence of intellectual conservatives must in logic begin with some sort of philosophy of conservatism. In turn, this philosophy rests remotely on a model of the universe and more immediately on history; it is a paradigm of causation, motivation, and sequence, and it involves of necessity some position on ordinary or perennial philosophical issues. In contrast, the political leader is the purveyor of prudential judgments on policy and proposals for political reform. There is surely a conservative theory of reform, such as that of the French Catholic intellectuals who criticized industrialism during the nineteenth century. Benjamin Disraeli and Richard Oastler in England may be cited as conservatives who had a theory of reform having little in common with the reforms urged either by the triumphant liberals or by the emergent socialists. In the contemporary situation the conservative is seeking to develop new positions in the ideological void that covers much of Europe. The restoration of symbols of order, including a Christian social policy and the restoration of the institution of monarchy, has been foremost in the minds of many European conservatives.[7]

b) In the second place, a statement of the common maxims and policies of the conservative should be offered. We deal here with the models, or designs, of a generalized conservative system that any of its adherents might advocate. The model or design is frequently like a Kantian conception which is defined formally to begin with while admitting that no single instance of what is defined may be strictly in accordance with the definition. The paradigm or the stylization is a kind of historical average; it is protographic and logical rather than existential. However, such a summary of maxim and policy is a construction of an idea resting on a considerable body of Western experience. Any design of ideology must rest on some primary idea of the cosmos. But since conservatism is a political position (as viewed in this discussion),

the propositions that make up the "creed" are not usually primary ideas in speculative philosophy. Most writers on conservatives have attempted to state a series of propositions that are commonly associated with conservative positions, and these statements constitute the model or the design of the ideology. The model, then, constitutes a summary at the surface; it consists of views held by intellectuals and those who in any case are articulate, but it must be conceded that the statement of the ideological paradigm is not a probing philosophical experience.

First, conservatives have variant but similar attitudes toward the continuity of experience. Most conservatives would say there are patterns in behavior to be observed in history, and these patterns give rise to clues of what is possible or probable in politics. Obviously not all history by any means is a proper subject of admiration, but "pattern," if it exists, is objective. Undoubtedly, the Irish look on their historical experience somewhat differently from the conservatives and Unionists in Great Britain.

Second, where history has been kind, as Englishmen have generally seen it, the attitude of Edmund Burke is appropriate. His antagonism to "sophisters and calculators" becomes understandable. History and statesmanship, as Burke urged, involve more than the metaphysics of an undergraduate and the arithmetic of an excise man. There is faith in prescription, and the love and enjoyment of tradition, as Walter Bagehot noted. Social time has its mysteries.[8]

Third, T. S. Eliot once said there must be an orthodoxy by which the tradition of practice, policy, and institution may be judged. The orthodoxy by which tradition is judged is the conservative acceptance of a moral order, or perhaps one should say it is the tradition itself as a deposit of truth, something that is handed on without basic change. Russell Kirk has spoken of the belief that a divine intent rules society. In Catholic terms this means natural law and rights, and in ordinary Protestant expression it is moral law. In any terms, it means a new Aristotelianism rather than pragmatism.[9]

Fourth, conservatives in their majority view have held that it is appropriate to have some distrust of human nature. The conservative "realist" may have the psychological distortions of judgment in mind, but the Christian conservative will probably consider the effect of sin, and, indeed, the effect of original sin. Such a view of practical, behavioral human nature suggests limits to humanitarian reform. In application reform and change are surely not the same; change can, in some instances, make reform impossible. In 1896, in a speech on Princeton University during the American Revolution, Woodrow Wilson said he believed, "There is nothing so conservative of life as growth. . . . But not all change is progress, not all growth is the manifestation of life. Let one part of the body be in haste to outgrow the rest and you have malignant disease, the threat of death." Or, as John Stuart Mill said in *Representative Government,* the people must be able and willing to do the things necessary to support a higher form of government than the one they may have.

Fifth, there is a further conservative view related to the distrust of human nature which is the rejection of the principle of equality. In the extreme in European society it has meant the distinctions of orders and classes. How-

ever, in commercial society it means almost simply the justification of the unequal distribution of wealth and the correlation of unequal function with unequal reward as a principle of distributive or social justice. Equality, however, seems to be the great passion of the twentieth century. Viscount Kilmuir said in June, 1953, reflecting a British conservative view, "Equality is intellectual and biological nonsense. Even in the French Revolution it took only five years for the concept of equality to change into that of equality of opportunity."[10]

Sixth, the conservative view holds that government must be limited in its power. Internal restrictions may be used, a careful arrangement of the preconditions of majority rule, and the attempt may be made to assure a pluralistic society. The revolutionist demands a high level of consensus, while the conservative will settle for a low one. It is at this point that the conservative suspicion of the planned society appears, and this suspicion is found both among those who favor an effective free-market economy and those who might accept much of the modification of individualism found in the old program of Disraeli's Tory democracy.

Seventh, conservatives are defenders of property, private property, before they are defenders of capitalism or a particular system of the manufacture and distribution of goods. Capitalism is a late comer, while property in many forms is an ancient institution.[11]

c) An additional problem of position and situation for conservatives concerns the "prudential judgment" of politics and programs. Here the political leader becomes primarily the advocate of policies which he believes will bring nearer the realization of the ideals in national tradition. Policy is always emergent in the history and symbolism of a given time. Since prudential judgment is exercised in the atmosphere of national tradition—that is, the deposit of unchanging value—and within a given nation, it must vary from situation to situation. Policy naturally involves the controversies which whirl around the interpretation of tradition. Against the political leader and his allies among the intellectuals there is often a struggle by segments of public opinion to secure different interpretations of the meaning of national experience. Here one deals with the existential rather than with the potential. The interpretation of tradition is often an argument about what has actually happened in national history. One may say there is in conservatism a national character which is reflected both in values and in established institutions. The application of tradition signifies commitment to policy, and policy may be generally regarded as an explicit statement of prudential judgment. If the intellectual conservative may be classified accoring to his theories of the truth or validity of ideas, the political leader who is a conservative may be classified according to the national character of the policies he urges for the common good.

The American is fully aware of the controversy concerning the meaning of his tradition. Among the intellectuals there is usually a struggle over the right to say what tradition means. One large school insists that the only American tradition is the liberal attitude as there has never been anything else either in the colonies or in the United States. The contention is focused on this point: there has been no feudalism in America to overthrow. But others have said there is here a practical and pragmatic attitude toward life; hence philosophical

views, often metaphysical in import, have had no meaning for Americans. The American tradition is the tradition of having no philosophy; it is a philosophy of no-philosophy. On the other hand, mere practicality is not pragmatism since pragmatism is an epistemology; it is a philosophy; and it might as well be obvious that the principle of natural rights, so deeply embedded in our historic system (including the civil libertarianism of our mid-century times), constitutes a philosophical system. While the liberal has been saying that the only tradition of America is liberalism, the conservative case has been centered on the hypothesis that conservative views have been creatively important in American history. There is, therefore, a formative conservative view in American experience. Must not the "political theology" of *The Federalist* be considered a conservative statement of first rank? Are not most political leaders and writings ambivalent to a degree in their positions? Jefferson was surely not all "liberal and democratic," and John Adams should not be considered all conservative.

Any political and intellectual life might be considered either liberal or conservative, with moments of the other interspersed within a general drift of attitude. But the problem is to discover as much as possible about the attitudes, motivations, and specific beliefs of an individual as he looks out at the social world. It is the individual, not a group, who makes his commitment to society and not to some form of social abstraction. Each individual, as well as each intellectual and political leader, must agree within himself what he will either support or reject and that he will feel harmonious with or alienated from the social world around him. The problem is one of attitude and judgment in a given situation. Conservatives say that certain ideas in America are valid and that they constitute the core of the tradition. The constitution—interpreted in a given manner—is the central symbol of order and the representation of the political cosmos. Private property, the free market, the protection of agriculture, the maintenance of national defense and the system of government, the idea that the United States is a Christian nation, and the maintenance of local autonomy and popular control over schools—all form, to many, the essence of our tradition. Conservatives, likewise, have generally favored stable money, the payment of debts, and the recognition of the moral responsibility of each individual. Curiously, too, when the modern existentialist stresses individual responsibility and the freedom of the will, he speaks like the traditional mind which stressed the moral code and the freedom of the will.

III

We have now reached a point where it should be asked: What is the central theme that creates some kind of taxonomic satisfaction in the study of conservatism? Gerhart Niemeyer has offered a forceful concept in these words:

> In essence, conservative theorizing has consisted in attempts to restate the understandings on which a given country actually was based. . . . Conservatives, in thus formulating political truth, have not necessarily desired to return to the past. Nor have they forsworn change and a better future. Essentially what they have done is to point out the laws of spontaneity in the order of a community, lest impatient change seek channels of alienating force. These men were not always called conservatives, just as their opponents were not always named liberals. But the conservative concern, always the same, has been consistently with the "planners," the thinkers of abstract

schemes, the know-better innovators, the politically unresponsive intellectuals.[12]

The theory of the community or the country involves the creation of an order to which the individual citizen can give his commitment, or his allegiance, and one which he can regard as legitimate. Most articulate and intellectual conservatives are driven in the end to ask also: What kind of a philosophy is necessary as the underpinning of such a community? And they will say, I think, with Niemeyer that behind the thought of men like Coke, Burke, Donoso Cortés, Richard Hooker, or the French critics of the Great Revolution, like Maistre or Bonald, is some kind of Aristotelian-Christian theory of the social nature of man and the society in which he may live. These conservatives, like Woodrow Wilson in the foundation of his thought, would say that just as folly may be observed in history, so wisdom can be gained. The revolutionary mind, and the liberal mind, I think, are more likely to be Kantian than Aristotelian; such minds are surely materialistic if one considers the whole impact of skepticism and dialectical materialism on modern man. The revolutionist may be existential in the atheistic sense, or pragmatic, and an adherent of radical empiricism; but the neo-Aristotelian believes that we can know real things and essential structures; that there is a free spiritual principle in man; that God exists and is providential; and that there is a universal moral law. It is the function of the conservative to state such a position, and it is the function of the conservative leader to formulate prudential judgments that will assist in the realization of the proper symbols of order. It is thus that one may seek to meet a crisis in the existence of the community.

Such a theory of the community is different in a profound sense from what has been called a modern "liberal" theory of society. The community has been emphasized at times to such a degree that there is support for an absolute majority rule, which in itself would be the definition of the truth of the community. There would be no recognition of a weightier or wiser part in making political decisions, for all decisions would flow from the easy spirit of democratic groupings. Freedom is to be attained through "belongingness" and "togetherness," and through the development of the personality under the guidance of psychologists rather than moral teachers; the objective of education and of life in the community would be "life normality and group conformity" and the process of learning might be regarded as a phase of group dynamics. It is a little like the *zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl* of the Hitler *Jugend*. Indeed, some philosophers have sensed in the pragmatic or instrumentalist group life an approach to the idealist theory of the community, which would be always morally superior to the individual.

The conservative's view of the community seeks to reject extremes. He rejects the utopia of the individual who lives in isolation like a god, as Aristotle noted, and also the utopia in which all members have a full expression of the ego. In the utopia of the isolated individual, the person must renounce the community and mean it; this very renunciation must be his condition of human happiness. A probing issue is raised: What are the ideal types of men? Even the most dedicated in the more strict of monastic orders of life find the process of self-realization in union with God a slow and painful proc-

ess. The saint, the wise man, the hero, the farmer, the artist, the servant of the city or the church, the person with beauty and talent, and those who practice the arts—have all been praised as ideal types, and all of them experience the necessity of "withdrawal" to solitude for a time. But nearly all of whom we have any record have returned from the transforming experience of self-communion to the activity of life in the community. The utopia of solitude is the preparation for life in society.[13]

Likewise, the conservative is unimpressed with the utopia of the submerged ego, the life in the group in which the personality realizes its own perfect importance, its unmeasured prestige, and the complete absence of any problem of security. In such a group there would be no need for any catharsis by violence against others, and frustration or pressure would be just words in other people's tracts for the times. In such a society the individual would never withdraw since withdrawal would be unsocial and dangerous to the individual who draws away from contented life with his fellowship.

Conservatives seek the balanced community, however difficult in practice it may be to attain it. Balance itself would be difficult both to define and to attain in policy under whatever system of society it might be sought. If the conservative attains his end he secures to the creative individual the proper conditions of life in the community so that there would be no alienation of those who might search for the utopia of the sublime life. Neither the intellectual nor the worker must be devalued and alienated from his social world. The burning ego of those who exploit must be restrained in so far as the politics of the possible says it can be done.

IV

Let us shift the discussion now to a more difficult level. It has been seen that to the conservative the primary object of inquiry is the community. The conservative life is a search for an authentic community which the individual feels to be legitimate and in which he shares in a commonly recognized consensus. It is a consensus, indeed, which is shared by the intellectual and the common man, or by any and all classes. The conservative community is always one in which there is some alleviation of class struggle and in which, it is said, *stasis* may be avoided altogether.

But this means that conservative inquiry into the community is far more than an inquiry conducted by observing political behavior. It is an inquiry that gives valid propositions; that is, the inquiry into community must result in truth. Now, the critics of conservatives in the past century believed they could reach truth, but in more recent days they have contented themselves with historical relativism, pragmatic workability, behavioral or operative consensus, and scientific analogy in social statement. If all conservatives have engaged in the quest for the truth of a community, and if this has meant some form of philosophy, one may surely classify the conservatives in accordance with their modes of discovering meaning in symbols of order. What conservatives would recognize, it seems, is that there must be a basis for truth that is more than pragmatic history; history has its uses, but the conservative would say, I think, that the philosophical inquiry is valid, for the philosopher can state the paradigmatic meaning that may be woven into the pragmatic event. Even the reason of the political leader

concerned with prudential judgment and the enactment of policy can probe into the issue of meaning.

1. On the one hand, meaning is sought in the sense of the transcendent, and in the opening toward God. To live in history is to live with God and the destiny He will allow or provide for those, who like the children of Israel, formulated the principle for the first time.[14] At the other extreme, one might cite Latin naturalism, including the views of Ortega y Gasset, Santayana, and Unamuno. At times philosophy erupts into the discussion of general policy, and policy is chosen because it seems to stand in agreement with primary philosophical views. Behind any such conception of policy, which is held to be the expression of truth, there is a model or a design of the universe; and the state, the government, and the system of politics are regarded as harmonious with a larger conception of the existential. The larger events of the revolution of heavenly bodies are said to have suggested by analogy the whole notion of "revolution." Thomas Hobbes was surely one of the first to use "revolution" in the modern sense of the word.[15] In modern times secular philosophers have looked at the world as a machine, as a kind of organism, and as historical process, while the religious thinker has included the providential within his design or law of the universe.[16] The theistic view may, of course, be found with many shadings. Isaac Newton, who provided modern man with a mechanical system, was deeply theistic and providential in his thought. Or even law in history may be seen in the state as power or force, realism in the empirical sense. So the German historian Heinrich von Treitschke idolized Machiavelli, and Treitschke exercised a greater spiritual influence on succeeding generations of academic youth in Germany than any other conservative before him.[17] Still, Treitschke was an earnest Christian; the laws of God and the laws of realistic or factual politics did not conflict though moral attainment was surely the higher and ultimate objective of political life. The state as power was the creation of the will of God himself.

The formulation of a theory of law or design in the world is a search for a basis of valid conclusions. Conservatives seek ideas to justify a social order, indeed, but the justification occurs because the ideas are true, and being true they are embodied in institutions that must be defended.[18] The conservative ideology rests on a view of truth, and public policy as prudential judgment is considered to be an expression of deeper strata of thinking about justice, right, and law in the universe. For the conservative as an intellectual, the model of proof of value rests upon a twofold foundation: "history" as a method of inquiry, and "philosophy" as a method of inquiry. Fact and value in either case are united, and empiricism is a "method" by which the facts of history and philosophy are joined into the satisfactory demonstration of judgment.

a) In the demonstration of the validity of ideas history had been, in truth, one of the great weapons of the conservative. From history one may derive a behavioral criticism of both revolution and reform. In some views history and evolution have blended together into a single tool of social inquiry. As a tool for the attainment of truth, history is used in three significant ways: as the criticism of institutions, as the buttress of empirical realism, and as the embodiment of an ideal, a paradigm, or an orthodoxy that may stand in judgment

on a social and political tradition. The uses of history separate conservative traditions with a great width, for human experience with history is diverse, and ultimately history is a tool that is judged for its utility in each situation.

History as a criticism of institutions is most lucid in the statement and defense of tradition. One starts with what is considered excellent, and those traditional and habitual forms of life which are in accordance are approved and proved through historical study. As a criticism of institutions history seems to say "the truth will work" even though some stretch of pragmatic history may have shown the failure of the symbols of order that are being defended. Institutions are criticized for their deviation from the standard of truth, or the word, or the law. But history as a criticism of situations and institutions is an agency for use in the application of an idea. It is a means to judge a situation by the standard which stands intellectually and traditionally outside of the whole of the historical moment. Judgment arises less from history and more from the energy of judgment that is injected into the historical.

In contrast, the historical realist attempts to see the facts separated from value; he asks whether something works, and in the spirit of pragmatism he says that it is true if it works. The judgment found in tradition is subjective, conventional, limited in time; and because values beyond the empirical are subjective, the fact judges the value. Now most conservatives would, I believe, be found in the camp which says that fact and value are organic and may not be separated effectively in Humean fashion. But this organicity works in two ways; for just as facts speak to values, values speak to facts, and the judgment is one of conscience and intellect on the part of the person who is doing the judging. Still, there is a class of conservatives who are in effect radical in their empiricism and who assume that a knowledge of facts will generate a proper judgment of values. Scientific realists in international relations are among the most common proponents of this view. Such realists, who persuade interests and facts to speak for themselves, find in history the confirmation of their judgment of contemporary affairs.[19]

History as value or as ideal seeks, in a sort of Kantian manner, to use history to create the ideal. The conservative's history looks toward the future though it is a future that is generally in no hurry to arrive. History as value becomes a standard by which tradition is judged.[20]

b) Against the conservative whose concern is some use of history as a tool for gaining social truth we must observe the conservative whose deepest effort is to attain an engagement or commitment on philosophical issues. Conservatives have commonly been attached to certain of the great philosophical positions, primarily the Aristotelian, the Christian, the Thomist, and the Hegelian. The conservative intellectual is, of course, a philosopher—of necessity so—and he is driven to ask an ontological question, or the existential question, What is man? Through philosophy one acquires a basis for judging experience and an insight into the justice of a social system. When one speaks of the unity of the "Great Tradition" of the West there is behind it a sense of community in philosophical method which has its ultimate roots in the Greek, Roman, and Jewish heritage. From the Greeks one might learn the

face of reason, from the Romans the symbols of order in a legal system, and from the Jewish-Christian tradition the realization that history is lived or judged under God. There is a paradigm or order that transcends the pragmatic events of the "kingdom" or of the "war." From the groundwork in philosophy one can discern agreement in social purpose in the creation of a society, and a sense that there is communication about order throughout the civilized West. To the conservative, the great symbols grounded on ontological inquiry have been order, law, the social inequality of man, the ownership of property, and the family. With all of the variation in the system there is some unity; but there is also imperfect realization, and there is evolution or change.

Some have said this is the tradition of every intellectual grounded in the West, not only Aristotle, Adam Smith and Burke, and not only the Tory and the Whig, but the liberals. Actually, the whole idea of a self-conscious conservatism did not originate until there had been an attack on tradition through an attack on religion and the theistic order of life. The conservative was born in the eighteenth century in the defense of religion, of the Church, and of the social order that had lived in symbiosis with the Church from time immemorial. While the critic might like to make the conservative reaction a tropism, the conscious conservative will assert he is essentially in the Aristotelian tradition, and he will not permit the denial of the importance of the truth of the community. But the conservative must often assert, against the liberal, that he is an intellectual.

2. It has been suggested that the conservative may be dissected in accordance with his method of searching for the meaning and the nature of the community. In a more specific sense he may be called either one who uses history as a tool for his course of discovery or one who uses philosophy more directly. But conservatives may be classified in accordance with their programs of the prudential judgment. We face an immense variety of programs, for the national tradition will dictate the possibilities of practical policy and politics. Yet, there are issues that transcend a national situation, such as international communism, the energy of capitalism, or pressures at the point of contact between the great religious systems. Theology, like philosophy, is in conservatism, a basis for a program; it demands by its logic to be translated into action.

It is in this area that most of the criticism of the conservative occurs. It is said that he has no program, that he is an exponent of do-nothing politics, or that what he does is reactionary, unprogressive, or dangerous. Here the conservative is charged with sponsoring outmoded political doctrine, of being a standpatter, and, indeed, simply as an opponent to change. On the other hand, he may be charged with a subversive attachment to change, resulting in a rejection of legal process and the espousal of revolution.[21] Still, the main charge in the anti-conservative barrage is that of doing little or nothing save resisting salutary change. F. M. Cornford in his whimsical classic on academic politics has defined conservative liberals and liberal conservatives as follows:

> A Conservative Liberal is a broad-minded man, who thinks that something ought to be done, only not anything that anyone now desires, but something which was not done in 1881–82. A Liberal Conservative is a broad-minded man, who thinks that something ought to be done, only not anything that anyone now desires;

and that most things which were done in 1881–82 ought to be undone.[22]

The range of conservative prudential judgments about policy have varied enormously from country to country, from time to time, and from one culture to another. Often, at this point, the conservative is charged with an unperceptive traditionalism, such as a Burkean unwillingness to reform Parliament, or a Metternichian unwillingness to accept the liberalism of the French Revolution and its daughter revolutions in Europe. But to the conservatives, aside from those who attempt to be "realistic" or scientific Machiavellians, their assumptions reach back into the ethical groundwork of their society and their history. The issue is expressed in the immediate and the human, but it is grounded in the national past. In a democracy such as ours one may praise both rights and majority rule, but in Spain a conservative like Calvo Serer may become the leading advocate of reforms that will bring about a Christian society and the restoration of monarchy.[23] In France, Raymond Aron has identified three kinds of conservatism: opposition to the Third Republic; the right wing in Parliament, including opposition to the Latin Liberal conception of the separation of church and state, the defense of laissez-faire and the free market economy; and the Boulangist-Gaullist position, which has been charged with showing vaguely fascist tendencies.[24]

For the American, one of the most difficult of all the problems of conservative symbolism has been the divergence between historic Toryism and the liberal, laissez-faire theory in Europe. In America the European Tory system did not take root, and the liberalism of the Europeans became the conservatism of Americans. The Tories in England launched one of the most effective early attacks on free trade in factory society, and the liberals in England (until after the middle of the century) opposed factory legislation. Adam Smith, as an exponent of capitalism, was in general a believer in free trade though there were many limitations which in his mind were compatible with free competition. We find Burke, the founder of conservatism, a liberal in this instance, since he supported the ideas of Adam Smith. Might not one say that the idea of free competition has been ambivalent, appealing to all liberals and to some conservatives? Might we not also say, in consequence, that the acceptance of free trade by the conservatives in America was a slow business? Did not the democratic tide of Jacksonianism defend free trade while conservatives remained Hamiltonians? After the middle of the century the liberals in both England and America began to be more sympathetic toward collectivism, and the conservatives slowly but certainly moved toward a more forceful presentation of free competition as an aspect of capitalism.

What the contemporary, collectivist opponent of American conservatives can hardly realize is that there has been a conservative theory of reform in Europe, exemplified in Disraeli and the continental aristocratic critics of industrialism. Though a particular reform may be accepted by both English Conservatives and Laborites, for example, the principle and the tradition behind the reform can readily be different. Industrial reform is the largest of the areas of political change involved in modern society, but it is not the only one by any means.

Much of the prudential judgment of

conservatives has been an effort to maintain some of the traditional orders of society against the impact of revolutions. The French Revolution, the revolution of 1848, World War I and World War II, the Russian revolution, the Fascist revolutions, the incredible spread of communist ideology throughout Asia, and the threat of further revolutions under communist inspiration in the Near East and in Africa, not to mention the Americas—have destroyed much of the relevance of many institutions and ideas that only a short time ago seemed lasting. Can the United States or any Western power succeed in convincing the Asian and the African that the Western states are not imperialistic? Can it be shown that they are only trying to serve well the international community of which we are all a part? Clearly the Romantic and antirevolutionary thinking of Adam Müller cannot be restored to favor nor can the details of the institutional arguments of Edmund Burke. However, both Müller and Burke must be numbered among the heroes of the conservative movement.

The conservative prudential judgment has sought to restrain the communist revolution; and, by so doing, it has hoped to maintain the spirit and structure of nineteenth-century economic, religious, cultural, and political institutions. In the end the conservative hopes for a victory over both fascists and communists and a resolution of the various "colonial" issues. But the victory over fascism in World War II strengthened the communists, while at the same time only a limited vitality was restored to parliaments, to capitalists, and to the influence of religious leaders.

V

Not all conservatives have been alike in this large enterprise. Many systems of policy may obviously be listed under conservatism. But it is clarifying to make some statement of the differences between conservatism in Europe and America. Both similarity and difference may be observed, and one of the most similar aspects of ideological thinking in both places has been "schools" of thought in Western politics. In his study of the history of political ideas Gaetano Mosca noted, first, that from the end of the eighteenth and through the nineteenth century there have been those who, following Montesquieu, have formed the liberal current; second, along with these there have been those who were democrats, aiming primarily at political equality through universal suffrage; third, one may observe the socialists who would complete political equality with an economic revolution; and, fourth, those who have formulated the principle of national union and independence, and sought to attain it in Germany, Italy, Poland, and in other countries.[25] The "schools" of political thought have spread throughout the West, and much of Montesquieu has been used by conservative thinkers. The nationalistic theory of the last century was upheld both by those who sought a revolution for the new and by those who wanted to restore through nationalism the ancient use and wont of political life.

Since movements of ideas and ideologies are now more widespread than in the past, one can well expect similarities between Europe and America that are greater than in the days when Thomas Paine and Joel Barlow were American missionaries of the "republican creed"

to European society. The conservative wherever he is in the West is an enemy of the march of militant communism. One may say, indeed, that one of the deeper causes of the crisis in Europe since August, 1914, has been extreme nationalism and the philosophies and ideologies that have gone with it in each country where the infection became acute. While there has been no effective, extreme nationalism in the United States, the conservatives of Europe have been increasingly hostile to the ravages of nationalistic passion. One thing seems to be clear: many conservatives in Europe have been weaned away from a liberalistic, free-market capitalism, and they have turned much of their loyalty to a functional or corporative organization of the economic process. In other words, social gains should be preserved, and there should be an effective functional organization of workers and management or owners. Thus, the young conservative imagines a world beyond both socialism and communism on the one hand, and beyond liberal and capitalistic society on the other. Conservatism can, thus, become a third vision of how man may earn his daily bread.

In Catholic Europe the conservative turns to the defense of the church, while conservatives in America are bound to be defenders of a pluralistic society which includes Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. In Lutheran Europe the conservative can defend a state-supported church and the confessional school which receives money from the state, while the Lutheran in America may be the defender of a different public-law setting for his religious life. In England the Anglican and monarchist tradition yet stands as the symbol of stability to the continental conservative where there has been a resurgence of monarchism. But in America our conservatism must be republican and thus must reject an Anglicanism that is tied to the monarchy though our modern republican creed can hardly be influenced by the utopianism of the vision of progress of the years immediately after the American Revolution.

In our time, of course, the secular mind turns to the ingredients of "liberalism" in the American political psyche. Ludwig Freund has said "there is no place in this country for a conservative movement in the European sense" because, first, liberal ideas of the Enlightenment deeply influenced the formation of the American tradition, and it was in opposition to many of these ideas that European conservatism was formulated. American conservatism must, thus, be steeped in aspects of the liberal tradition. The main difference between political parties within the American consensus is one of degree and emphasis. "Do they believe more in the humanistic tradition of liberalism as symbolized by Locke, Montesquieu, and Thomas Paine or in the *economic* aspects of liberalism as embodied in the teachings of the Manchester school of thought?"[26] But times change, and the position of the liberal element is not the same as it once was. Liberalism in America has grown collectivistic, and the conservative may now affirm the principle of the free-market against the liberal. But, as Gerhart Niemeyer has argued, conservatives fear that the "innocent ideologists" in the fight against communism are insufficiently firm.

Hence it is no accident that over the issue of communism conservatives have attacked not only liberal actions and policies, but the very pattern of modern liberal thought. The sight

of totalitarian actuality has sharpened the conservatives' sense of dangerous potentialities inherent in liberal ideology.[27]

There has been more than a faint suggestion that American and European conservatives in the new age are sensing that they have much in common because of the weakness of European liberalism and the successes of communism. But European liberals in the same situation may sense they have something in common with conservatives. As Kuehnelt-Leddihn has said:

> A hundred years ago the Liberals worshipped Adam Smith, Spencer, J. S. Mill, and Bentham, while the nineteenth-century Conservatives devoured De Maistre, Bonald, Carlyle, Cortés, and C. L. von Haller. Today the New Liberals as well as the New Conservatives are living on a *common* diet of Alexis de Tocqueville, Acton, Burckhardt, Vinet, Röpke, Hayek, Dawson, Jouvenal, Martini, and Somary.[28]

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NOTES

1. Consult Richard Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt," *American Scholar,* XXIV (Winter, 1954–55), 9 ff.; Herbert L. McCloskey, "Conservatism and Personality," *American Political Science Review,* LII (March, 1958), 27–45. For excellent criticisms of this method see David L. Spitz, "Power and Personality: The Appeal to the 'Right Man' in Democratic States," *ibid.,* pp. 84–107; Willmoore Kendall, "Comment on McCloskey's Conservatism and Personality," *ibid.,* pp. 506–10.

2. Clinton Rossiter, *Conservatism in America* (1955). See the significant review of this work by Gerhart Niemeyer, *Journal of Public Law* (Emory University), IV (Fall, 1955), 441 ff.

3. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology," *American Political Science Review,* LI (June, 1957), 454–73, for a development of such a point of view.

4. Bernard L. Kronick has said: "Natural conservatism is both the result of habit and the product of fear. Thus it is the psychological basis of all other conservatism. Many kinds of fear are present in conservatism" (see "Conservatism: A Definition," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly,* XXVIII [September, 1947], 171–79, 173).

5. Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, "The New Conservatism in Europe," *Southwest Review,* Winter, 1955, p. 2. M. M. Auerbach, *The Conservative Illusion* (1959), may be consulted on the philosophical issue in the criticism of conservatism.

6. See Edward Gargan, "The Ultimate Service of History," *Critic,* XVI (June-July, 1958), 7–8.

7. See *Modern Age,* Vol. II (Summer, 1958), for a discussion of the social theory of Otto von Hapsburg who illustrates some of the current theories of the reform of the social order.

8. From the Greek criticisms of democracy to the present, some conservatives have had distrust of the extreme forms of populistic politics: democratic mass movements can easily become despotic. See Amaury de Riencourt, *The Coming Caesars* (1957); R. H. Luthin, *American Demagogues* (1954); Donald R. Richberg, *Labor Union Monopoly: A Clear and Present Danger* (1957).

9. On tradition see Josef Pieper, "The Concept of Tradition," *Review of Politics,* XX (October, 1958), 465–91. On p. 490 he notes tradition is both resistance and incentive at the same time.

10. R. A. Butler (ed.), *The New Conservatism: An Anthology of Post-war Thought* (1955), p. 85.

11. A great range of literature might be cited but the following may suffice: Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind* (1953); *A Program for Conservatives* (1954); *Beyond the Dreams of Avarice* (1956); Peter Viereck, *Conservatism Revisited* (1949); *Conservatism from John Adams to Churchill* (1956); F. G. Wilson, *The Case for Conservatism* (1951); "A Theory of Conservatism," *American Political Science Review,* XXXV (1941), 29 ff.; Daniel Bell (ed.), *The New American Right* (1955); Walter Lippmann, *Essays in the Public Philosophy* (1955); Daniel Boorstin, *The Genius of American Politics* (1953); Ludwig Freund, "The New American Conservatism and European Conservatism," *Ethics,* LXVI (October, 1955), 10 ff.; W. M. McGovern and D. S. Collier, *Radicals and Conservatives* (1957); W. M. Chamberlin, *The Evolution of a Conservative* (1959).

12. See Niemeyer's review of Rossiter, *Conservatism in America,* in *Journal of Public Law* (Emory University Law School), IV (Fall, 1955), 443.

13. Consult Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (Abridgment, 1947), pp. 217 ff., for his discussion of the "withdrawal and return" of the creative personality. Cf. E. V. Walter, "The Political Sense of Ford Maddox Ford," *New Republic,* March 26, 1956, pp. 17–19: "In the aristocratic imagination, there are four royal roads to the sublime life: the saintly, the wise, the heroic and the bucolic."

14. See Eric Voegelin, *Israel and Revelation* (1956), *passim.* The theistic conservatism of John H. Hallowell, *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought* (1950) and *The Moral Foundations of Democracy* (1954) is a significant contribution to American conservative thinking.

15. This analogy is present at the end of the "Review and Conclusion" of the *Leviathan.*

16. Karl W. Deutsch, "On Communication Models in the Social Sciences," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* XVI (Fall, 1952), 356 ff.

17. Freund, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

18. Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 454.

19. Voegelin has said: "In Protagoras appears, for the first time, the type of thinker who is a skeptic, or agnostic, with regard to transcendent reality and, at the same time, a conservative with regard to historical order." For further illustrations he mentions Pyrrho toward the end of the fourth century and Montaigne, Bayle, and Hume in post-Reformation times. Voegelin regards the position unstable, to be maintained only if "the theoretical question of validity and its source will not be raised" (Eric Voegelin, *Order and History,* Vol. II: *The World of the Polis* [1957], p. 308).

20. See T. S. Eliot, *After Strange Gods: A Primer of Modern Heresy* (1934).

21. See Robert J. Harris, *Journal of Politics,* XX (February, 1958), 232, in a review of Jackson Kilpatrick, *The Sovereign States* (1957).

22. *Microcosmographia Academica, Being a Guide for the Young Academic Politician* (5th ed., 1953), p. 4.

23. See Rafael Calvo Serer, *Política de integración* (1955); *Theoría de la restauración* (2d ed., 1955).

24. (1) Raymond Aron, "Espoir et peur du siècle," *Western World,* No. 7 (November, 1957); Réné Rémond, *La Droite en France de 1815 à nos jours* (1954). Rémond shows that the right itself is a microcosm in which diverse traditions and diverse ideologies cross and enter into combat. Thomas Molnar, "French Conservative Thought Today," *Modern Age,* III (Summer, 1959), 283–98, has made an excellent statement of the positions to be found among French conservatives.

25. See Ferruccio Pergolessi, "Notas sobre la 'ciencia politica' de Gaetano Mosca," *Revista de estudios politicos,* LXXXIX September–October, 1956), 83–84, summarizing Mosca's *Storia delle dottrine politische* (1st ed., 1933). Pergolessi's long article is a remarkably complete study of Mosca, both in idea and in bibliography.

26. Freund, *op. cit.*, p. 16. Since World War II the Christian Democrats in France have believed in the neo-Thomist theory of man and society. They have had a "long-range desire to reconcile the church and the Enlightenment" and to cure the division that has prevailed since 1789. In addition the "reconciliation" would be based on a peaceful replacement of the capitalist economy "with a system based on the private ownership and the public management of property." Also some form of pluralism should be attained in which there would be a decentralized social order and a recognition of group rights. Each person should be free to associate himself with groups having a philosophy acceptable to his view of life. See Willard Ross Yates, "Power, Principle, and the Doctrine of the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire,*" *The American Political Science Review,* LII (June, 1958), 421.

27. Niemeyer, *op. cit.*, p. 444.

28. Kuehnelt-Leddihn, *op. cit.*, p. 9.