

tion to the legal aspects of the subject. Beginning with the impression that American civil liberties were in parlous condition, Professor Roche was soon convinced by the facts that, on the contrary, "never since the foundation of the Republic has there been such a concern for the basic principles of decency and civility in intergroup relations as we know today." (P. ix.) He traces the story of human relations from the turn of the century to today. The First World War "led to an ignoble and disgraceful defacement of American ideals"; "the American dream had become a nightmare." (P. 49.) F.D.R.'s liberalism was somewhat inchoate and almost wholly lacking in an ideology, yet its net effect on liberty was positive. During the same period, Huey Long, Father Coughlin, "Tom-Tom" Heflin, and others of the "Yahoos" raised a frightening threat to liberty, but in the end they were contained. Although the Second World War itself showed in almost every respect a heartening contrast to its predecessor as far as civil liberties were concerned, it was, in due course, followed by a powerful attack upon liberty and decency. Again the Yahoos failed. Here Roche makes one of his few forays into speculative theory. "Freedom in our urban society, by a curious paradox," he concludes, "is sustained by the very impersonalization of city life and of the development of legal and political institutions which have muffled interpersonal and intergroup conflicts among people necessarily living at very close quarters with each other." "Ironically," he continues, "the collapse of that sense of community so highly esteemed by nostalgic sociologists seems to have created a new atmosphere of liberty and procedural due process for the nonconformist, who no longer finds himself perpetually in face-to-face relationships with his neighbors or subjugated to the coercive power of the 'group'—whether it be the rural parish or the ethnic ghetto of fifty years ago." (P. 232)

The last quotation from Professor Roche's excellent volume provides a good starting point for discussion of Professor Newman's briefer study of liberalism's "retreat from politics." While generally he impresses his own organization and analysis on the material, Newman devotes himself extensively to an interpretive account of the ideas of such writers—most of them sociologists—as Hannah Arendt, David Riesman, C. Wright Mills, Robert Heilbroner, and Paul Goodman. While Roche is concerned primarily with those specific liberties we know as "civil," Newman almost completely ignores this important aspect of liberalism. If Roche can be chided for interlarding his factual recital with too little theorizing, Newman's speculation (and that of the authors he treats) far too often loses touch with the facts. Half-truths and unsupported generaliza-

tions abound; and all too frequently contrary propositions seem equally plausible.

Two features of *Liberalism and the Retreat from Politics* frustrate this reviewer. One is that almost every page invites dispute. The other is that it is difficult to know when the author is adopting or approving the ideas of those whom he discusses. One gets the impression throughout most of the volume that Newman agrees that freedom is declining (cf. Roche to the contrary); that we have lost the sense that we can control our lives (except as we can withdraw into an inner world of privacy), but that our frustrations come not so much from any identifiable individuals, groups, or organizations as from a nebulous "system," or "power structure." Liberals are caught between the "upper world of bureaucratic insolence," and "the lower world of anarchic freedom" peopled by the direct-actionists. "The tragedy of the loss of society," and here Newman clearly seems to be speaking for himself, "lies precisely in the gulf between the official liberal in the White House, trapped into isolation by the system" and the vital energies and aspirations of the real heroes of America, the Marchers, with which he is out of touch. (P. 114.) Moreover, Newman himself feels frustrated by our politics of accommodation. One gets the picture of an "angry young man" frustrated because his anger is "accommodated."

Perhaps these reactions are unfair. The author concludes on a note of modest optimism that seems to belie much of what has gone before. In the concluding chapter, where it appears, rather to the reader's surprise, that his academic heroes are men like Key and Schattschneider, it appears that the liberal has a role to play in public life after all. Here, under the name of "flexibility," the author praises a feature of our political system that sounds remarkably like the "accommodation" earlier decried. Here, too, his earlier concerns about the power structure and the "system" inexplicably fade from view. More hard thought and careful expression would have made this book much sounder—but also less provocative.—J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College*.

*Nicholas of Cusa and Medieval Political Thought.*  
By PAUL E. SIGMUND. (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963. Pp. xii, 335. \$6.95.)

*The Political Ideas of Nicholas of Cusa with Special Reference to His De Concordantia Catholica.* By MORIMICHI WATANABE. (Genève, Suisse, Librairie Droz. Travaux d'Humanisme et Renaissance, Vol. LVIII. 1963. Pp. 215.)

We have here two volumes which continue the distinguished modern inquiry into political theory in the middle ages. Here especially is the

impact of Renaissance thought on Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), a notable Catholic leader of the XV century. While the two volumes cover much the same ground, there are significant differences. Sigmund is concerned with the philosophical background of ideas in Cusa's work, while Watanabe presents with effectiveness the historical background of each of the problems he discusses. In this sense, these two books are supplementary. In addition, it would seem that in style Watanabe has the edge over Sigmund, though clearly it must be difficult to write engagingly about the German Cardinal, Nicholas of Cusa. I would argue that Watanabe shows more sensitivity than Sigmund to the niceties of Catholic philosophy and doctrine, but in both works one misses the explication for the time of some notable concepts in the apparatus of Catholic apologetics. Such ideas as natural law, indirect power, designation theory, divine right, and the exact nature of the higher dignity of spiritual power are not discussed with lucidity in either of these works, though there seems to be more sense of the meaning of medieval law in Watanabe than in Sigmund.

Another difference is of significance. Sigmund relies almost entirely on German scholarship, with little reference to the work done in, for example, the Latin countries. Watanabe uses much of the same material, but the influence of Anglo-American writing in the field of medieval and Renaissance political thinking is more clearly perceptible. On p. 85, for instance, Sigmund makes reference in a footnote to the work of Father John Courtney Murray on John of Paris, but he does not explain what is there argued. If he had he might, indeed, have been forced to alter the treatment of John of Paris, including his emphasis on indirect power and jurisdiction *per accidens*. Considering the various interpretations of John of Paris it might have been well, at least in footnotes, to have explained something of the dynamism of John of Paris scholarship.

*De Concordantia Catholica* is often considered the most important work in political theory between Marsilius of Padua and Machiavelli. It would rank above Cusa's philosophical work, especially *De Docta Ignorantia*. The first work is distinguished for its defense of the General Council of the Church, and particularly the Council of Basel, to which he presented his *De Concordantia*, probably in 1433. The Council of Constance had cured schism in the Church, but the Council of Basel degenerated into an attempt to create another schism. Such a degeneration led Cusa to become a supporter of the Pope against the Council, and it explains why there have been so few Councils in the succeeding centuries. Cusa's general position is argued in philosophical

terms in his later work. Political thinkers have stressed Cusa's use of the ideas of consent and representation, and the principle of the organic analogy (quite common, of course, in medieval thought). Latterly, the emphasis on Cusa's work has been on neo-Platonic thinking, that is, hierarchical and analogical ideas in making comparisons between the divine economy, the government of the Church, and the government of the Empire. But while this exploration, in Sigmund in detail, is impressive, neither writer discusses the extensive modern scholarship which has been bringing Plato and Aristotle together and which would argue that as much of Plato remained in Aristotle, the resurgence of Platonism in the Renaissance was more a matter of emphasis than of contradiction. Of course, it can well be argued that the Pseudo-Dionysius, or Dionysius the Areopagite, was neither Plato nor Aristotle.

The discussion of consent and representation in these two volumes is of especial importance. Any student of modern theory and practice of representation might well start with the problem of virtual or figured representation in the conciliar movement of the XV century. Ideas such as customary law, tacit consent, *quod omnes tangit*, all become involved. It is clear that medieval ideas of consent and representation, even in advanced conciliar theory, do not equate with a purely behavioristic and modern interpretation of representation. Our modern practice of imputing a representative quality, say to the Constitution or to the judges of the Supreme Court, has the qualitative aspect of much conciliar theory. Or, even the Pope as representative of the Church, or the Cardinals or Patriarchs, or the Council, may be viewed as St. Augustine suggested the "figure" of the Church. But the analogy might go further, since the Council descended into disorder, in which no guidance of the Holy Spirit could be claimed. So in modern representation, parliamentary life has receded before the necessity of the virtual or figured representation of the "head of state," or even of the President of the United States.

In medieval study, more than in most, it is easy to say too little or too much. To argue that the spiritual power is superior to the temporal does not argue in any sense that the Church should exercise temporal authority (except perhaps in papal territory and in other quite special circumstances). To argue that the emperor has his power directly from God does not suggest that he is exempt from ecclesiastical censure because of sin. To argue for the spiritual *plenitudo potestatis* does not argue in itself that temporal jurisdiction is a subdivision of the papal curia. The relation of the spiritual and the temporal is at all times a complicated issue, and at no time was it more com-

plicated than in the divergent currents of thought of XV century Canon Law and philosophy. Furthermore, each of these various ideas has a long history; these authors might well have discussed the vote in favor of collegiality in the present Vatican Council as a continuation of some conciliar notions, as well as more ancient arguments about the nature of the power of the Bishop of Rome.

But whatever qualification one may make in the controversies over medieval thought, we have here two able books, both of which represent an enormous amount of study and patience. We are indebted to both Sigmund and Watanabe and to their publishers. Sigmund gives us lessons in philosophy which, no doubt, the contemporary political theorist always needs, and Watanabe gives us historical information condensed from extensive sources. But both authors would say clearly that their studies were not possible without the immense amount of modern scholarship which has been devoted to medieval thought and

to Nicholas of Cusa.—FRANCIS G. WILSON, *University of Illinois*.

*An Introduction to the Social Sciences*. BY MAURICE DUVERGER, TRANSLATED BY MALCOLM ANDERSON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 342. Cloth, \$7.50; paper, \$2.95.)

M. Duverger's highly compressed description of some leading techniques used in the contemporary social sciences is intended mainly as a textbook.

*Sources of Information in the Social Sciences*. BY CARL M. WHITE AND ASSOCIATES. (Totawa, N. J.: The Bedminster Press, 1964. Pp. x. 498. \$10.50.)

Brief reviews of the principal sub-fields of history, economics, sociology, anthropology, psychology, education, and political science, with a listing of the reviewer's choice of the leading works in each. Heinz Eulau wrote the section on political science.

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